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This study sought to investigate the strategy options for regional economic resilience in the face 
of industrial decline in Bulawayo Metropolitan Province in Zimbabwe. Bulawayo has been going 
through a protracted period of crippling industrial decline. Using the economic resilience concept 
and theories of regional development, the study analysed the different factors behind industrial 
decline, firm resilience strategies, policy strategy options for firm and economic resilience, 
strategy options for economic resilience in Bulawayo, and the conceptualisation of economic 
resilience in cities in the Global South whilst drawing lessons from the study area. The study 
utilised mixed methods. The positivist and interpretivist philosophies were both adopted to 
achieve a detailed understanding of economic resilience. Data was collected from 392 
industrialists operating in Bulawayo through questionnaires and observations. Eight key 
informant interviews were also conducted. Data was analysed through chi-square analyses, 
Fisher’s exact tests, trend analyses, regression analyses, content analyses, and descriptive 
statistics.  
The study found that, a prolonged period of industrial decline has ‘locked-in’ the economy of 
Bulawayo in a path of economic decline that has altered the structure of the economy. The city is 
now dominated by micro, small, and medium enterprises constituting approximately 90% of the 
total number of firms. However, small firms were found to be more resilient, compared to large 
firms. The study also found that firm resilience, coupled with economic diversification, firm 
linkages, and regional patriotism are some of the important determinants of economic resilience 
in Bulawayo. It was also found that measuring and analysing economic resilience in cities in the 
Global South, such as Bulawayo, is marred by low quality and the dearth of data. Accordingly, 
the study recommends a long-term investment in the creation of quality datasets required for the 
analysis of economic resilience and for regional policymaking. A clear separation between 
national and regional policies in Zimbabwe is also recommended. This would encourage the 
formulation of policies that address unique and region-specific economic challenges. Finally, the 
study recommends complementary linkages between formal and informal firms as a precursor to 
unlock dead capital trapped in the informal sector. Unlocking capital would address the dire need 
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for funds to stimulate firm growth and economic development in Bulawayo Metropolitan 
Province. 
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Die studie doen ondersoek na strategie opsies vir ekoniese herstel en voortgesette nywerheids 
groei in die metropolitaanse streek van Bulawayo met die oog daarop om ‘n einde te bring aan 
die voortslepende gebrek aan nywerheidsgroei in die stad. Die studie maak gebruik van die 
konsep van voortgesette ekonomiese herlewing en teorieё van streekontwikkeling om enersyds 
die faktore wat gelei het tot die historiese nywerheidsagteruitgang van die Bulawayo 
metropolitaanse streek te indentifiseer, en andersyds strategieё vir besigheids herlewing en 
strategiese beleidsopsies vir nywerheids- en ekonomiese herlewing te vind wat ook wyer 
bruikbaar mag wees in die Ontwikkelende Wêreld. Die studie maak gebruik van ‘n gemengde-
metode benadering. Beide posivistiese (kwantitatiewe) en interpretivistiese (kwalitatiewe) 
filosifiese benaderings word gebruik om ‘n gedetailleerde begrip van ekonomiese venuwing en 
voortsetting in die studiegebied te weeg te bring. Deur middel van vraagbriewe en waarneming is 
data van 392 industrialiste wat nog in die Bulawayo metropolis opereer, versamel. Dit sluit agt 
sleutel onderhoude in. Data is ontleed deur bebruik te maak van die metodes van Chi-
kwadraattoetsing, Fisher se presiesheidstoetsing, neigingontleding, inhoudanalise en 
beskrywende statistieke.  
 
Daar is gevind dat ‘n langdurige periode van nywerheidsagteruitgang die ekonomiese 
vooruitgang van Bulawayo belemmer het. Dit het die struktuur van die ekonomie van Bulawayo 
verander. Die stad word nou gedomineer deur mikro-, klein- en middelgrootte ondernemings wat 
ongeveer 90% van die totaal vorm. Tog is daar gevind dat klein ondernemings meer 
deursettingsvermoё besit as groot ondernemings. Voortgesette groei van ondernemings gekoppel 
aan ekonomiese diversifikasie, skakelingseffekte en streek patriotisme is van die bepalende 
faktore wat die herstel en voortgesette groei van die ekonomie van Bulawayo sal verseker. Daar 
is ook gevind dat die meting en ontleding van ekonomiese herstel en groei van stede soos 
Bulawayo, wat tipes van stede in die Ontwikkelende Wereld is, gebrek gaan aan goeie kwaliteit 
en selfs ontbrekende data. Gevolglik doen die studie aan die hand dat ‘n langtermyn belegging 
gemaak word in die skepping van kwaliteit datastelle wat geskik is vir die ontleding van, en 
beleidsformulering vir volgehoue ekonomiese herstel en groei. ‘n Duidelike skeiding tussen 
nasionale and streekbeleid work ook vir Zimbabwe voorgestel. Die doel daarmee is om beleid 
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daar te stel wat streek-spesifieke uitdagings die hoof kan bied. Ten slotte stel die studie voor dat 
onderling ondersteunende skakelingseffekte tussen formele and informele ondernemings as ‘n 
vereiste gestel word om dooie kapitaal in die informele sektor te ontsluit. Daar is ‘n groot 
behoefte aan kapitaal in die stad vir ondernemingsontwikkeling en -groei. 
Trefwoorde en-frases: Agglomerasie-ekonomieë, stad mededingendheid, industriële 
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CHAPTER 1: SETTING THE CONTEXT - PROMOTING ECONOMIC 
RESILIENCE IN DECLINING REGIONS 
 
“Economic resilience has become imperative especially in the developing world, where most 




This chapter lays the foundation of the whole thesis that aims to investigate the strategy options 
for regional economic resilience in the face of industrial decline in Bulawayo Metropolitan 
Province (BMP). The chapter commences by locating the study in the regional economic 
resilience literature at regional, national, and city levels, respectively. This leads to the rationale 
of the study and the illumination on the problem statement. Linked to the problem statement is 
an outline of the aim and objectives guiding this study. The chapter is concluded by a historical 
account of the study area and a chapter outline summarising the contents of the whole thesis. 
 
1.2 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
 
Escalating global inequalities have become rampant, with the rich industrialised countries 
(Global North) emerging economically strong and stable whilst poor countries (Global South) 
have continued to experience increasing instability and economic stagnation. Consequently, 
pressure has increased on poor countries to improve economic growth and development (Briscoe 
2008). However, an attempt to replicate the development strategies utilised by industrialised 
countries is inappropriate as the development contexts present remarkable differences. In the 
Global North, industrial development, research and development, and critical innovation 
thinking have been in existence for many decades, if not centuries (Henley & Van Donge 2013). 
The same cannot be said about the Global South. Most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
for example, are characterised by low investment and capital formation, minimum technological 




trade (Sampath 2014). Notwithstanding their differences, the South can benefit from importing 
and adapting technology from the North. The focus in this study is on a country in the South, 
specifically SSA. However, lessons are drawn from the development experiences in Asia, Latin 
America, and where necessary also the North. 
 
A clear divergence in the development patterns can be noticed among different regions in the 
South. While sustained and accelerated economic growth is experienced in regions such as 
Southeast Asia, SSA on the other hand, presents a pattern of instability and stagnation (Henley & 
Van Donge 2013) as shown in Figure 1.1.  
 
 
                     Source: Henley and Van Donge (2013: 29). 
Figure 1.1 GDP per capita growth in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-2008 
 
The growth patterns shown in Figure 1.1 can be explained by the changes in the international 
division of labour that resulted in the movement of production processes to areas where 
conditions are most favourable for production (Geyer 2006). The changes involved labour-
intensive production systems that were slowly being phased out in the North, whilst being 




supply (Geyer 2006). The relocation of high-mass production plants from the North to the South 
improved economic growth in Asia through increased production. Thus, the faster pace of 
economic growth in Southeast Asia (popularly known as the Asian Miracle) resulted in the bulk 
of its exports being manufactured goods (Henley & Van Donge 2013; Tan 2014). In comparison, 
little is manufactured in SSA that is sold on the global market (Henley & Van Donge 2013). 
These notable differences between regions in the South justify the study of economic resilience 
in SSA.  
 
Enhancing economic resilience in declining regions has become more important now than ever 
before, especially with the integration of African cities in a global capitalist system. 
Globalisation has exposed economies in the South to outside influence, which in turn has bearing 
on their development conditions (Zaaijer 1998; Geyer 2006). This has seen economic activities, 
especially in SSA, facing stiff competition from industries in the North and in other regions in 
the South. Thus, for industries to survive global competition, there is now the need for stronger 
manufacturing and marketing capabilities (Geyer 2006). These capabilities seem to be missing in 
SSA. The failure of companies and industries to compete internationally has resulted in declining 
industries especially in Zimbabwe’s struggling metropolitan economies. To address the lagging 
behind of SSA, strategy options for economic growth and development are required to assist the 
region to catch-up with others in the South, especially those in Southeast Asia that are 
performing economically well.  
 
Towards the end of colonialism SSA and Southeast Asia, were on the world’s economic 
periphery. Both regions had predominantly rural, subsistence-oriented economies characterised 
by the export of primary agricultural products (Henley & Van Donge 2013). However, this was 
followed by the Southeast Asian economies experiencing major developments, including a rapid 
process of foreign trade liberalisation and a consequent high rate of foreign direct investment 
(Briguglio & Piccinino 2012), thereby leaving SSA behind. Consequently, most African cities 
lack large-scale industrialisation (Geyer 2006). This alienation of Africa (with the exception of 
countries such as South Africa) from the modern industrial society can be attributed to 




such as poor national politics cannot be overlooked, especially in the case of Zimbabwe. Thus, 
years after colonialism, many African cities are now characterised by vacant, abandoned and 
dilapidated industrial structures and the proliferation of informality. This has become a 
permanent feature of African cities (Geyer 2006; Mutami & Gambe 2015). Accordingly, critical 
thinking is needed in order to come up with strategy options for economic resilience in 
metropolises, especially those in SSA. 
 
Building economic resilience in African countries, especially those classified by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (2015) as fragile states, is vital for their economic wellbeing. Fragile 
states are countries characterised by failure to deliver basic services to their citizens and that 
experience entrenched hindrances to both economic and human development (IMF 2015). These 
are poor African countries that are finding it difficult to achieve meaningful and stable economic 
growth. However, extractive industries in Africa provide an opportunity for resilient economic 
growth and development, especially in countries endowed with natural resources. As highlighted 
in Figure 1.2, extractive industries earned Africa the highest percentage (44%) of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) during the period 2003 to 2010 (Ernst & Young 2011).  
                                                                                                                                          
 
Source: Adapted from Ernst & Young (2011: 4) 




The FDI statistics in Figure 1.2 suggest that concentrating on building and reinvigorating 
extractive industries is a possible route towards achieving economic growth. What is worrying is 
that economic growth in Zimbabwe has remained depressed in spite of the country’s vast natural 
resource endowments. The economy has instead regressed. This makes the current study 
imperative as it contributes to the debate on how Zimbabwe’s fortunes can be turned around. 
 
In Zimbabwe, regional economic disparities are widespread, and have been partly attributed to 
the country’s colonial history (Manyanhaire et al. 2009; Munangagwa 2009; Bratton & 
Masunungure 2011; Chirisa, Dumba & Dube 2013). However, these imbalances still exist 
although the country gained independence in 1980. This shows that regional disparities are 
indeed an inherent feature of development. As development takes place some regions or places 
are more able to attract capital and labour than others, causing differential growth patterns that 
result in regional disparities. The efforts to address these imbalances resulted in the development 
of growth points across Zimbabwe’s 10 provinces (Manyanhaire et al. 2009). These centres were 
expected to benefit the surrounding rural areas through a process of cumulative causation 
(Myrdal 1957). However, some centres did not manage to grow and develop economically. 
 
Industrial agglomeration is frequently regarded as a determinant of regional economic growth in 
Zimbabwe yet, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), & the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
(2016: 326) noted that the country has been experiencing “reverse urbanisation in recent years as 
an economic slowdown hampered opportunities in cities.” As economic decline worsened, some 
urbanites returned to their rural areas to find other sources of survival. Zimbabwe has also 
remained in debt distress and its lack of a diversified export base is worsening its predicament as 
the country is struggling to adjust to changing world demands for tradable goods (AfDB, OECD 
& UNDP 2016). In contrast, the Asian Tigers, as the newly industrialised countries (NICs) in 
Southeast Asia are often referred to, were able to transition from a scenario almost similar to that 
of Zimbabwe, to become manufacturing powerhouses. As such, important lessons for economic 





The majority of big industries in Zimbabwe were traditionally located in Bulawayo, resulting in 
the city being able to significantly contribute to the country’s GDP (Zaaijer 1998: 22). During 
the colonial period, the city was referred to as ‘the Manchester of Rhodesia’ due to its level of 
industrial activity (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2011). However, today most industries have closed 
down, leaving the economy of Bulawayo staggering. The decline of these industries was partly 
due to the removal of trade barriers, which resulted in the industries of Bulawayo facing stiff 
competition from cheaper and better-quality imports from other African countries and from Asia 
(Zaaijer 1998). The adoption of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the mid-1990s 
aggravated the industries’ predicament with the majority of industries experiencing massive 
retrenchments, being placed under provisional liquidation, being delisted from the stock 
exchange, or being closed down (Zaaijer 1998). However, the effect of poor politics in the 
country in terms of policies unfavourable to business development, cutting ties with the 
international community, and rampant corruption and nepotism in government, cannot be 
disregarded. As the industries continued to close down and relocate to other countries, a 
protracted decline of the metropolitan economy was experienced that haemorrhaged the 
surrounding regional economies.  
 
This study seeks to investigate the strategy options for regional economic resilience in the face of 
industrial decline in BMP. The city has been struggling economically due to the closure of its 
major manufacturing industries. Finding and implementing strategies that can revamp the 
economy is of supreme importance as economic resilience of Bulawayo is not only important for 
the surrounding peripheral regions, but also for the resilience of the national economy. 
 
1.3 RATIONALE  
 
Despite a myriad of studies on industrial agglomeration, most have focused on agglomeration 
economies, industrial growth and expansion, and the subsequent influence of industrial 
agglomerations on regional economic growth (Fan & Scot 2003; Polèse 2005; Lin, Shanglang & 
Yong 2014; Stohr 2014; Mukhlis et al. 2017). However, the reality that diseconomies of scale 




deglomeration triggers economic decline as out-migration of capital and labour is set in motion. 
Thus, it is important to prevent further decline in affected regions whilst at the same time 
promoting economic resilience.   
 
Regional economic resilience is still a fairly new concept. Despite the ground covered so far in 
literature, there is still need for further exploration and discussion of this concept, both in science 
and practice (Tóth 2015). Emanating from this, the current study is expected to contribute to 
regional economic-resilience literature, both theoretically and empirically. In particular this study 
addresses how industrial decline affects the economic resilience of a metropolitan city in the 
Global South and the subsequent promotion of economic resilience in regions experiencing 
industrial decline. Findings of this study provide an empirical base for enhancing economic 
resilience in metropolitan cities experiencing industrial decline in regions categorised by IMF 
(2015) as fragile states. 
 
The majority of studies undertaken in regional economic resilience focus on the North, 
particularly on the European and North American economies (Wink 2012; Breathnach, Van 
Egeraat & Curran 2014; Royal Town Planning Institute 2014; Simmie 2014; Williams & Vorley 
2014; Han & Goetz 2015; Brooks, Vorley & Williams 2016; Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016; 
Bristow & Healy 2018). The scarcity of studies interrogating economic resilience, especially on 
the African context, justifies this particular study that focuses on a country in SSA. Due 
cognisance is given to how changing contexts matter. Despite the periodic occurrence of 
economic shocks in metropolitan economies, Hill et al. (2011: 1) noted that, “the effect that … 
shocks have varies from region to region as does the region’s adjustment and recovery to them.” 
As such, the current study assesses BMP’s reaction and adjustment to shocks, and its prospects 
for economic recovery.  
 
The study focuses on both formal and informal sectors. This is vital in conceptualising and 
analysing economic resilience in SSA, a region that is characterised by high unemployment that 
has pushed the majority of the economically active population to operate in informal sectors. As 




the integration of formal and informal urban sectors provides prospects for better economic 
growth in these cities. The inclusion of the informal sector in the search for economic resilience 
strategies in SSA is expected to produce new insights and empirical evidence that will improve 
and add to the existing body of knowledge. 
 
1.4 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
  
Many studies on the conceptualisation, measurement, and analysis of economic resilience in 
different regions have been conducted, albeit in the North (Wink 2012; Breathnach, Van Egeraat 
& Curran 2014; Simmie 2014; Williams & Vorley 2014; Han & Goetz 2015; Brooks, Vorley & 
Williams 2016; Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016; Bristow & Healy 2018). Yet, little is understood 
of how economic resilience can be conceptualised and promoted in declining metropolitan 
regions in the Global South (especially in Africa),  both theoretically and empirically. This study 
seeks to investigate strategy options for economic resilience in the face of industrial decline and 
displacement in Bulawayo Metropolitan Province. Unless this study is done, the concept of 
economic resilience will continue to be perceived in the context of the North – which is very 
different from the African context. Apart from that, continuous industrial displacements or the 
evaporation and out-migration of inhabitants from Bulawayo, will aggravate the economic 
instability of this already-struggling metropolitan province.  
 
1.5 AIM OF THE STUDY 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the strategy options for economic resilience in the face of 
industrial decline in Bulawayo Metropolitan Province. 
 
1.5.1 Study objectives 
 
Using Zimbabwe and Bulawayo Metropolitan Province as particular examples, specific 




1) Evaluate the effects of industrial decline on the economy of Bulawayo Metropolitan 
Province;  
2) Assess the resilient strategies employed by firms in Bulawayo to overcome their 
operational challenges;  
3) Examine how economic and industrial policies in Zimbabwe should be formulated in 
order to promote economic resilience of metropolitan regions in the country with the 
impetus to propose strategies that improve policymaking;  
4) Explore how the economy of Bulawayo can be revitalised in order to attract meaningful 
investment and enhance competitiveness on a global scale, thus, what should be done to 
enhance economic resilience in the metropolis; and, 
5) Redefine the concept of economic resilience in light of the African development setting 
whilst highlighting how it is similar or dissimilar to its conceptualisation in other parts of 
the world. 
 
1.5.2 Major research question 
 
What are the strategies that can be adopted to promote economic resilience in Bulawayo, a 
metropolitan city in the Global South, which is experiencing industrial decline and 
displacement? 
 
The specific sub-research questions are: 
 
1) What are the effects of industrial decline on the economy of Bulawayo Metropolitan 
Province?  
2) What are the resilient strategies adopted by firms in Bulawayo to overcome their 
operational challenges?  
3) What are the improvements required in economic and industrial policymaking in 
Zimbabwe for policies to promote economic resilience of metropolitan regions?  
4) What are the strategy options for economic revitalisation and the promotion of economic 




5) In what way is the conceptualisation of economic resilience in the African development 
setting comparable to other parts of the world? 
 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The current study is one of a few that focuses on regional economic resilience in the Global 
South, specifically Southern Africa. The majority of literature studies focus mainly on developed 
regions, especially Europe (Aiginger 2009; Simmie & Martin 2010; Martin 2012; Wink 2012; 
Breathnach, Van Egeraat & Curran 2014; Royal Town Planning Institute 2014; Simmie 2014; 
Williams & Vorley 2014; Martin, Sunley & Tyler 2015; Brooks, Vorley & Williams 2016; 
Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016; Bristow & Healy 2018) and North America (Hill et al. 2011; 
Han & Goetz 2015). The region-based approach to economic resilience is noble because, despite 
the periodic occurrence of economic shocks in metropolitan economies, their effects vary from 
one region to another and so does the ability of regions to adjust and recover from them (Hill et 
al. 2011). This is consistent with Han & Goetz (2015: 131) who observed that, “[l]evels of 
economic resilience also vary across regions.” Thus, since the majority of economic resilience 
studies mainly focus on the regions in the Global North, it is vital that an African perspective be 
added in the resilience debate, thereby filling shortcomings of existing literature. Besides, factors 
characterising the location of regions have the ability to affect the region’s adaptability (Simmie, 
2014). New knowledge is expected to be generated in this study. 
 
Progress has been made in the North concerning the conceptualisation of resilience. Three major 
strands are worth noting. The first one indicates that resilience as a concept, is elusive and that 
no generally agreeable definition of the concept exists (Hill, Wial & Wolman 2008; Simmie & 
Martin 2010; Hill et al 2011; Martin 2012; Breathnach, Van Egeraat & Curran 2014; Simmie 
2014; Martin, Sunley & Tyler 2015; Tóth 2015). As an example, Simmie & Martin (2010: 28) 
note that, there is “no universally agreed definition of resilience in economics or social science, 
let alone in regional or urban studies.” In support, Hill et al. (2011: 1) indicate that: “Economic 
resilience is a concept that is frequently used but rarely well defined.” This study therefore seeks 




application in Southern Africa. Apart from that, the study contributes to existing literature as 
studies focusing on economic resilience are scarce (Hill, Wial & Wolman 2008; Hill et al. 2011). 
The study proposes a model for analysing economic resilience in metropolitan cities in the 
South, specifically Zimbabwe.  
 
The second strand concerns the different perspectives of resilience. Accordingly, resilience can 
be perceived under the engineering perspective (Simmie & Martin 2010; Martin 2012; Wink 
2012; Han & Goetz 2015), ecological perspective (Simmie & Martin 2010; Martin 2012), and 
economic perspective (Simmie & Martin 2010; Martin 2012; Simmie 2014; Sensier, Bristow & 
Healy 2016). Only the economic perspective is adopted in analysing economic systems in 
Bulawayo. The other two perspectives are considered not to be applicable to this study area. 
Economic systems rarely assimilate materials and biological organisms in terms of behaviour. 
Thus, it is difficult to use concepts in physics and ecology to study the behaviour of economic 
systems (Simmie & Martin 2010; Martin 2012).  
 
The third strand is about measuring economic resilience. Although there are no agreed indicators 
to measure the concept, research in the North proved the efficacy of quantitative indicators such 
as GDP per capita (Wink 2012; Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016), employment levels (Wink 
2012; Breathnach, Van Egeraat & Curran 2015; Han & Goetz 2015; Sensier, Bristow & Healy 
2016), and regional production levels (Wink 2012). Qualitative indicators such as policy reviews 
have also been used to measure regional economic resilience (Brooks, Vorley & Williams 2016). 
These indicators are also applicable in the South. However, in Bulawayo, the dearth of data 
restricted quantitative indicators to that of employment levels. The policy reviews that were done 
focused only on policies relevant to the study.  
 
The findings of this study are believed to be important to regional development policymakers in 
government. Research findings call for a set of considerations that can be adopted in the 
formulation and implementation of economic development strategies for regions (Tóth 2015). 
With this study, it is expected that there will be a push for a policy agenda in Zimbabwe that 




is vital because long-term, reliable, and consistent policies are necessary in the attempt to 
revitalise growth in lagging regions (Simmie 2014). Besides, long-term policies that consistently 
support innovation, are regarded as an economic ‘turn-around’ strategy, especially in Zimbabwe. 
Accordingly, this study is considered relevant as it analyses and proposes strategies that can be 
adopted to resuscitate the economy in BMP and enhance its resilience. The study also generates 
knowledge on the current state of industrial infrastructure and its suitability to deliver the 
economic needs of the metropolis. 
 
It is believed that this study is beneficial to Bulawayo Metropolitan Municipality, as it explains 
the drivers of regional economic decline in BMP and proposes strategies to restore the city’s 
economic competitiveness while enhancing its economic resilience. Since regional economies 
have different degrees of resilience to recession (Martin 2012), it is important that these 
differences be explained. Emanating from this, it is necessary to explain why some industries 
have closed down, why some migrated from BMP, and others managed to remain operational. It 
must also be explained what the impact of shifts in industrial competition on the economy of 
BMP has been, and how changes in government policies may have aggravated industrial decline 
in the metropolitan city. Attempted responses to these questions are presented and analysed in 
this study. 
 
1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
It is imperative to mark and emphasise conceptual and physical boundaries of the study so as to 
properly direct its progression from beginning to the end. 
 
1.7.1 Conceptual scope 
 
The study is broadly guided by the concept of resilience. This has been applied in physical, 
engineering, and ecological sciences for some time before it was recently adopted into 




Martin (2012: 1) argues that, “it is only very recently that [resilience] has attracted attention from 
regional analysts, spatial economists and economic geographers.” As such, this study is mainly 
hinged on economic resilience through the lens of the evolutionary perspective that places the 
adaptive capacity of local economy in the centre of regional economic resilience. The definition 
of resilience is still blemished by a myriad of diverse perceptions (Hill, Wial & Wolman 2008; 
Simmie & Martin 2010; Hill et al. 2011; Martin 2012; Breathnach, Van Egeraat & Curran 2014; 
Simmie 2014; Tóth 2015). A detailed discussion on the diverse perceptions is covered under 
Section 2.2 in Chapter 2. The main focus here is on the perspective informing the current study.  
According to Han & Goetz (2015: 131), “Regional economic resilience [can be] defined as a 
region’s capacity to absorb and resist shocks as well as to recover from them.” Alternatively, 
Simmie & Martin (2010: 28) view resilience as “the ability of a local socio-economic system to 
recover from a shock or disruption.” These definitions inform the understanding of resilience in 
this study. 
 
In agreement with Simmie & Martin (2010) this study views the adaptive capacity of the 
industrial, technological, and institutional structures of BMP as some of the key determinants of 
its economic resilience. Apart from that, ‘path dependence’ as an approach under evolutionary 
resilience, is also utilised to explain economic decline in Bulawayo. Path dependence1 is 
influenced by different factors such as increasing returns, self-reinforcement, positive feedbacks, 
and lock-in effects (Page 2006). The assumption is that policies implemented after independence 
‘locked-in’ the economy in a development trajectory that negatively affected its adaptability to 
various shocks (Simmie & Martin 2010). The explanation of economic resilience in BMP is also 
enriched by analysing the growth and decline of industries in light of agglomeration and 
deglomeration economies, and also the emerging concept of global regionalisation. 
 
On theoretical basis, the study is guided by theories of regional development that include the 
core-periphery theory (CPT), the circular cumulative causation (CCC) theory, unbalanced 
growth theory (UGT), industrial district theory (IDT), new economic geography (NEG), 
                                                 





industrial cluster (IC) theory, and economic base theory (EBT). These theories guide the 
understanding and analysis of the factors driving industrial decline and displacement in BMP. 
Both the CPT and NEG guide the analysis of factors behind industrial decline and deglomeration 
in Bulawayo at national, regional, and global levels. On the other hand, the CCC theory guides 
the understanding of how the closure of industries in BMP may be attributed to negative events 
that either took place or are still taking place in the region.  In addition, the IDT and IC theory 
inform the understanding and analysis of how and why industries concentrated in Bulawayo. The 
theories also underpin the analysis of firm linkages and their potential benefits to the growth and 
resilience of BMP’s economy. The EBT guides the classification of industries and their utility to 
the economy of BMP. The firms are classified as either basic or non-basic industries (full 
discussion in Chapter 2). Finally, UGT informs the analysis of firm linkages and also the level of 
social overhead investments. 
 
Business relocation theories are equally important in this study as they help explain the in- and 
out-migration of firms or industries in BMP and how this may be linked to the current industrial 
decline. The driving forces behind the relocation of firms can be explained in light of neo-
classical, behavioural, and institutional approaches to relocation theories (Pellenbarg, Van 
Wissen & Van Dijk 2002). The interregional movement of firms or industries can be a direct 
response to economic, behavioural, and/or institutional factors. This confirms that the classical, 
behavioural, and institutional approaches help establish the reasons for relocation as these have a 
direct impact on the growth and/or decline of a region’s economy. Finally, the ideas of Dunn 
(2018) on policy analysis steer the understanding and analysis of economic and industrial 
policies implemented in Zimbabwe. 
 
1.7.2 Physical scope 
 
This study focuses on Bulawayo Metropolitan Province, the second largest metropolis in 
Zimbabwe. Within the metropolis, the targeted areas are the industrial areas that are mainly 
occupied by manufacturing industries, the central business district (CBD) that is occupied by 




from these areas, mining centres are also considered to be vital in this study as mining activities 
have the capacity to influence regional cash inflows. Micro, small, and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs) operating in the metropolis are also part of the study. Despite targeting registered 
firms in BMP, the study also includes informal firms in the target group. This is motivated by the 
fact that the informal sector has become increasingly important in African cities where high 
unemployment levels forced the majority of the economically active group into informal trading. 
What makes this study unique is the inclusion of the informal sector in analysing economic 
resilience, as this represents a departure from the typical conceptualisation and analysis of 
economic resilience in the Global North. In light of the differences between the North and South, 
the key terms that are repeatedly utilised in this study are defined in the next section.   
 
1.8 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
 
The key terms are defined in light of their meaning in this study. It is vital to have a common 
understanding of the terms to avoid different conceptualisations. 
 
1.8.1 Global North versus Global South 
 
The classification of countries into Global North (or North) or Global South (or South) is still 
subject to debate. While countries in the North are those that are rich, capitalistic in nature, and 
have successfully undergone the experience of ‘development’, those in the South are 
economically weak, with limited international influence, and are deficient in ‘development’ 
(Harris, Moore & Schmitz 2009). Accordingly, the North has the richest countries with the 
highest per capita income, while the South has the lower-income countries of the world, most of 
which are in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Harris, Moore & Schmitz 2009). 
 
Due to economic development in some countries that used to be classified as low income, 
another group of nations now exists. This group is referred to as newly industrialised countries 




include South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. These are known as the Asian Tigers. 
The North/South divide is vital in this study as economic resilience is studied in the context of 
the Global South, which, in many respects, is unrelated to the North. However, countries in the 
South such as those in Southeast Asia, have managed to achieve remarkable economic growth 
while those especially in SSA have remained stagnant and/or regressed in terms of economic 
development. It is thus clear that there is a need to find strategy options for resilience in the 
lagging regions. 
 
1.8.2 Agglomeration versus deglomeration economies 
 
These terms are direct opposites and need to be dealt with separately in order to exhaust issues 
surrounding each. 
 
1.8.2.1 Agglomeration economies 
 
For the purposes of this study, agglomeration economies are viewed through the lens of Glaeser 
(2010: 1) as, “the benefits that come when firms and people locate near one another together in 
cities and industrial clusters.” These benefits may include reduced transport costs, labour costs, 
and shared technology. However the economies vary from scale economies, to localisation 
economies, to urbanisation economies. 
 
While scale economies take place when there is expansion of the scale of production of a firm in 
a given location, localisation economies accrue when firms in a given industry and given 
location, increase their output (Hoover 1937; Isard 1956). Furthermore Isard (1956) noted that 
the economies usually accrue due to factors such as the exploitation of a common resource pool 
or the collective utilisation of specialised facilities and infrastructure. This can be applicable to 
BMP. The city had the advantages of well-developed industrial infrastructure and facilities. 
Examples include regional transportation links in the form of roads and rail, and also specialised 




Urbanisation economies take place when firms or plants of different nature concentrate in a 
given site so that spatially they are side by side rather than being geographically separated 
(Hoover 1937; Isard 1956; Parr 2002a; 2002b). This results in an enlargement of the economic 
size of a locality or region (Hoover 1937; Isard 1956). The enlargement of the economy in this 
instance involves an increase in population, income, and output as products of a plant in one 
industry are absorbed as inputs in a different industry, located in the same area. It is therefore 
vital to understand the meaning of localisation and urbanisation economies as these are more 
applicable to the declining industrial agglomerations in Bulawayo.  
 
1.8.2.2 Deglomeration economies 
 
The term deglomeration is usually linked with disagglomeration economies. According to Bailey 
(2010: 145), “deglomeration (deconcentration due to technological change or increased costs of 
continued clustering) occurs when too many activities … are too close together.” As a result, the 
agglomeration produces negative effects that include pollution, traffic congestion, and shortages 
of raw materials. In this study deglomeration means, the deconcentration of industries that were 
previously agglomerated in a cluster or district, due to factors such as poor and unfavourable 
national economic policies (that caused a general economic decline and flight of investors), 
strained natural resources that are necessary for production for instance water, and interrupted 
production systems such as regular power outages.  
 
Deglomeration is closely linked to the process of polarisation reversal (PR), which is defined by 
Richardson (1980: 67) as, “the turning point when spatial polarization trends in the national 
economy give way to a process of spatial dispersion out of the core region into other regions of 
the system.” Both deglomeration and PR are vital in explaining the industrial decline and/or 
deconcentration that is taking place in BMP where firms have relocated to other towns or cities 





1.8.3 Industrial clustering 
 
Porter (2000: 16) defines a cluster as, “a geographically proximate group of interconnected 
companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and 
complementarities.” Using this definition, industrial clustering can be seen as the process 
through which interrelated industries locate close to each other in a given geographical location 
over a period of time. Clustering is usually a spontaneous formation rather than an induced one 
(Qing 2012). Once formed, a cluster is expected to evolve, subject to its ability to adapt to 
changing times (Qing 2012).  
 
The process of clustering can produce an industrial cluster and/or an industrial district. In the 
context of this study an industrial district is defined as an extended area within a town or city that 
is occupied or that hosts a sizeable concentration of firms that are interconnected in such a way 
that the benefits of such a concentration accrue to the firms in the given locality. However, an ID 
as propounded by Marshall is not simply a primitive localisation but rather one that lasts long 
enough to become a more compound localisation (Belussi & Caldari 2008). Emanating from this, 
the location of extracting and manufacturing industries used to be mainly caused by climatic 
conditions, a region’s natural resource endowment, and rulers’ preferences on the location of 
production of certain goods, among others (Marshall 1920). However, the location of firms is 
now influenced by factors such as availability of suitable land, low cost of spaces, agglomeration 
effects, personal factors (including locating closer to home), and accessibility to markets 
(Rahman & Kabir 2019).  The definitions of industrial cluster and industrial district adopted in 
this study provide an important distinction of industrial concentrations found in BMP. In 
addition, the definitions provide possible explanations of what triggered the initial industrial 
concentration in the city. 
 
1.8.4 Industrial decline 
 
The definition of the term industrial decline in literature is limited, hence the definition for 




their study of Bulgaria, Spiridonova & Novakova (2005) utilise the term ‘regions of industrial 
decline’ and borrow it from Bulgaria’s Regional Development Act. Accordingly, Spiridonova & 
Novakova (2005: 51) define these regions as those that, “show a severe decline in industrial 
sectors, decreasing production, surging unemployment, and they are facing an economic 
restructuring which brings with it acute social problems.” In this study, the researcher uses 
industrial decline to describe a process whereby industries in a given area or region experience 
an acute reduction in production output usually resulting in low unit sales and monetary inflows 
and/or totally shut down, due to factors outside its direct control. These factors could be the 
melting down of the economy, migration of entrepreneurs to other regions or countries, and high 
costs of running business in a given locality. The consequences of industrial decline include 
massive retrenchments, vacant and decaying industrial infrastructure, and low capacity utilisation 
in those industries that continue operating. 
 
1.8.5 Industrial displacement 
                                                                                                    
The term industrial displacement is defined by Giloth & Betancur (1988) as a forced relocation 
of firms from a locality caused by the invasion of the same by new and incompatible firms or 
developments. These developments include lease refusals, changes in planning zones, and the 
increase in rentals (Curran 2007). Thus in the context of this study, industrial displacement is 
taken to mean a ‘forced’ movement of industries from one locality, usually presenting 
unfavourable conditions for successful business operation, to another, that presents better 
opportunities for entrepreneurial growth and development. The unfavourable conditions can be 
in the form of political and economic instability that negatively affect industrial operations 




The term deindustrialisation means the decline of employment in manufacturing as a share of 




pertaining to the causes and significance of deindustrialisation (Rowthorn & Coutts 2013). While 
some scholars take the decline in manufacturing employment as an indication of economic 
failure, others believe that declining manufacturing employment indicate economic growth in 
advanced economies – a move from manufacturing to service industries (Rowthorn & Coutts 
2013). However, the meaning of deindustrialisation adopted in this study is, a marked reduction 
of employment in the manufacturing industries due to downsizing and/or complete shutdown of 
industries in the manufacturing sector. In light of this, deindustrialisation is closely linked to 
industrial decline as the downsizing and shutdown of industries, or both, are heavily linked to 
political and economic ramifications of growth policies adopted in a country. The consequences 





Outsourcing is not a new term in regional economics as different definitions exist. According to 
Dolgui & Proth (2013: 6770), “Outsourcing is defined as the act of obtaining semi-finished 
products, finished products or services from an outside company if these activities were 
traditionally performed internally.” However, instead of expanding a business to handle 
functions internally, functions can also be outsourced. An alternative definition is given by Jones 
(1997: 66) who note that: “Outsourcing means that a vendor assumes responsibility for providing 
some or all of an organization’s services.” In light of this, Jones (1997) argues that the one who 
outsources is known as the buyer and the one providing the services, as the vendor. Outsourcing 
is a vital concept in this study as it promotes the industrial linkages within a region. Outsourcing 
also provides an opportunity for lagging regions to benefit from core regions. Good examples are 
China and Ethiopia. With its low cost of labour, China benefitted from outsourcing by 
industrialised countries in Europe and by the USA. However, with the passage of time China 
itself started outsourcing to countries like Ethiopia where labour is even cheaper (Dolgui & Proth 
2013). Emanating from this the abundant and unemployed skilled labour in Zimbabwe provides a 





1.8.8 Growth pole 
 
The term growth pole has been given different meanings and interpretations since its emergence 
in literature. However, Hoover & Giarratani (1984: 210) noted that the term growth pole, “refers 
sometimes to larger developed regions that include centers and sometimes to specific industry 
complexes, activities, or even single large installations that play a strategic role in sparking new 
development.” It is vital to note that, the term was popularised by Perroux in the early 1950s 
though its conceptualisation kept evolving till this day. Consequently, a growth pole in this study 
is viewed as a centre (mainly an urban one, though it can also be a rural or district centre) that is 
characterised by a sustained agglomeration of economic activities, generating successful 
economic growth – that is spread to the surrounding areas lagging behind in economic 
development. BMP can be perceived as a growth pole that is responsible for spreading economic 
growth to the surrounding regions in Matebeleland. As such, the decline of its industrial 
agglomerations spells an economic slowdown to the dependent regions. 
 
1.8.9 Value addition 
 
The process of value-addition is vital in this study that interrogates industrial decline in 
metropolitan cities. Coltrain, Barton & Boland (2000: 4) perceive adding value as, “the process 
of changing or transforming a product from its original state to a more valuable state.” In other 
words, this process entails turning or transforming raw or primary goods into secondary and/or 
tertiary goods through a processing industry. Understanding value-addition is vital as the 
industries responsible for converting primary goods into secondary goods are the ones declining 
in BMP. This scenario affects the whole value addition process hence the need to find strategies 









Linkages between and among industries are inevitable as it is impossible for an industry to 
operate in isolation. Consequently, industries trade with one another exchanging goods and 
services thereby creating connections that can be referred to as linkages (Christiansen, Ehnts & 
Trautwein 2010). In light of this, Hoen (2002) simply defines linkages as relations or 
connections between economic actors. However, linkages between industries can be classified as 
backward (i.e. a relation between the industry and its suppliers, which can be other industries) or 
forward (i.e. the relation between the industry and its market, which can also be in the form of 
other industries) (Hirschman 1958).  These linkages are considered vital as in this study they are 
deemed to be the bond that keeps industrial agglomerations functional. The decline of industrial 
agglomerations in BMP can therefore be viewed as a result of failing industrial linkages. 
 
1.8.11 Basic versus non-basic industries 
 
From the ancient times early geographers, planners, and economists have held the belief that 
exports are linked in a special way to regional economic growth. This understanding was based 
on the belief that the economic output of any region can be divided into output and productive 
services that are sold outside the region and those that are consumed internally (Sirkin 1959). In 
light of this, McGovern (1961) simply defines basic industries as exporting industries while non-
basic industries are the non-exporters. However, in this study basic industries are taken to mean 
a group of industries in a region that produce goods and services, which are not only consumed 
locally, but are also sold beyond the region’s boundaries, thereby bringing cash flow into the 
region. In contrast non-basic industries are taken to mean industries that produce goods and 
services mainly consumed within the region and are therefore responsible for circulating export 
earnings in the region. This classification of industries is important as it is believed that the 





1.8.12 Local versus mesa versus global regionalisation 
 
Regionalisation has of late become a widespread phenomenon because of a growing need 
amongst regions and countries to jointly address common challenges. Accordingly, global 
regionalisation is a process that involves complex relationships among countries. The 
relationships, which can be bilateral or multilateral, result in the formation of different types of 
global regions (Geyer 2006). Emanating from this, regionalisation is taken to mean a process 
whereby regions (within a country) and/or individual countries work together administratively in 
order to confront common social, environmental, economic, and political challenges. This 
arrangement can take place at a local level, which refers to either an in-country or subcontinent-
level arrangement, or at a mesa level, which can be a continent-level arrangement. However, 
regionalisation becomes global when the arrangement takes place across continents. These 




A market has been defined differently from various fields such as law, business, and real estate. 
Houck (1984: 356) provides a comprehensive definition: 
 
A market is a collection of actual or potential buyers and sellers of a specific good 
or service. This collection has two characteristics: (1) none of the buyers has the 
option to purchase the item from sellers outside this collection and (2) none of the 
sellers has the option to sell the item to buyers outside this collection. The 
interaction of these buyers and sellers generates a set of interrelated prices and 
conditions of sale or use. The principles or facts determining which buyers and 
sellers are in this collection identify the market spatially, temporally, and 
politically. 
 
However a market in this study is defined as an arrangement or a place whereby sellers and 
buyers interact (or gather) in order to negotiate a price at which their goods and services can be 
exchanged in line with the prevailing demand and supply forces. In this instance both the buyers 
and sellers can be industrial companies or individuals who require or provide certain goods and 




are to bring about positive economic benefits to host regions. Otherwise, if no viable markets are 
found to support the industrial activity, industrial decline will set in. 
 
1.8.14 Industrial corridor  
 
An industrial corridor can be defined as an infrastructural spending package meant to stimulate 
industrial development in a specific geographical location which should be well connected to 
other areas through road, rail, sea, and/or air (Kaushik 2016). Proper conceptualisation of this 
term gives a clear understanding of how BMP became an industrial capital of Zimbabwe. The 
city is well linked to other Southern African countries through roads and railways. This 
influenced the initial agglomeration of economic activities in Bulawayo, with industries taking 
advantage of the easiness of distributing manufactured goods to the neighbouring countries. 
 
1.9 DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREA 
 
It is fundamental to highlight the geographic, demographic, and economic characteristics of the 
study area in order to provide a background that is essential in the conceptualisation of the study. 
 
1.9.1 An overview of Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in Southern Africa as shown in Figure 1.3. The country was 
under colonial rule from 1890 to 18 April 1980 when it got its political independence (Shizha & 
Kariwo 2011). The name Zimbabwe was derived from the name of an ancient city of stone 
structures, commonly referred to as dzimba dzamabwe in Shona, called Great Zimbabwe 
(Garlake 1982). Zimbabwe shares its borders with South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Namibia 
and Botswana. The country’s total land coverage is 390 757 square kilometres (CSO 2004). 
Shizha and Kariwo (2011: 3) noted that: “The country lies on a high plateau between two river 






                                                Source: Oliphant (2017)2 
Figure 1.3 Location of Zimbabwe in Southern Africa 
 
Zimbabwe is endowed with good natural resources such as, excellent agricultural soils, an 
abundance of wildlife, and enormous mineral deposits. The country also boasts various sites of 
historical importance such as, the Matopos and the Great Zimbabwe monuments and is 
furthermore home to Victoria Falls (Zvobgo 2009). The current population is estimated to be 
approximately 15.2 million (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016), which shows an increase from 13 061 
239 (ZIMSTAT 2013a) reported in the 2012 population census. The 2012 census revealed that 
48% of the population was male and 52% female, it furthermore stated that 7 661 295 people 
were aged 15 years and above (ZIMSTAT 2013b). Of 7 661 295 people, 67% were economically 
active and out of this group, 89% were employed whilst 11% were unemployed (ZIMSTAT 
2013b). The current official unemployment rate stands at 16.4% (ZIMSTAT 2020).3  
                                                 
2 The map was adopted from an online article that is not paginated. The article is accessible at 
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/879751/Zimbabwe-map-where-is-Zimbabwe-Harare-location-Africa-
mapped. 
3 See http://www.zimstat.co.zw. The ZIMSTAT official rate is based on 2019 figures. However, Bertelsmann 
Stiftung’s (2016; 2020) estimates of the unemployment rate are 80% in 2016 and 90% in 2020. In the calculation of 
the employment rate, Bertelsmann Stiftung (2020: 25) noted that ZIMSTAT “apparently includes people working in 
the informal and communal agriculture sectors, which increases the proportion of those employed.” This explains 




Zimbabwe used to have a functional and strong industrial sector that contributed to its economic 
development in the late 1960s to 1980s. The strength of the economy emanated from the 
successes registered in the mining and agricultural sectors (Stoneman 1990). However, after the 
adoption of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the early nineties, economic decline 
set in to reach its lowest ever in 2008 with the crashing of the local currency (Shizha & Kariwo 
2011). This negatively affected the industrial performance in the country resulting in many 
industrial closures, downsizing, and massive relocations.   
 
Zimbabwe has significant deposits of minerals such as gold, nickel, chrome, platinum, and 
diamonds. These minerals provide an opportunity for meaningful economic development and 
growth emanating from increased FDI from extractive industries, however, this is not the case.  
Instead, the economy is characterised by lack of investment due to factors such as poor politics 
coupled with inconsistent policies. These two factors led to capital flight as Zimbabwe is 
regarded as a risky investment destination. The economy is currently dominated by agriculture 
employment. As the leading sector, agriculture employs 67.2% of the total labour force, followed 
by 10.9% in the wholesale and retail trade (including the repair of motor vehicles and motor 
cycles), 4% in manufacturing and 1.5% in mining, respectively (ZIMSTAT 2015). However, 
mining contributed an estimated 62% of total exports in 2018, followed 22% in agriculture and 
15% in manufacturing (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2020). These statistics show that the 
dominance of agriculture in terms of employment has a minimal contribution to the country’s 
export earnings. 
 
1.9.2 An overview of Bulawayo Metropolitan Province 
 
Bulawayo metropolis is the second largest city located in the south western part of Zimbabwe as 
shown in Figure 1.4. The city is composed of districts which include Bulawayo Central, Imbizo, 
Khami, Mzilikazi, and Reigate (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2011), and is one of the oldest cities in 
Zimbabwe (Msindo 2007). According to Parliament of Zimbabwe (2011: 3), “Bulawayo is 




the country and the Southern African region providing important railway linkages to South 
Africa, Botswana and Zambia.” 
    
                                                                         
                                                  Source: Google Maps (2020) 
Figure 1.4 Location of Bulawayo in Zimbabwe 
 
In addition, BMP is surrounded by Matebeleland North and Matebeleland South Provinces as 
shown in Figure 1.5. The inhabitants of BMP are of different ethnic backgrounds though the 
majority is the Ndebele people. Approximately 98% of the BMP population is of African ethnic 
origin while the remaining 2% are of European, Asiatic, and mixed origin (ZIMSTAT 2013a).  
 
The total land coverage for BMP is approximately 479 square kilometres (CSO 2004). 
According to the Parliament of Zimbabwe (2011: 4), the city is “located on a plain that marks the 
Highveld of Zimbabwe and is closer to the watershed between the Zambezi and Limpopo 





            Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2009) 
Figure 1.5 Bulawayo Metropolitan Province boundaries 
 
BMP’s total population was 676 650 in 2002, representing 5.82% of the Zimbabwe’s population 
(CSO 2004). However, in 2012 the city’s population dropped to 653 337 (ZIMSTAT 2013a), to 
represent 5% of the Zimbabwe’s total population (ZIMSTAT 2013b). Though the decline in the 
population in BMP is not fully explained in the 2012 census report, it can be attributed to 
changes in provincial boundaries that were implemented by the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission (ZEC) in 2008 in the preparation of national elections. This exercise saw some 
provinces getting bigger in terms of land coverage and population size, whilst others were 
reduced in extent through shifting of boundaries – a process referred to as gerrymandering by 
opposition parties in Zimbabwe. The discrepancy can also be explained by the out-migration of 
skilled labour from Bulawayo at the height of deindustrialisation. The economically active 
group, mainly those aged between 15 and 49, left Zimbabwe in search of better opportunities in 






The economic history of BMP can be summarised in the words of Msindo (2007: 267): 
 
Economically, Bulawayo was a major employment centre, boasting the 
headquarters of the Rhodesian Railways, plus numerous, small but viable, gold 
mines that attracted labourers from beyond Southern Rhodesia. Bulawayo was 
also a temporary stopover for Central African labourers trekking to the better-paid 
industries in South Africa, though some of them never reached their intended 
destinations and settled permanently in Bulawayo. 
 
The quotation by Msindo (2007) presupposes the argument that Bulawayo was able to attract 
labour from different parts of Africa not only because of its location along major transportation 
routes but also because of its industrial activities. However, today the city is characterised by the 
presence of heavy industrial infrastructure of which the bulk is no longer utilised mainly because 
of massive deindustrialisation taking place (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2011) that contributed to a 
declining economy which in turn, led to spike in the unemployment rate. The unemployment of 
many residents then led to an expansion in the informal sector as this sector absorbed some 
labour that was laid-off in the formal sector. Consequently, both sectors have become 
increasingly important to the city economy.  
 
1.10 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
The dissertation comprises 10 coherent chapters. Each chapter is unique and covers different 
aspects from the preceding and the succeeding one. 
 
Chapter 2 presents the conceptual and theoretical frameworks adopted in the study. The chapter 
commences with an analysis of the concepts guiding this study. These concepts are ‘economic 
resilience’ and ‘path dependence’. After presenting the conceptual framework, the different 
theories that have a bearing in the understanding of this study are reviewed. The main focus is on 
the theories of regional development as the study focuses on economic growth and development 
of BMP. In addition, the chapter also covers relocation theories. These explain the deglomeration 





Chapter 3 contains an analysis of the concept of development through exploring the drivers and 
inhibitors of development. The chapter begins with a discussion about the meaning of 
development, followed by a presentation of potential drivers and inhibitors of development. The 
consequential effects on the development of regional economies are also explored. The emphasis 
is learning from economic leaders in the South, mainly countries in Southeast Asia. 
 
Chapter 4 gives a historical account and analysis of economic development in Zimbabwe in 
general and Bulawayo specifically. The literature is based on economic and industrial 
performance, namely the growth and decline thereof. The historical account of economic 
development in Zimbabwe is undertaken in different phases that respectively include the early 
colonial period, federation period, unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) period, and the 
post-independence period. Emphasis is given to the post-independence period that is also 
subdivided in different temporal phases depending on the ideology that informed the economy at 
a particular point in time. Besides that, the chapter also gives a historical account of the study 
area before concluding with a focus on the implications on Bulawayo’s future growth.  
 
Chapter 5 explains the operationalisation of the research. The chapter commences with the 
explanation of the research philosophy, paradigm, and design guiding the study. This 
illumination is done as a way of linking methodological issues to the guiding paradigm and 
philosophy. The study population is also explained in terms of size and characteristics. This leads 
to the sampling design after which the tools that were used to collect data, are presented. This 
chapter ends with a presentation on research ethics taken into consideration during fieldwork, 
and a research methodology matrix. 
 
Chapter 6 details the effects of industrial decline on the economy of BMP. However, the chapter 
commences with a focus on the factors behind industrial decline. These are the factors that have 
hamstrung firm operations in the city. The chapter then proceeds to evaluate how industrial 
decline has affected the economic performance of the metropolis. The effects are discussed in 
terms of the city’s economic structure, export levels, employment levels, and attractiveness to 




Chapter 7 focuses on the evaluation of firm resilience strategies in Bulawayo. The chapter 
commences by assessing firms’ operational challenges followed by an overview of firm 
resilience. The resilience strategies adopted by firms in the metropolis are then examined 
indicating their implication to Bulawayo’s economic resilience. The main strategies discussed 
include diversification of products and services, reliance on a broad customer base, and utilising 
a USD-based pricing system to avoid losses through currency reforms. 
 
Chapter 8 presents an in-depth analysis of economic and industrial policymaking in Zimbabwe 
and how policies promote or hinder economic growth and resilience in BMP. The chapter also 
assesses the strategies that can be adopted to improve policymaking. The main thrust is to 
generate ways of revamping and re-orienting the policymaking process in Zimbabwe to achieve 
economic growth and resilience in metropolitan cities. 
 
Chapter 9 dwells on the strategy options for economic revitalisation and resilience in BMP. 
However, the chapter initially analyses the level of economic resilience using employment as the 
key variable. Three different formulae for calculating the sensitivity of Bulawayo to the 
economic recession are utilised. The focus is then shifted to different strategy options that can be 
adopted to enhance economic resilience in Bulawayo. These strategies are in line with data 
collected from fieldwork.  
 
Chapter 10 provides a summary of key results, conclusions, and recommendations. This is the 
chapter that concludes the study and discusses the perception of regional economic resilience in 
Zimbabwe indicating similarities and dissimilarities with the conceptualisation in the North. The 
chapter also covers a presentation and explanation of a proposed model that can be used to 
analyse regional economic resilience in metropolises in countries in the South. A focus on policy 









This chapter has provided a broad introduction of the study thereby setting the context of the 
whole thesis. It traces the problem under study from global to the local contexts. The rationale 
that is presented clearly highlights the research gap and states the utility of this study. Despite the 
research strands on regional economic resilience in the North, the concept needs further 
examination especially in SSA countries like Zimbabwe. Bulawayo Metropolitan Province is 
undergoing industrial decline and displacement. Consequently, the formal economy of the 
metropolis has shrunk and hence the proliferation of informality. Strategy options for economic 
revitalisation and resilience are required to turnaround the economy of Bulawayo. As such, the 
next chapter provides an extended discussion on the concept of regional economic resilience and 
theories of regional development, paying particular attention to strategy options for economic 



















CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND RESILIENCE – 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
What matters for the long-run success of a regional economy is the ability of the 
region’s industrial, technological, labour force and institutional structures to 
adapt to the changing competitive, technological and market pressures and 




This chapter examines the conceptual framework that guides the current study. It commences by 
unravelling the concept of resilience, paying particular attention to economic resilience. 
Economic resilience provides a better way of assessing regional economies compared to 
engineering and ecological perspectives (Simmie & Martin 2010; Martin 2012). Furthermore, 
attention is also given to the concept of path dependence before focusing on the concepts of 
agglomeration economies and global regionalisation. The concept of agglomeration economies is 
fundamental in discussions involving firm location and regional economic development (Parr 
2002a; 2002b). Apart from the conceptual framework, the theories guiding the conceptualisation 
and understanding of phenomena in this study are presented and their application assessed. These 
are mainly the theories of regional development and business relocation. 
 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The study is broadly guided by the concept of resilience, specifically regional economic 
resilience. Resilience has become a buzzword especially now that most cities in the Global South 
are grappling with economic challenges. The ability to withstand economic shocks and also to 
bounce back to the pre-shock growth path is a central tenet that keeps city economies 
sustainable. In addition, path dependence and agglomeration economies are other concepts 
guiding the understanding and interpretation of phenomena in this study. Path dependence 





2.2.1 The concept of resilience 
 
Despite its use in different disciplines, resilience is a complex concept and in literature its 
meaning is subject to debate (Hill, Wial & Wolman 2008; Simmie & Martin 2010; Hill et al. 
2011; Martin 2012; Breathnach, Van Egeraat & Curran 2014; Simmie 2014; Tóth 2015). The 
concept of resilience is frequently used in the fields such as economics, social sciences, and 
regional or urban studies (Simmie & Martin 2010; Hill et al. 2011). However, the concept is 
multidimensional and has multiple meanings in different academic fields (Sensier, Bristow & 
Healy 2016; Simmie 2014). 
 
Resilience is not a new concept as its usage in literature dates back to the 1970s. The concept of 
resilience was developed by Holling in 1973 as a framework for ecological research (Tóth 2015). 
However, the concept has been applied in physical, engineering, and ecological sciences for 
some time before it was recently adopted into disciplines such as psychology and organisation 
science (Martin 2012). The concept has also attracted the interest of regional planners, spatial 
economists, and economic geographers (Martin 2012) who are still debating its meaning. The 
term resilience is derived from a Latin word ‘resiliere’ (Simmie & Martin 2010; Martin 2012; 
Tóth 2015), which generally means to leap back or to rebound (Simmie & Martin 2010; Martin 
2012). According to Simmie & Martin (2010: 28), “the idea of resilience refers to the ability of 
an entity or system to ‘recover form and position elastically’ following a disturbance or 
disruption of some kind.” These disturbances can be short or long term. It is vital to note that in 
ecological literature, resilience is understood in terms of both ‘engineering resilience’ and 
‘ecological resilience’ (Simmie & Martin 2010). However, these perspectives are not adopted 
due to their limited applicability in analysing economic resilience in the study area. Both the 
engineering and ecological perspectives make the conceptualisation of regional economic 
resilience ambiguous (Simmie & Martin 2010). 
 
Engineering resilience is perceived in the auspices of physics and its ascribed definition is the 
system’s resistance and speed of bouncing back to equilibrium (Simmie & Martin 2010; Martin 
2012; Wink 2012). When applied to systems, Martin (2012: 4) noted that the one which “is more 




is deemed to be more ‘resilient’ than a system which … takes longer to move back to its 
‘equilibrium’ or steady state.” However, to view regional economic resilience through the 
engineering perspective is problematic. According to Simmie & Martin (2010: 29) “if regional 
economic resilience is defined in terms of the ability of a regional economy to retain (return to) 
its equilibrium form and function … it becomes difficult to reconcile the notion of resilience 
with the idea of regional economic evolution.” Regional economies do not necessarily need to be 
in equilibrium but should be characterised by a stable growth trend (Simmie & Martin 2010; 
Martin 2012). Thus, regional economic resilience departs from the engineering perspective of 
resilience as an economy functions differently from materials and other engineering systems. 
 
Ecological resilience is also an equivocal concept that is not easy to apply to the analysis of 
regional economic systems. Ecological resilience is measured by the size of the shock or 
disturbance a system can absorb before changing its structure (Simmie & Martin 2010). 
According to Simmie & Martin (2010: 30) ecological perspective implies that “the bigger the 
shock required to change a system’s structure and function, the more resilient that system would 
be deemed to be.” This perception makes it difficult to clearly define what constitutes resilience 
and separate the engineering from the ecological perspective (Simmie & Martin 2010; Martin 
2012). The complexity emanates from the fact that a concept developed to analyse ecological 
systems cannot be easily adapted and used in a different setting, such as analysing a regional 
economy (Martin 2012). While punctuated equilibrium that is espoused in ecological resilience 
can be applicable to biological and ecological evolution, it is difficult to apply the same analysis 
to urban and regional economies (Simmie & Martin 2010). As a result, multiple equilibria 
supported by ecological resilience seem less important in the analysis of the concept of regional 
economic resilience which mainly exhibit stability and self-organisation, attributes that are not 
synonymous with equilibrium (Simmie & Martin 2010). 
 
2.2.1.1 Economic resilience 
 
Besides the engineering and ecological uses of the concept of resilience, another approach that is 




concept, is also regarded as highly complex and multidimensional in nature (Sensier, Bristow & 
Healy 2016). However, the concept can be perceived through different lenses that include the 
‘plucking model’, ‘hysteresis’, and ‘adaptive evolution’ (Simmie 2014). The ‘plucking model’ 
defines resilience as the ‘bounce-back’ of an economy to its pre-shock growth path (Simmie 
2014). In contrast, the ‘hysteresis’ approach (underpinned by the studies of magnetic and elastic 
properties of metals and materials) defines resilience as an economy’s reaction to an external 
shock and the nature of the new development path that the economy takes due to the shock’s 
immediate impact (Simmie 2014).  
 
The concept of ‘adaptive evolution’ as the third approach, emanates from the theory of complex 
adaptive systems (Martin 2012; Simmie 2014). In this approach, regional economic resilience is 
taken to be the regional economy’s capacity to reconfigure and/or adapt its structure in terms of 
its industries, technologies, and institutions so that it is able to maintain sustainable growth levels 
in terms of output, employment, and wealth over a given period of time (Martin 2012).  
Alternatively, Han & Goetz (2015: 131) noted that: “Regional economic resilience [can be] 
defined as a region’s capacity to absorb and resist shocks as well as to recover from them.” 
These definitions presuppose two important aspects of economic resilience. Besides being able 
to adapt or bounce back, a regional economy should also be able to resist shocks and disruption. 
This is the approach that is adopted in the analysis of economic resilience in BMP. Finding 
strategy options that enhance BMP’s capacity to adapt and resist economic shocks and 
disruptions is the main focus of this study.  
 
The evolutionary perspective of resilience places the adaptive capacity of a local economy in the 
centre of regional economic resilience (Simmie & Martin 2010). Consequently, Simmie & 
Martin (2010: 30) argue that the success of the economy of a region is underpinned by, “the 
ability of the region’s industrial, technological, labour force and institutional structures to adapt 
to the changing competitive, technological and market pressures and opportunities that confront 
its firms and workforce.” This is supported by Martin (2012) who presupposes the importance of 
the economic structure, innovation, industrial networks (both intra- and inter-regional), skilled 




important factors that determine a region’s economic resilience. Thus, the economy’s response 
and recovery from economic shocks and stresses are determined by these factors. However, it is 
worth noting that besides the abovementioned factors, Martin (2012) also stresses the role of the 
political economy in influencing regional economic resilience. This influence can be positive or 
negative. This study therefore adopts the conceptualisation of regional economic resilience posed 
by Simmie & Martin (2010) and Martin (2012). This conceptualisation helped the researcher 
explain the challenges facing BMP’s economy and strategies that can be adopted to revitalise and 
promote resilience. In addition, the impact of the political economy on firm and regional 
economic resilience in BMP is assessed in light of the conceptualisation by Simmie & Martin 
(2010) and Martin (2012).    
 
Within evolutionary resilience there are four approaches that can be adopted. These approaches 
are generalised Darwinism, complexity theory, panarchy, and path dependence theory (Simmie 
& Martin 2010). While these are relevant to the study, two approaches namely the generalised 
Darwinism and path dependence theories, are more applicable in explaining phenomena in the 
study area. Generalised Darwinism emphasises diversity as an important attribute of regional 
economic resilience (Simmie & Martin 2010). This diversity is in the sense of the structure of the 
economy and of the behaviour of firms in terms of their different ways and levels of adaptability 
(Simmie & Martin 2010). Accordingly, a more diversified economy is taken to be more resilient. 
Thus, the study assesses the diversity of the industrial base in BMP and its implications to the 
economic resilience of the metropolis.  
 
Regional economic systems can be conceptualised as complex adaptive systems (Simmie 2014). 
However, complex adaptive systems are inclined towards increased connectedness among 
system components and this reduces their adaptability to changing environmental conditions 
(Simmie & Martin 2010). Notwithstanding this, an attribute of the complexity theory such as 
networking, is applicable in this study. Networking is considered an important aspect of both 
firm and regional economic resilience. According to Simmie (2014: 109) “networked 
interactions both within and between regions are one of the key and regionally distinctive driving 




adaptability and resilience of regional economies.” Thus, networking in terms of firm linkages is 
considered beneficial for firm growth and also the economic development and resilience of the 
regions in which they operate. 
 
The panarchy model was considered limited in explaining regional economic resilience in the 
study area. Tóth (2015: 73) noted that, while complex adaptive systems, panarchy, and 
equilibrist approaches “have important and deep roots in the economic development literature … 
[they] are only tenuously linked to resilience itself.” The panarchy model, like the engineering 
and ecological perspectives, is more applicable in the analysis of ecological systems (Simmie & 
Martin 2010). Ecological systems experience long periods of stability that in most cases are 
interrupted only by major external shocks. In comparison, regional economies are usually 
characterised by agents and institutions capable of altering their behaviour in response to shocks 
and disturbances that are even minor (Simmie & Martin 2010). 
 
2.2.1.2 The concept of path dependence  
 
As previously highlighted, path dependence is an approach under evolutionary resilience 
(Simmie & Martin 2010). This concept explains development processes that seem to digress 
from what is regularly acceptable in theory (Szajnowska-Wysocka 2009) as a region’s 
development pattern and path are understood from its history (Page 2006; Szajnowska-Wysocka 
2009). According to Page (2006: 88), “path dependence means that current and future states, 
actions, or decisions depend on the path of previous states, actions, or decisions.” The past 
therefore indirectly influences the present course of action (Page 2006).  
 
The concept of path dependence is open to various interpretations (Simmie & Martin 2010). Path 
dependence can be a result of different factors such as increasing returns (benefits realised from 
actions taken), self-reinforcement (sustenance of an action taken due the combined effects of 
encouraging forces and complementary institutions), positive feedbacks (positive externalities 
associated with course of action taken), and lock-in effects (a chosen course of action becomes 




However, the lock-in perspective is the main notion of the path dependence approach (Simmie & 
Martin 2010). Accordingly, Simmie & Martin (2010) noted that path dependence can be 
understood in three different interpretations. Firstly, regional economy is assumed to be resilient 
if it continues to evolve in this lock-in development trajectory in the face of shocks that attempt 
to throw the economy off-path. Secondly, the lock-in development trajectory is perceived as a 
negative trait affecting the adaptability of the regional economy to various shocks. Finally, path 
dependence can influence a regional economy either as an enhancer or inhibitor of the 
economy’s adaptation to shocks (Simmie & Martin 2010). 
 
The notion of path dependence is applied in this study to determine the existence, or non-
existence, of factors that locked-in the economy of BMP in a certain growth path and whether 
those lock-in effects are positive or negative. The history of how BMP became the industrial 
capital of Zimbabwe is important in light of this concept. This history is expected to provide vital 
insights concerning the extent of adaptability of the economy to shocks and stresses. 
 
2.2.1.3 Measuring regional economic resilience 
 
The concept of resilience is important in explaining differential regional development, as the 
process of regional economic development is prone to various shocks and stresses that include 
economic recessions (Navarro-Espigares, Martín-Segura & Hernández-Torres 2012). However, 
the lack of a universally agreed definition makes it difficult to come up with correct indicators 
that can be used to measure regional economic resilience (Kakderi & Tasopoulou, 2017). 
Consequently, debates on how best to operationalise the concept of regional economic resilience 
are still ongoing in literature (Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016). However, it seems that these 
debates may have reached consensus that economic resilience is better conceptualised as a 
process (Turok 2014; Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016). Apart from that, resilience can also be 
analysed at different levels, for example, on individual, community, firm, and sub-regional, 





In light of the aforementioned arguments, Sensier, Bristow & Healy (2016: 132) noted that, “in 
measuring resilience, it is critically important to distinguish between the measurement of a 
region’s specific post-shock outcomes, or its revealed resilience, and measurement of the 
region’s resilience capacities.” Resilience has varied meanings in different disciplines (Seeliger 
& Turok 2013; Vale 2014). As such, there is need to determine what is regarded as resilient 
economies; whether it is continual growth in the face of a shock, or recovery from a shock 
(Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016). This is crucial in pinpointing what exactly is being measured. 
Furthermore, Sensier, Bristow & Healy (2016) observed that if resilience is taken as recovery 
from a shock then the supposed point of recovery needs to be noted. This provides clarity in 
terms of timelines adopted in the concerned analysis. 
 
Different variables can be used to measure resilience, though most studies have utilised GDP and 
employment trends (Turok 2014; Breathnach, Van Egeraat & Curran 2015; Sensier, Bristow & 
Healy 2016; Giannakis & Bruggeman 2017). According to Sensier, Bristow & Healy (2016) 
variables such as GDP and employment can be used to measure resilience as a performance or 
outcome. These insights are vital in the operationalisation of this study. They provide a base for 
the current study that seeks to understand the economic resilience of a region experiencing 
industrial decline. The variables discussed, inform the choice of variables utilised in BMP taking 
into consideration the dearth of data in Zimbabwe. It is important to note that there has been 
progress in terms of compiling universally standardised indicators for measuring city resilience. 
The ISO 37123 (Sustainable cities and communities – indicators for resilient cities) published in 
2019, captures various indicators that can be used to measure city resilience. In terms of 
measuring the economic component, employment is one of the important variables included in 
ISO 37123 and is adopted in this study. 
 
When the concept of resilience is analysed, there is need for a proper definition of the scope and 
context within which the notion is applied (Turok, 2014). The shock or disturbance under 
analysis should also be clearly defined (Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016), and the definition may 
involve the nature and extent of the shock involved, whether it is economic, political, 




whether it is a short-term or a long-term shock. While some shocks such as the closure of a 
major industrial plant can be dated (highlighting the beginning of the shock), the same is difficult 
when one is considering a shock such as an economic or financial crisis (Sensier, Bristow & 
Healy 2016). Thus, shocks in BMP are defined accordingly. 
 
2.2.2 The concept of agglomeration economies  
 
The concept of agglomeration economies is fundamental in the analysis of industrial location and 
regional economics (Parr 2002a; 2002b). Agglomeration is usually a result of centripetal forces 
while dispersion or deglomeration is usually caused by centrifugal forces (Fujita & Thisse 2002). 
In simple terms, agglomeration economies are the benefits that are derived when firms and 
people are located in close proximity (Glaeser 2010). Agreeing with this analysis, Stimson, 
Stough & Roberts (2006: 27) noted that, “agglomeration economies are benefits available to 
individuals and firms in large concentrations of population and economic activity, as found in 
big cities and in some nodal concentrations of activities within them, such as for producer 
services in CBDs.” These benefits may include reduced transport and production costs and 
shared technology.  
 
Agglomeration should be treated in terms of both internal and external economies, taking on 
different forms such as scale, scope, and complexity (Parr 2002a; 2002b). The first classification 
under internal economies, is ‘internal economies of scale’, alternatively known as ‘economies of 
horizontal integration’. This concerns the reduction of production costs linked to the relationship 
between the unit cost of production and the level of output (Parr 2002a). Generally, higher levels 
of output tend to reduce the unit cost of production. The second classification is internal 
economies of scope (or economies of lateral integration), this focuses on the effect of product 
diversification on the cost of production (Parr 2002a; 2002b). Diversification results in lower 
production costs. This happens when a number of different products produced by a single firm 
have a cost-reduction effect on production, compared to a scenario whereby the products are 
produced by different firms (Parr 2002b). Finally internal economies of complexity (or 




multi-staged production processes within a firm, as opposed to outsourcing tasks at different 
stages to specialist firms (Parr 2002a). Thus, Parr (2002b: 155) noted that internal economies of 
complexity occur when the “firm’s production involves several technologically separable 
stages.” It is worth noting that these types of agglomerations are not influence by physical 
concentration of economic activities (Parr 2002a). 
 
Both Hoover (1937) and Isard (1956) classified agglomeration economies in terms of external 
economies such as scale, localisation, and urbanisation economies. Parr (2002a; 2002b) is of the 
view that the scale economies of Hoover (1937) and Isard (1956) are internal economies 
perceived differently. Furthermore Parr (2002a; 2002b) viewed localisation economies as 
external economies of scale, and urbanisation economies as external economies of scope. 
However, a third classification introduced by Parr (2002a; 2002b) is referred to as external 
economies of complexity or activity-complex economies.  
 
Localisation economies are cost-saving benefits accruing to industrial plants of similar or related 
character that are situated together in a particular location (Hoover 1937; Isard 1956; Parr 2002a; 
2002b). Urbanisation economies on the other hand, apply to firms with different specialisations 
but in proximity to one another. Benefits accrue to each when products of a plant in one industry 
are absorbed in a different industry as inputs but located in the same area (Isard 1956; Parr 
2002a; 2002b). According to Parr (2002a) external economies of complexity (or activity-
complex economies) concern cost-saving benefits accruing to a firm due to its input-output 
linkages with firms operating in other industrial sectors. Efficient flow of information and better 
coordination with other firms produce cost serving mechanisms (Parr 2002a). This differentiation 
of agglomeration economies guides the conceptualisation of industrial agglomeration in BMP. 
Understanding the different types of agglomeration economies is vital because a positive 
relationship between industrial agglomeration and economic development (Fan & Scot 2003) 






Industrial deglomeration taking place in BMP is perceived and understood in light of 
deglomeration economies or diseconomies of scale. These are the negative effects associated 
with the continued clustering of economic activities (Bailey 2010) that cause excessive 
competition amongst firms. Deglomeration is also linked to a process of polarisation reversal 
(Richardson 1980), representing the dispersal of economic activity from core to the nearest large 
regional centres outside the direct catchment area or the core region. This dispersion may be 
influenced by agglomeration economies and other economies of scale in the selected peripheral 
locations. Thus, these economies, combined with growth hindrances in the centre, could 
accelerate industrial decentralisation, influencing migrants to prefer urban destinations outside 
the centre (Richardson 1980). Because of this, factors driving industrial decline and 
deglomeration in the study area are assessed in line with diseconomies of scale and polarisation 
reversal. These concepts guide the assessment of whether the process taking place in BMP can 
be termed polarisation reversal or whether it is a deglomeration process with the firms choosing 
alternative locations. 
 
2.2.3 The concept of global regionalisation 
 
Global regionalisation is an emerging concept that also guides the conceptualisation of economic 
growth and development in BMP, at national and international levels. Global regionalisation is a 
process in which a world economy is fragmented into macro-regions that are hierarchically 
integrated into the world system (Leonova 2016). As noted by Geyer (2006: 28) the process 
involves “an intricate range of bilateral and multilateral relationships evolving between 
individual countries, groups of countries (as subsets of global regions), and global regions as a 
whole.” Zimbabwe is a member of several regional blocs, including Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), and African Union (AU). Membership of these blocs has an impact on the national 
economy. Thus, global regionalisation informs the analysis of the effects of Zimbabwe’s bilateral 





2.3 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
To understand and explain different phenomena in this study, different theories had to be 
adopted. The majority of these theories were propounded to explain regional economic 
development and regional imbalances or disparities.  The theories explain the factors behind 
regional imbalances and how the disparities can be addressed. In addition, theories of industrial 
relocation are also adopted to explain in- and out-migration of industries in BMP.  
 
2.3.1 Theories of regional development 
 
The theories adopted in this study explain spatial agglomeration of economic activity. The choice 
of theories has also been motivated by the need to explain the economic agglomeration changes 
caused by industrial and economic shrinkages in BMP. Furthermore, the theories informed 
strategy options for economic revitalisation and resilience. An example is the unbalanced growth 
theory (UGT) that has been applied, not only to explain firm linkages in BMP, but also strategy 
options for growth in terms of social overhead investments. 
 
2.3.1.1 Core-periphery theories 
 
Core-periphery theories divide regions into two categories, namely core/centre/metropolitan and 
periphery/hinterland/satellite. These theories can be used to explain disparities on a global scale, 
for instance, regions in the North versus those in the South (Szajnowska-Wysocka 2009). 
However, core-periphery theories can also explain disparities on regional (intra-continental) and 
national (within a country) levels. The disparities can be caused by differences among countries 
in terms of technological and cultural innovations, hence the centre dominates over the 
peripheral regions (Szajnowska-Wysocka 2009). Scholars that contributed to the core-periphery 







Friedmann’s early contributions 
 
Friedmann propounded the early core-periphery theory in 1966. He observed that differential 
growth causes disparities, resulting in the classification of the world’s regions into two 
categories, the core and the periphery. The driver of differential growth is innovation. Friedmann 
(1967) viewed innovation as an anchor of development. Such innovation could either be 
technical or organisational, which in turn could be social, economic, or political. Friedmann 
(1967) further noted that chances of innovation are higher in large cities or urbanised regions, in 
other words, within a spatial system where the core represents the major centres of change whilst 
the rest of the areas in the system are known as peripheral regions. These spatial systems, 
according to Friedmann (1967: 29), can be “the world, the multi-nation region, the nation, the 
sub-national region, and the province.” Whatever the level, the peripheral regions are dominated 
by the core regions and this dominance is underpinned by early innovations that produced an 
economic advantage in the core (Friedmann 1967).  
 
Friedmann (1967) made four major propositions concerning the relationship between the core 
and the peripheries: (i) core regions promote and perpetuate the dependency of peripheral 
regions, (ii) the dominance of the core regions on the peripheral ones is self-reinforcing, (iii) if 
innovations driving growth in core regions are planted in the peripheral regions then the flow of 
information toward the dependent regions will increase, and (iv) spread effects may result in 
some regions in the periphery becoming new core regions that share authoritative decisions with 
old core regions. The propositions in this relationship are widespread especially at a national 
level in the South. Thus, disparities in terms of goods and services offered in these two regions 
tend to promote what is known as the ‘bright lights syndrome’, as better amenities in the cities 
attract labour migrants to urban areas hoping to get better opportunities (Todaro 1969; Harris & 
Todaro 1970; Todaro 1980). These insights help to understand and explain why out-migration of 
labour and capital outweigh in-migration of the same in BMP at both national and global levels. 
Thus, the core-periphery relationships can help explain out-migration of skilled labour and 





The world systems theory 
 
Wallerstein’s world systems theory dates back to the 1970s and was meant to explain 
development patterns and the emergence of domination around the world (Straussfogel 1997). 
The theory explains the role of colonialism in the determination of global economic 
development. In terms of the world systems theory all nations or countries are assumed to belong 
to a social system responsible for shaping them, however the nations are also believed to shape 
this social system through the different roles that they perform (Straussfogel 1997). Accordingly, 
Wallerstein (1974: 347) argues that: “A world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, 
structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence.” This system is driven by 
capitalism which explains the capitalistic world-economy (Wallerstein 1974; Straussfogel 1997). 
These insights are vital in explaining how capitalism directed the development path followed by 
BMP. Apart from that, other exogenous factors affecting the performance of the economy in 
BMP can be understood in the way the world system operates, such as how competition of 
economies and firms at a global level affects the economic resilience of the study area. 
 
The global division of labour under the world systems theory has influenced the classification of 
nations in the following categories, namely core, periphery, and semi-periphery (Wallerstein 
1974; Straussfogel 1997). According to Straussfogel (1997: 121), “A state within the world-
system belongs to one or another of these categories depending on the nature of its dominant 
production processes.” The core region represents the wealthiest nations with advanced 
technology and is characterised by a high quality of life (Wallerstein 1974; Straussfogel 1997). 
On the contrary, the periphery is mainly dominated by agricultural production and the provision 
of raw materials or partially processed goods that are consumed by the core region in an unequal 
exchange manner (Wallerstein 1974; Straussfogel 1997). Thus, economic polarisation in this 
theory is driven by unequal exchange and cemented by imperialism (Straussfogel 1997). The 
theory also postulates that nations that exhibit characteristics of both the core and periphery 
regions should be referred to as the semi-periphery (Straussfogel 1997). Nations can move from 
one category to the other either downwards or upwards (Wallerstein 1974). This theory guides 




countries. Apart from that, the theory also guides the analysis of firm competitiveness at both 
regional and global levels. 
 
New economic geography (NEG) 
 
Various scholars have contributed to the NEG approach though the initial contribution is 
attributed to Paul Krugman in 1991 (Garretsen & Martin 2010). NEG attempts to explain uneven 
spatial development (Krugman 1991; Garretsen & Martin 2010; Wilson 2011) linked to 
globalisation and neo-liberalisation (Wilson 2011). The regions assumed by the NEG model can 
be at different levels, such as country levels, intra-country regions, cities, or intra-city regions 
(Garretsen & Martin 2010). The theory divides the nation’s economy into an industrialised core 
and agricultural periphery and only two forms of labour that of farmers and workers (Krugman, 
1991; Wilson 2011). While workers are assumed to have the ability to move freely between the 
regions, peasants are taken to be immobile and only produce agricultural goods (Krugman 1991). 
In terms of transportation, Krugman (1991) assumes that no costs are incurred in the 
transportation of agricultural output or for the manufactured goods; costs are incurred only for 
the transported goods. The variability of transport costs may have different effects on the 
regions, with high transportation costs resulting in regional convergence and low transportation 
costs triggering regional divergence (Krugman 1991; Dawkins 2003; Garretsen & Martin 2010; 
Wilson 2011). In light of this, regional economic clusters are therefore underpinned by the 
combined action of centrifugal and centripetal forces (Dawkins 2003). 
 
The interaction between agglomeration and spread effects determines the pattern that prevails in 
the region, whether it becomes a core-periphery or symmetrical economic landscape (Garretsen 
& Martin 2010). In cases where a combination of high transport costs and weak economies of 
scale exist, the location of manufacturing production is therefore influenced by the distribution of 
peasants (Krugman 1991; Wilson 2011). Lower transportation costs coupled with stronger 
economies of scale, trigger a process of circular causation where manufacturing is attracted to a 
region with a competitive edge (Krugman 1991; Wilson 2011). Similarly, continual decrease of 




the other hand constant or increasing transport costs would give regions with an edge the ability 
to continue to attract industry and growth from competing regions without favourable initial 
conditions (Martin & Sunley 1996).  
 
NEG is mainly focused on explaining uneven spatial economic development, specifically 
shedding light on spatial agglomeration of economic activity (Garretsen & Martin 2010). 
Accordingly, the explanations of the theory are useful in the understanding and explanation of 
spatial agglomeration and deglomeration in BMP. The two forces behind agglomeration in this 
model are the size of the market and the cost of living. In both circumstances locational choices 
of firms and mobile workers reduce the effect of transport costs (Garretsen & Martin 2010). In 
order to reduce delivery costs, firms locate in areas where there is a high local demand and where 
other industries are already located (Dawkins 2003), thereby creating a core. However, stiff 
competition in the created core region may result in the process referred to by Richardson (1980) 
as polarisation reversal, with firms moving to the peripheral region. Despite the fact that the 
assumptions that underlie the NEG theories are restrictive, especially those relating to worker 
mobility, land use, and regional dynamics (Dawkins 2003), the theory is important in explaining 
industrial and economic processes in BMP, especially those that inhibit and/or drive economic 
resilience. 
 
2.3.1.2 Circular cumulative causation theory 
 
The circular cumulative causation (CCC) theory was propounded by Gunnar Myrdal in 1957 and 
explains spatial economic inequality among regions and countries in both the North and South 
with critique on general equilibrium economics (Hall & Ludwig 2009; Sheppard 2017). The 
process of cumulative causation is central to this theory (Myrdal 1957; Dawkins 2003; Sheppard 
2017). As such, cumulative causation is crucial in the study of both economic development and 
economic underdevelopment (Myrdal 1957). An example given by Myrdal (1957) is of a 
negative event in a region such as a factory which employs the majority of the residents being 
burnt down with no prospects of rebuilding it again. This sets in motion a spiral of negative 




and a decreased demand for products and services (Myrdal 1957). Similar effects are 
experienced by other businesses or firms in the locality with backward or forward linkages with 
the burnt firm (Myrdal 1957). This results in a process Myrdal (1957: 23) refers to as circular 
causation “with effects which accumulate in the fashion of the ‘vicious cycle’.” If no exogenous 
changes take place, the abovementioned locality becomes less attractive to outside business or 
firms and skilled labour that had previously considered immigrating into the region (Myrdal 
1957). Consequently, effects of the initial negative event continue in a vicious cycle resulting in 
the decline of the locality as relocation of businesses and consequential out-migration of skilled 
labour are set in motion (Myrdal 1957). 
 
This cumulative causation process can, however, also be positive, if an established business or 
firm locates in a locality and allows a quite different narrative for the community (Myrdal 
(1957). In this instance, opportunities are created in terms of employment and higher incomes 
and increased trading opportunities with some firms already in the locality (Myrdal 1957). 
Consequently, the locality is able to attract labour, capital, and enterprise from other 
communities to exploit the created opportunities (Myrdal 1957). The cumulative causation 
theory informs the understanding of out-migration of labour and industries from BMP. 
Furthermore, the factors that cause the out-migration taking place are understood and explained 
in the context of this theory. However, the positive cumulative causation is also vital in this study 
as strategies are sought that promote economic resilience in BMP possibly through improving 
the attractiveness of the metropolis to labour, capital, and enterprise from other regions. 
 
The different forces active in the cumulative causation theory are referred to as the spread and 
backwash effects (Myrdal 1957; Knight & Shi 1997; Dawkins 2003; Hall & Ludwig 2009; 
Sheppard 2017) and are also known as positive and negative feedbacks (Knight & Shi 1997). 
Spread effects can be described simply as the positive benefits experienced in the surrounding 
regions emanating from the growth at the centre of economic expansion (Myrdal 1957). Thus, 
spread effects are expected to benefit lagging regions through offering an established market for 
their products (Myrdal 1957; Dawkins 2003). On the other hand, capital and labour flight 




2009). Accordingly, the growth experienced in one locality may result in negative growth effects 
in surrounding localities (Myrdal 1957). The differential action of spread and backwash effects 
leads to regional economic inequalities with some regions experiencing development and others 
underdevelopment. The theory also guides the understanding of how the study area, as a lagging 
region, can benefit from regions experiencing economic growth and how the benefits can be 
converted to economic resilience. The capital and labour flight prevailing in BMP are explained 
in light of the backwash effects as the metropolis is losing skilled labour and investment to other 
countries especially in Southern Africa.  
 
2.3.1.3 The theory of unbalanced growth 
 
The unbalanced growth theory is an antithesis to the theory of balanced growth (Hirschman 
1958; Yeung 2017; Saliminezhad & Lisaniler 2018). In this theory, regional disparities are 
inevitable and necessary for furtherance of growth (Hirschman 1958; Yeung 2017).  
Development polarisation is expected to benefit both core and the peripheral regions in the long 
run (Dawkins 2003). Accordingly, investments should be directed towards key sectors of the 
economy (Hirschman 1958; Saliminezhad & Lisaniler 2018). Growth in these key sectors is 
believed to finally initiate growth in the other sectors through positive externalities (Hirschman 
1958; Saliminezhad & Lisaniler 2018). Forward and backward linkages between industries 
transfer growth from core to peripheral regions (Hirschman 1958). This is made possible through 
a process of trickling-down, as goods produced in the periphery are purchased and labour is hired 
by the core region (Dawkins 2003).  
 
The unbalanced growth theory is specifically applicable to the analysis of imbalances between 
various sectors in an economy. The unbalanced growth processes are considered necessary for 
economic growth (Hirschman 1958; Saliminezhad & Lisaniler 2018). Hirschman (1958) argues 
that due to the interdependence of sectors in the economy, the growth of one sector generates 
forces that eventually get rid of imbalances since growth in one sector should not be at the 
expense of the other sectors. The forces that underpin the economy ensure the disappearance of 




effects are eventually outweighed by the trickling down effects as economic policies are enacted 
to address the unfavourable effects of polarisation (Hirschman 1958; Dawkins 2003). This theory 
proffers important insights into understanding industrial decline in BMP. The propositions of the 
theory are used to evaluate how forward and backward linkages influence the economic 
resilience of the study area. Furthermore, social overhead investments in Bulawayo are analysed 
through the lens of the unbalanced growth theory. Likewise, strategy options for economic 
resilience in the metropolis are also discussed in light of this theory. 
 
Unbalanced growth is a possible strategy to achieve economic growth in countries in the South. 
These countries are characterised by low financial capital, an inability to create an environment 
for massive investment, and limited diversity in human resource skills (Saliminezhad & Lisaniler 
2018). In these circumstances, simultaneous investment in all sectors is difficult to achieve. As 
such, adopting an unbalanced growth strategy in Bulawayo can prove to be a strategy option for 
resilience in the long run. 
 
2.3.1.4 Economic base theory 
 
The economic base theory (EBT) is also popularly known as the export base theory (Stimson, 
Stough & Roberts 2006) and was propounded by Charles Tiebout and Douglas North in the 
1950s (Dawkins 2003). Economic base analysis divides the economy into two sectors, the 
economic base or export sector and the residentiary or non-basic sector (Dawkins 2003; Stimson, 
Stough & Roberts 2006; Szajnowska-Wysocka 2009). The economic base constitutes a group of 
industries that produce goods and services consumed within the region and also outside the 
boundaries of the region (Stimson, Stough & Roberts 2006; Szajnowska-Wysocka 2009). The 
expansion of the economic base is expected to positively influence development through a 
multiplier effect (Stimson, Stough & Roberts 2006). As such, economic base expansion results in 
an increase of export goods and services sold to consumers outside the region’s boundaries while 
at the same time increasing cash inflows that can be used to generate new local consumption 





The non-basic sector constitutes industries that produce goods and services that are only 
consumed within the region and are not meant for export (Stimson, Stough & Roberts 2006). In 
the Global South, this sector is mainly dominated by informal production processes. As such, De 
Soto (2001a) argues that most countries’ assets in the South are dead capital while in countries in 
the North, they are live capital that is able to create wealth. Dead capital refers to assets that are 
unable to enter the formal market and whose full potential cannot be realised because they are 
internalised (De Soto 2001a). These assets are ‘useless’ because they cannot be used as collateral 
against a bank loan or any other payments (De Soto 2001a) with resultant negative implications 
on the economies in the South. It is seen that live assets produce abundant wealth in the North 
however with more dead capital in the South, there are also very little wealth in the South (De 
Soto 2001b).  
 
Capital is an important catalyst for increased labour productivity and wealth creation in nations 
(De Soto 2001b). However, capital is scarce in the Global South and the majority of what is 
available is trapped in the informal sector as dead capital. Tracing and validating ownership of 
these assets is a difficult task (De Soto 2001b). This limits the potential of these assets in terms 
of economic utility as they cannot be used to generate surplus value (De Soto 2001b). In 
comparison, capital in the formal sector is live capital, representing assets with clear and 
traceable ownership which are highly formalised and legally governed (De Soto 2001a). These 
assets are therefore able to generate more capital and also contribute in the creation of regional or 
national wealth (De Soto 2001a).   
 
 The economic base theory guides the understanding of the industrial decline in BMP and how 
this affects economic resilience in the metropolis. The division of the industries in BMP into 
basic and non-basic sectors, and the assessment of the challenges faced by industries in these 
sectors are guided by this theory. In addition, the strategy options for economic resilience in 
BMP can be interpreted and understood in light of strengthening the economic base. The related 
concept of dead versus live capital guides discussions on ways of improving the informal sector 
in BMP so that it becomes an important variable in the regional economic resilience matrix. 




informal sector into live capital. In this regard, valuable lessons can be learnt from the 
experiences of Japan. Sub-contracting linkages between SMEs and large corporations improved 
SMEs technologically and also their access to export markets (Kimura 2009). Furthermore, 
Kimura (2009: 15) noted that SMEs “became the source of international competitiveness among 
the Japanese industries in the 1970s, and took an important role in extending production 
networks to East Asia in the 1990s and thereafter.” Accordingly, the possibility of such linkages 
in Bulawayo is analysed with the aim of promoting technology transfers from large to small 
firms, and also converting ‘dead’ into ‘live’ capital. 
 
The EBT also guides the assessment of the industrial and economic diversification in BMP. 
Regions experiencing growth are expected to have their economies diversifying as production 
increases to serve both the local and export market (Dawkins 2003). Economic diversification is 
an equally important aspect of economic resilience.  The theory therefore provides a good basis 
for measuring and evaluating economic resilience in cities in the South where informality is 
widespread (Geyer 2006). The inclusion of informal sectors in the analysis of economic 
resilience is one of the central tenets of this study, as most economies in Africa are dualistic in 
nature (Geyer 1989). Both basic and non-basic industries are vital to the economy of BMP. 
Enhancement of basic industries increases monetary inflows used for further developmental 
needs in the metropolis. Likewise, non-basic industries need to continually meet local demand 
for goods and services and also promote the circulation of export proceeds in the city. The 
relationship between basic and non-basic industries in Bulawayo is therefore examined in light 
of the EBT. 
 
2.3.1.5 Industrial district theory versus industrial cluster theory 
 
Both the industrial district and industrial cluster theories are adopted in the conceptualisation of 
industrial agglomeration and deglomeration in BMP. Propositions in these theories aid the 
explanation of economic phenomena in the study area. In addition, strategy options to improve 
the current and prospective industrial districts and clusters are also guided by these theories. The 




The concept was further expanded by scholars such as Becattini in 1990. The industrial district 
theory emphasises the central role of space in economic development and is applicable in 
explaining clustering of industries in countries in the North and South (Capello 2010). Three 
forms of organisation are evident in industrial districts. According to Loasby (2009: 80) these are 
“single businesses, groups of similar businesses and groups of different kinds of businesses.” 
This coincides with the ideas of scale economies, localisation economies, and urbanisation 
economies explained earlier on. When these forms combine in an industrial district, efficiency 
achieved as shared knowledge is exploited by the firms involved (Loasby 2009). While a single 
firm system is vital for the creation and application of knowledge, variation of production 
procedures and products is regarded as central in the concentration of similar businesses (Loasby 
2009). This brings about economic development as relationships among firms generate external 
economies necessary for growth (Loasby 2009).  
 
In the initial development of the industrial district theory, Marshall (1920) observed that textile 
industries were mainly concentrated in the same areas with mining and engineering industries. 
Although this may no longer be applicable in the modern-day economic configurations, the 
factors behind localisation of industries in the early industrial districts are helpful in explaining 
the early agglomeration of industries in BMP. Apart from that, the industrial district theory also 
indirectly explains factors that affect economic resilience. A district dominated by one industry 
risks decline if demand for the products of the concerned industry decreases. Marshall (1920) 
noted that this predicament is avoided in large industrial districts or large towns with a 
diversified industrial base. Thus, analysing prospects for industrial diversification in BMP is 
guided by the industrial district theory. 
 
The further development of the industrial district theory in the 1990s witnessed the redefinition 
of an industrial district. Becattini (1990: 38) defined an industrial district as “a socio-territorial 
entity which is characterized by the active presence of both a community of people and a 
population of firms in one naturally and historically bounded area.” The local community in this 
instance is taken to be a ‘homogeneous system of values and views’ (Becattini 1990). In his re-




as each firm specialises in a single or few stages of the district’s production process. However, 
he agrees with Marshall (1920) that in an industrial district, unlike a generic economic region, 
industrial activity is the dominant economic action. Though unlikely in Bulawayo, Becattini 
(1990) considered industrial activity to be socially embedded, with kinship ties between 
entrepreneurs. These new insights guide the evaluation of relationships that exist among 
industries in BMP, while at the same time examining their utility to the economic resilience of 
the metropolis.  
 
Besides the Marshallian and Italian industrial districts, Markusen (1996) has proposed three 
additional types that include hub-and-spoke district, satellite platform, and the state-anchored 
district. The hub-and-spoke industrial district has one or more key economic activities (firms or 
economic facilities) that are central to a regional economy (Markusen 1996). Other firms in the 
same district are spread around the dominant one in a spoke-like pattern (Markusen 1996). 
Examples of hub-and-spoke industrial districts as observed by Markusen (1996: 302) include 
“Seattle and central New Jersey, United States; Toyota City, Japan; Ulsan and Pohang, South 
Korea; San Jose dos Campos in Brazil.” In these districts, the dominant economic activity 
purchases from local and external suppliers but mainly sells its products externally (Markusen 
1996). Hub-and-spoke districts are rarely found in Bulawayo. No evidence exists, of firms that 
are huge and specialised like Boeing in Seattle or Toyota in Toyota City. Satellite platforms 
constitute an agglomeration of branch facilities belonging to firms that are externally located and 
have multiple plants (Markusen 1996). In most instances the branch facilities are located a 
distance from the main branches so as to promote and stimulate regional growth in lagging areas 
and simultaneously as a way of reducing the firm’s operation costs (Markusen 1996). Through 
their key investment decisions, large firms that are externally situated dominate the business 
structure in satellite platforms (Markusen 1996). In as much as this arrangement is applicable in 
Bulawayo, the firms’ location pattern seems to depart from Markusen’s (1996) formulation. 
However, this formulation is adopted in explaining the shrinkage of branches in Bulawayo 





State-anchored industrial districts are dependent on either public or non-profit entities and may 
be in form of a concentration of government offices, military, or university facilities (Markusen 
1996). The dominant facilities in the business structure of state-anchored industrial districts are 
controlled in the political realm as opposed to the private sector (Markusen 1996). The prospects 
for long-term growth in these districts are influenced by two factors. According to Markusen 
(1996: 307) the two factors are the growth prospects of the dominant facility and “the extent to 
which the facility encourages growth within the region by spawning local suppliers, spinning off 
new businesses, or supplying labor or other factors of production to the local economy.” Two 
features of Markusen’s (1996) industrial districts that are applicable in explaining phenomena in 
this study are lack of patient capital (long-term capital) in regions and the firm location patterns 
in satellite platforms. These features help explain MSMEs’ lack of access to business capital and 
the closure of some firms in Bulawayo. 
 
Industrial cluster theory is closely linked to the industrial district theory. The theory was 
propounded by Michael Porter in 1990. As noted by Porter (2000: 15) “Clusters are geographic 
concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in 
related industries, and associated institutions (e.g., universities, standards agencies, trade 
associations) in a particular field that compete but also cooperate.” Thus, clusters according to 
Porter & Ketels (2009: 173) are driven by “supplier relations, common labour markets, rivalry, 
knowledge spillovers, and learning effects.” In the theory, Porter (1990; 2000) presents the 
‘diamond of national advantage’ that explains the attributes a nation creates for its industry. 
These attributes include factor conditions (factors of production in a state), demand conditions 
(local demand for industry’s goods and services), related and supporting industries 
(unavailability or availability of competitive supplier and other related industries), and firm 
strategy, culture, and rivalry (rules and regulations controlling creation, organisation, and 
management of companies and competition). The ‘diamond’ works as a system that eventually 
makes way for the clustering of competitive firms (Porter 1990). This theory guides the 





Clusters can be found in small or big economies and at different geographical levels such as 
nations, states, metropolitan regions, and cities (Porter 2000). They are underpinned by three 
dimensions, namely the geographic dimension (concentration of clusters in different localities), 
the activity dimension (interconnected activities of companies in different industries), and the 
business environment dimension (clusters affected by actions of different institutions for 
example, those in private and public sectors) (Porter & Ketels 2009). It is important to realise 
that favourable business environments are necessary for the emergence and full development of 
clusters (Porter & Ketels 2009).  In addition, linkages and complementarities amongst the 
industries and other entities are essential in clusters, especially for competitiveness (Porter 1990; 
2000). These attributes of the theory are used to understand and explain the business 
environment (in terms of its suitability to support cluster emergence and growth), the linkages 
amongst different industrial activities, and the level of competitiveness of the industries in the 
study area. In addition, the role of government in cluster development and growth, and in 
promoting economic resilience, is assessed in light of this theory. Porter (1990; 2000) noted that 
government plays a vital role in the economy, including ensuring the achievement of 
macroeconomic and political stability, improving microeconomic capacity, and establishing the 
micro-economic rules and incentives governing competition.  
 
Countries in the South are typically characterised by less developed clusters. The clusters are 
hamstrung by inadequate supporting industries and institutions and hence competition of firms is 
mainly based on cheap labour and locally available natural resources (Porter & Ketels 2009). 
Because the firms in these clusters are mainly dependent on components, machinery, and 
technology that are imported the economic resilience of the clusters is heavily compromised 
(Porter & Ketels 2009).  The challenges faced by the industries in BMP can therefore be assessed 
using these theories of sustained growth and development. The economic activities of clusters 
and industrial districts have an impact on a locality’s economic performance (Porter & Ketels 
2009). However, these two theories differ in terms of scope and extent. Porter & Ketels (2009) 
noted that industrial districts focus on agglomerations of mainly small or light manufacturing 




configurations including those found in industrial districts (Porter & Ketels 2009). Industrial 
districts can therefore rather be conceptualised as a type of cluster. 
 
2.3.2 Business relocation theories 
 
Relocation entails the movement of a firm from one location to another (Pellenbarg, Van Wissen 
& Van Dijk 2002; Brouwer, Mariotti & Van Ommeren 2004). It can be necessitated by firm 
expansion and/or the need to reduce costs as firms seek to locate in areas with favourable cost 
conditions (Brouwer, Mariotti & Van Ommeren 2004). Competitiveness is an important reason 
for relocation as the need to remain competitive pushes firms to move from one location to the 
other (Birkinshaw et al. 2006). Relocation theories can be subdivided into neo-classical, 
behavioural, and institutional approaches (Pellenbarg, Van Wissen & Van Dijk 2002; Brouwer, 
Mariotti & Van Ommeren 2004). 
 
The neo-classical approach seeks to explain the locational and the push factors that influence a 
firm’s relocation decisions (Pellenbarg, Van Wissen & Van Dijk 2002). Accordingly, Pellenbarg, 
Van Wissen & Van Dijk (2002: 6) noted that: “The spatial margins to profitability discriminate 
between profitable and unprofitable locations, and are therefore useful in determining where a 
firm should locate (pull).” A firm therefore chooses an optimal location that supports profit 
maximisation. Location factors such as transport and labour costs could thus drive firm 
relocation (Brouwer, Mariotti & Van Ommeren 2004). A firm migrates from an unprofitable 
location (push factor) to a profitable one (pull factor) (Brouwer, Mariotti & Van Ommeren 
2004). The propositions of the neo-classical approach inform the understanding and assessment 
of firm relocation patterns in Bulawayo and their consequential effects to the economy. 
Furthermore, the propositions inform strategy options for regional attractiveness to capital and 
enterprises. 
 
The behavioural approach has strong links with the neo-classical approach though its emphasis is 
on understanding the behaviour of entrepreneurs that influences relocation decisions (Pellenbarg, 




this approach “seeks to understand actual behaviour of entrepreneurs and focuses on the decision 
making process, that may led [sic] to relocation and takes also path-dependency and relocation 
costs into account.” The behavioural approach is different from the neo-classical approach as the 
behavioural approach does not consider costs associated with relocation (Brouwer, Mariotti & 
Van Ommeren 2004). In this study, factors other than profit maximisation, that are influencing 
industrial decline and deglomeration, are explained in light of the behavioural approach.  
 
The institutional approach assumes that economic activity is socially and institutionally 
embedded thus, the firm’s investment strategies determine the firm’s location behaviour 
(Brouwer, Mariotti & Van Ommeren 2004). Institutions such as the real estate market have the 
ability to influence firm relocation through land prices (Pellenbarg, Van Wissen & Van Dijk 
2002). Thus, this approach guides the analysis of how various institutions influence industrial 




A comprehensive analysis and explanation of the concepts and theories guiding this study was 
presented in this chapter. The main concept is economic resilience followed by agglomeration 
economies. These concepts are central in the analysis of regional economic development. Apart 
from that, theories of regional development have been summarised indicating their influence on 
the conceptualisation of phenomena in the study. The essence was to explain how these theories 
shed light on the economic growth or decline of cities and towns, and how the propositions of 
these theories can help understand and explain regional economic resilience. Finally, a review of 
relocation theories was presented, highlighting how they inform in- and out-migration of 
industries in the study area. The conceptual and theoretical underpinnings covered in this chapter 






CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENT DRIVERS AND RESTRICTORS 
 
“Development has been taken to mean different things at different times, in different places, and 




This chapter briefly examines the concept of development highlighted from different 
perspectives available in literature. More emphasis is given to economic development as it is 
closely linked to the notion of economic resilience, the main concept guiding this study. The 
drivers and restrictors of development are then analysed with the purpose of exploring different 
strategies that can promote regional economic resilience in countries in the Global South. 
 
3.2 THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
The term ‘development’ has a variety of meanings in different contexts (Schumpeter 1934; 
Hamburger 1957; Harris 1957; Nagel 1957; Robbins 1968; Seers 1969; Sen 1988; Närman 1997; 
Chambers 2004; Morvaridi 2008; Mancini & Roberto 2009; Esteva 2010; Todaro & Smith 
2015). Sometimes these various meanings could end up being confusing. Accordingly, Chambers 
(2004) argues that realities in development are many and varied, including economic, social, and 
political realities. While the study acknowledges the multidisciplinarity of the meaning and 
approaches to development, this chapter mainly focuses on economic development and 
sustainable development. The decision is motivated by the centrality of these two approaches in 
the discussion of regional economic resilience.  
 
3.2.1 Development as economic growth 
 
The conceptualisation of development as economic growth is linked to early scholars of which 




development as the undertaking of new combinations of economic activity. This 
conceptualisation involved establishing one or a combination of the following: a new good, a 
new production method, a new market, a new source of raw materials, and a new industrial 
organisation. Accordingly, development is achieved as an outcome of economic growth (Soares 
& Quintella 2008). Similarly, development is linked to the achievement of sustained per capita 
income enabling the nation’s output to grow faster than its population growth rate (Todaro & 
Smith 2015). In this perspective, development is equated to growth in the per capita income of 
those in economically underdeveloped regions (Esteva 2010). Development is also taken to be 
synonymous with economic development.  However, economic development in literature has in 
some instances, been equated to economic growth or growth in general (Chambers 2004; Jhingan 
2011). In repudiation Jhingan (2011) noted that, economic development refers to 
underdevelopment problems of countries in the South whilst economic growth is associated with 
countries in the North. This indicates that economic development is a wider concept than 
economic growth (Jhingan 2011).  
 
The attainment of economic growth is mostly accompanied by economic development. However, 
such development could occur mainly amongst the higher echelons in the labour market without 
guaranteeing immediate economic development amongst the lower echelons. According to Seers 
(1969) and Jhingan (2011), the growth of any economy will not lead to development as long as 
poverty, unemployment, and income inequalities remain widespread. This represents an 
overstatement, though. In most cases growth in an economy leads to some development, but 
when such growth does not significantly reduce poverty, unemployment, and inequality, it 
remains ineffective over the shorter term. However, economic growth always leads to greater 
gains in government coffers, which then enables government to reinvest this income in the 
economy to the benefit of the lower echelons in the labour market. This is what Hirschman, in 
his classic publication of 1958, referred to as the difference between the social overhead capital 
(SOC) approach in contrast to the direct productive activities (DPA) approach in development 
thinking. The former leads to investment of government in social overhead as a result of higher 
levels of income (the outcome of a growth-driven economy) compared to one in which 




and immediately. In the SOC approach, government identifies economic sectors with strong 
growth potential in order to make social overhead investments in those sectors with the aim of 
expanding employment opportunities once those sectors respond to the social overhead 
investments. Both approaches, however, require economic growth, in fact it is hard to imagine 
how economic development could be achieved without economic growth.   
 
Linked to the conceptualisation of ‘development as economic development’, is the understanding 
of development as increased industrialisation. This perception was mainly held after World War 
II and this view was influenced by the rebuilding and repairing of buildings and infrastructure 
destroyed during the war. Because of all the rebuilding exercises, this pre-war period was 
marked by the centrality of development (Rapley 2007). Organisations such as the World Bank, 
viewed development as industrialisation, development was therefore meant to improve people’s 
incomes so that they could afford different types of goods and services (Rapley 2007). Thus, it 
could be seen that prosperity and opulence were the main targets of development during the pre-
war era (Rapley 2007). In addition, development strategies were mainly meant to achieve rapid 
industrialisation and the abandonment of agriculture (Todaro & Smith 2015). This approach 
placed more value on the capacity of a country to manufacture finished goods. However, in 
Africa, it is difficult to abandon agriculture and focus only on rapid industrialisation. To this day, 
most economies are still agro-based with a low level of investment in industrial infrastructure. In 
fact, the available infrastructure in Africa was largely inherited from former colonial 
governments and in Zimbabwe, little has been done to improve industrial infrastructure after 
achieving independence. Consequently, industrial productivity has remained low. 
 
The need to industrialise was twofold especially in African and Asian countries that had gained 
independence. These countries not only needed to improve the lives of citizens, they also had to 
consolidate their newly gained independence (Rapley 2007). Furthermore, these countries 
wanted to convert their newly achieved political equality with countries in the North, into 
economic equality (Rapley 2007). However, achieving economic equality was not any easy task. 
A lot had to be learnt from countries in the North in terms of governance structures and 




development common in the South after World War II, was criticised as a restrictor of growth 
(Rapley 2007). Proponents of the neoclassical approach argued that the state was the main cause 
of development failure in the South whilst their critics, the dependency theorists, blamed the 
market (Rapley 2007). Neoclassical protagonists advocated rolling back the state, while the 
dependency theorists supported more state intervention in development (Rapley 2007). It was the 
neoclassical theorists that got an upper hand in the debate in the late 1970s, resulting in the 
implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in most countries in the South 
(Rapley 2007). However, the SAPs did not deliver the expected results and even though positive 
results were recorded in the advanced countries in the South, the same results were not recorded 
in the countries regarded as poorer and in most need for rapid growth (Rapley 2007; Jhingan 
2011). 
 
The reasons behind the failure of SAPs in countries in the South are varied. Firstly, there were 
inevitable regional disparities. The same policy implemented in different regions achieved 
above-average economic growth in some and below-average growth in others (Richardson 
1973). Secondly, the failure of SAPs in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) seemed predetermined as 
most countries in this region wanted to dismantle capitalism after they attained independence. 
Consequently, these countries adopted socialism (Rich 1976; Nyerere 1987; Bamikole 2012; 
Martin 2012; Ikechukwu 2016). SAPs were therefore not well-received by government officials 
and the general populace who ideologically were socialist. Thirdly, those who had converted to 
the capitalist ideology were not fully equipped to oversee the efficient implementation of neo-
liberal programmes. These challenges were primarily behind the failure of SAPs to deliver 
wealth in some African countries.  
 
Other factors that also hindered the success of SAPs in African countries include insufficient 
entrepreneurship, corruption, lack of political commitment, and weak government institutions 
(Singh 2012; Negussie 2018). As an example, high corruption levels in government ministries 
and departments have in most cases made development funds ‘disappear’. In Zimbabwe, for 
instance, funds disappear from government coffers without proper explanation. The levels of 




book often have the result that corrupt culprits are neither charged nor arrested. Even when 
arrests are made, the subsequent court cases are either abandoned or the accused are acquitted in 
unclear circumstances.  
 
The perception that development should be seen as economic development, faced growing 
challenges, especially after World War II (Seers 1969). Quantitative indicators of economic 
development, such as gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP) per 
capita, further limited the broader goals of development (Esteva 2010). In this instance it is 
worth looking at India as an example. In the 1990s, India managed to improve average growth 
rates to above 6% as compared to earlier rates that were less than 3% (Nadkarni 2001). However, 
this economic growth was coupled with high rates of poverty and threats to natural resources 
(Nadkarni 2001). It is thus clear that economic development does not always lead to poverty 
reduction (Kwon & Yi 2015). As such, Nadkarni (2001), Heintz (2015), Kwon & Yi (2015), and 
Todaro & Smith (2015) noted that economic development cannot be synonymous with 
development in general but constitutes a part of what development is all about. Furthermore, 
Esteva (2010) argues that the meaning of the word ‘development’ is impoverished when it is 
equated to economic development or economic growth. However Esteva’s (2010) argument has 
to be taken cautiously, as economic growth is still the key that unlocks other development facets 
in the countries of the Global South, where, once economic growth is achieved, it paves the way 
for other development, such as human and social development.  
 
Development interventions can sometimes result in increased GNP but at the same time 
negatively affect other freedoms such as social and economic opportunities enjoyed by the poor. 
Nadkarni (2001) describes this development as elitist in nature as it largely serves the interests of 
the rich. Nadkarni (2001) continues by calling this development category destructive 
development that not only worsens poverty and also results in environmental degradation.  It is 
however possible that Nadkarni’s (2001) statements are inflated, since a growing economy 
seldom leads to a worsening of poverty, unless it is associated with large-scale brain draining – 
the abandoning of the former productive sector of economies – as has happened in many African 




environmental degradation. In fact, environmental degradation in a growing economy is usually 
associated with the relaxing or absence of government oversight of industrial processes. 
 
Eradicating income inequalities in countries in the South is a daunting adventure. Any attempt 
should be a two-way process whereby both government and the general populace, especially the 
poor, are involved. If government provides the economic opportunities for growth, the choice is 
on the poor to grab such opportunities in order to improve their income. Thus, in a growing 
economy the poor should complement the government’s efforts in reducing the income gap 
between them and the rich. However, if the poor fold their arms and wait for government alone 
to solve their problems, the whole process becomes futile. 
 
3.2.2 Development as ‘sustainable development’ 
 
Sustainable development lacks a clear and unambiguous definition (Soares & Quintella 2008). 
Despite its growing use in literature and policy debates, sustainable development has been 
conceptualised and interpreted differently (Hediger 1997; Kambites 2014) with no agreement on 
the meaning of the term (Kambites 2014). Sustainable development emerged in literature in the 
1970s and was further defined by the Brundtland Commission in 1987 (Soares & Quintella 2008; 
Jhingan 2011; Kambites 2014). In general, sustainable development focuses on addressing the 
needs of the current generation without compromising those of future generations (Jhingan 2011; 
Armeanu, Vintila & Gherghina 2018). Accordingly, the concept advocates development that 
speaks to economic, social, and ecological aspects (Hediger 1997; Soares & Quintella 2008; 
Armeanu, Vintila & Gherghina 2018).  
 
It is vital to re-visit the sustainability debate between the neo-liberals and the socialists. While 
Seers (1969) argued that development should address inequality, this can be understood and 
interpreted by looking at different development approaches. In general, socialists believe that 
neo-liberal policies are unsustainable. Furthermore, development should bring about equality in 




equality in the long run. As an example, Hirschman (1958) believes that uneven growth among 
sectors in an economy is necessary to achieve economic growth in the long run. Hirschman 
(1958) repudiates the idea of balanced growth and argues that an effective policy of development 
should maintain the tensions, disproportions, and disequilibria, thus keeping the economy 
progressive.  
 
It is difficult for countries in the South to achieve a balanced growth of SOC and DPA 
(Hirschman 1958).4 This is linked to shortages of capital to simultaneously invest in all sectors. 
Accordingly, a choice has to be made. Hirschman (1958) believes that preference should be 
given to an investment sequence that is self-reinforcing. Investments in SOC should be done first 
as these are a prerequisite for DPA investments. Furthermore, economic development is largely 
influenced by the availability of SOC. As an example, Hirschman (1958: 84) argues that, 
“availabilities of electric power and of transportation facilities are essential preconditions for 
economic development practically everywhere … . Investment in SOC is advocated … because 
it permits and in fact, invites DPA to come in.” Thus uneven growth is supported with the view 
that sustainable development is achieved over a long period of time. Furthermore, 
complementarities are expected to bring about further investments that will positively transform 
the economy (Hirschman 1958). This approach is unlike the equality advocated by the socialists, 
which can be short-lived.  
 
In African countries, such as Zimbabwe, unbalanced growth is a useful development approach. 
The justification emanates from an acute shortage of investment capital and other challenges 
such as institutional weaknesses. A balanced-growth approach under these circumstances is 
difficult to achieve and for this reason a better option would be that of unbalanced growth. 
However, government has to play a key role in social overhead investments. As noted by 
Hirschman (1958), entrepreneurs on the brink of investment may be motivated by good SOC 
facilities. Low quality social overhead investments in Bulawayo are therefore one of the main 
factors that impedes economic growth and development in the metropolis.  
                                                 
4SOC refers to those important basic services that support primary, secondary and tertiary productive activities while 




In the sustainable development process, government can be involved in different tasks that 
sometimes seem contradictory. According to Hirschman (1958) the role of government in the 
development process is to initiate the whole process. This involves laying down pre-requisites 
for development to take place. In the view of Hirschman (1958) this role involves investment in 
SOC which in turn lures DPA. This is where some countries in Southern Africa seem to be 
failing, as little has been done after independence in terms of social overhead investments. Even 
in the instances where social overhead investments have been done, the maintenance of the 
investments have been poor. In Zimbabwe, social overhead investments by government have 
been below expectation. Currently, acute water and power shortages have become disincentives 
for investors (both local and foreign) who might consider investing in the country. The 
predicament is worsened by poorly constructed and maintained transport networks. Apart from 
negatively affecting image of Zimbabwe as an investment destination, these shortages and 
logistical shortcomings have also triggered mass industrial closures and relocations.  
 
The other role of government should be that of pressure-relieving, especially where there are 
market failures (Hirschman 1958). In such circumstances, government should address acute 
shortages and shortcomings in both the education and health sectors as well as in the provision of 
public utilities (Hirschman 1958). This overall role of government is believed to bring about 
sustainability as it addresses the unsustainability brought about by market failures. However, 
despite its role in initiating development, it sometimes seems as if government is not willing to 
appear to be selective or discriminatory, for example, when governments is channelling its 
investment efforts in one region or sector, whilst the need is uniform amongst all regions or 
sectors (Hirschman 1958). Accordingly, government may end up investing in regions or sectors 
that may not induce growth in other regions or sectors. This affects achievement of sustained 
growth and development in the long run, as resources are channelled to non-productive sectors 
and regions. Government policies meant to address regional disparities can also serve as a good 
example here. While regional disparities are inevitable (Richardson 1973), governments in 
countries in the South have invested substantially in trying to reduce the gap between the core 
and lagging regions. Efforts have been through different mechanisms that include incentives and 




Redistributing economic prosperity from the leading to the lagging regions needs a proper 
strategy to avoid becoming a disincentive to those who work hard to bring about the economic 
prosperity, especially when they perceive those in lagging regions as doing nothing to build their 
own wealth.  
 
Government should also make policies that enhance the development process. However, 
development policy by government can either lead to sustainability or unsustainability. In 
circumstances where the policy focuses on key sectors of the economy and is implemented well, 
sustainability is likely to result although these circumstances are rare in countries in the South. 
What seems to be more common in Africa specifically is that development policies become 
politicised. This has also been noted by Richardson (1973) who argues that regional policy 
decisions are political in nature and mainly undertaken by policymakers who purport to represent 
the welfare of society. Likewise, Richardson & Townroe (1986) noted that in countries in the 
South, regional policies can be a result of political pressures or a response to economic 
development programmes. Consistent with the views of Richardson & Townroe (1986) political 
influences in Zimbabwe have favoured some regions or sectors at the expense of other regions or 
sectors.  
 
3.3 DRIVERS AND RESTRICTORS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Factors influencing development differ from one region to another especially when countries in 
the South are compared to those in the North. Emphasis in this study is given to factors 
influencing economic development of countries in the South. However, economic growth cannot 
be ignored as in most cases economic growth and economic development are treated as 









3.3.1 Drivers of economic growth and development 
 
The drivers of development abound and differ from one region to the other. While 
underdevelopment is still a challenge to the majority of countries in the South there are many 
factors that are able to drive economic growth and development in these countries. Lessons can 
be derived from those countries in the South that have managed to achieve high levels of 
economic growth and development. Examples are mainly drawn from countries that resemble 
Zimbabwe in terms of their economic development history and that have managed to transform 
their agro-based economies to modernised and industrialised economies. In light of this, 
examples are drawn from countries that include China, Malaysia, and Thailand. Reference is also 
made to Southeast Asia as a region and the Asian Tigers that, according to Negussie (2018), 
provide lessons to African countries in terms of development paths that can deliver growth and 
development.  
 
Drivers of development are also discussed with particular reference to Japan, which experienced 
a successful transition from being a country in the South to a country in the North (Ohno 2006; 
Kimura 2009). The development history of Japan offers important lessons for countries in the 
South. However, it should be stressed that external forces of development experienced by Japan 
were fundamentally different from those currently faced by countries in the South (Ohno 2006; 
Kimura 2009; Imade 2016). In spite of these differences, some factors that influenced Japan’s 
development success such as improved technology, high capital levels, industrial linkages, and 
human capital development, are still important in contemporary development thinking. This 
justifies drawing development lessons for Zimbabwe from the Japanese development history. 
The economic drivers that are discussed are: natural resource endowment, improved innovation 
and technology, increased investment and capital accumulation or formation, human capital 







3.3.1.1 Natural resource endowment 
 
Natural resource endowment is one of the principal factors that influence the development of an 
economy (Jhingan 2011). Usually a country with abundant natural resources has better prospects 
for economic growth compared to one with limited natural resources (Jhingan 2011; 
Ghazanchyan & Stotsky 2013; Negussie 2018). However, having abundant natural resources 
does not guarantee economic growth or development per se, as it is only through the proper and 
adequate exploitation of those natural resources that the desired results can be delivered.  
Unfortunately, there are some countries in the South that have an abundance of natural resources 
but, because they are underutilising their resources (Jhingan 2011), they are still underdeveloped.  
Negussie (2018) confirms that Africa has failed to develop despite its vast natural resources such 
as gold, diamonds, and oil. Jhingan (2011) adds that countries with limited resources also have 
an equal chance of developing, as new competitive uses for the existing resources, are 
discovered. This argument can be explained by comparing the growth patterns of countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. 
 
After the colonial period, average incomes were greater in Africa compared to Southeast Asia 
(Lewis 2013). With better natural resource endowments and a small population, Africa had better 
growth prospects but by the 1970s growth in Southeast Asia had surpassed that in African 
economies (Lewis 2013). While most countries in SSA were characterised by an acute economic 
downturn resulting in stagnation and increasing poverty, sustained growth and diminishing 
poverty were experienced in Southeast Asian countries (Lewis 2013). African countries 
(inclusive of Zimbabwe) were affected by factors such as macro-economic turbulences, price 
instabilities, fiscal crises, and heavy burdens of debt (Lewis 2013). Labour unrest and political 
instability also played a role. In some cases violent labour demonstrations and political protests 
resulted in the destruction of private property. Furthermore the demand for higher wages and 
prolonged industrial actions increased production costs, while reducing worker productivity. 
Overall these factors disturbed the smooth operation of businesses in Zimbabwe as risk and 
uncertainty increased, and also affected the competitiveness of goods and services on both 




Zimbabwe can learn from the strategies adopted by Japan.5 After adopting its first constitution in 
1889, Japan prioritised adoption of Western technology and development of modern industries 
(Ohno 2006). Japan was also able to achieve sustained growth by maintaining extremely high 
levels of labour productivity and labour stability, by improving educational levels, by integrating 
informal and formal production technology, and by discovering new uses for their limited 
resources coupled with the importation of natural and mineral resources (Ito & Weinstein 1996; 
Kimura 2009; Jhingan 2011). Its superior technology, and research and development, all 
associated with the long-term focus on quality education, also played a key role in its 
development achievement (Kimura 2009; Jhingan 2011). This superior level of technology is 
rarely found in the majority of countries in Africa and partially explains these countries’ failure 
to achieve economic growth and development. 
 
To take advantage of their natural resource endowment, countries in SSA must improve their 
levels of technology as was done in Japan. This would give SSA countries the ability to extract 
their resources at lower and more competitive costs. In addition, improved technology can enable 
these countries to convert their natural resources into finished products (i.e. either secondary or 
tertiary). Finished products fetch better prices in the global market as compared to unprocessed 
and semi-processed goods they are mostly exporting. In Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Agenda for 
Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim Asset) policy was implemented to provide a 
break-away from only being an exporter of primary goods. The Zim Asset policy advocated 
value addition and beneficiation as one of its four clusters. A discussion on this policy is covered 
in Chapter 4.  
 
3.3.1.2 Improved innovation and technology 
 
Innovation is an important driver of development as advancement and improvement of industrial 
processes ahead of others could bring along a comparative advantage. According to Lin (2013: 
                                                 
5 Reference is made to 19th century Japan. According to Ohno (2006: 8), “Japan in the 19th century [was] a weak, 
agricultural, backward country with low technology [before it was] suddenly exposed to influences from the 




260), “A continuous stream of technological innovation is the basis for sustained growth in any 
economy.” Innovation includes new and improved processes, products, and/or services that help 
companies or nations to achieve better performance (Nicolaides 2014). Therefore, innovation can 
originate from individuals who, or companies that, possess the ability to innovate (Nicolaides 
2014). These abilities include the drive and quest for improvement in individuals, companies, 
and even countries. This quest for improvement requires a strong commitment to, and a 
sustainable investment in research and development activities. The motivation is to produce 
goods and services that solve the current and future regional and global challenges as industries 
and countries that are able to offer viable solutions to current and future global problems, enjoy a 
competitive edge in terms of economic growth and development.  
 
Improvements in technology constitute a vital component of economic growth (Jhingan 2011; 
Dao 2014). These improvements are usually associated with changes in production methods, 
resulting in increased labour and capital productivity (Jhingan 2011). However, technological 
advancements are still lagging in some countries in SSA. Most of the production systems in these 
countries are either still in their infancy or in some cases, inefficient. The inefficiency is brought 
about by factors such as gross incompetence, corruption, nepotism, and a lack of proper research 
and development amongst industries. Accordingly, Jhingan (2011) and Todo & Shimamoto 
(2019) noted the importance for countries in the South to import technology from the North for 
use in the interim while efforts are underway to create their own. This happened in Japan and 
China. The success of industrialisation in Japan was partly due to the country’s improvement in 
technology and its importation of sophisticated industrial machines (Kimura 2009). This 
improved export production with consequential growth in real GDP shown in Figure 3.1. 
Although the growth of the Japanese real GDP was negatively affected by WWII in the 1940s, 
the Japanese economy managed to recover from the shock. This clearly indicates a resilience 




                                                 




                                          
       Source: Ito & Weinstein (1996: 208) 
Figure 3.1 Real GDP in Japan from 1880-1995 (in Trillions of 1990 Yen) 
 
In 1978 China’s per capita income was below that of the countries in SSA. However, the per 
capita income, which was by then only US$154, had risen to US$6 100 in 2012 (Lin 2013). 
Similarly, Collins, Bosworth & Rodrik (1996) noted that China, together with countries in East 
Asia, managed to achieve a GDP per capita of 4% from 1960 to 1994 whilst other countries in 
the South experienced a growth of only 2%. China imported technology from other countries in 
the world at a lower cost (Lin 2013). Consequently, China was able to undertake massive 
production that led to a rapid increase in international trade and increased the share of 
manufactured goods in her exports from 75% in 1979 to levels above 95% in 2009 (Lin 2013). 
Apart from that, China changed its focus from the manufacturing of cheap goods such as toys 
and textiles to high-tech machinery and high-end ICT products (Lin 2013).  
 
Zimbabwe can draw important lessons from the economic and development history of both 
Japan and China. The replacement of old and inefficient machines in the industry by 
sophisticated and technologically advanced machines can provide the much-needed opportunity 
to transform Zimbabwe’s economic performance. This would also enable the production of high-
end goods that can be sold internationally at higher prices. Since Zimbabwe is financially 




productivity. It is also important that research and development be undertaken as a way of 
encouraging the proper assimilation and adaptation of imported technology to Zimbabwe’s factor 
endowments (Jhingan 2011). 
 
3.3.1.3 Increased investment and capital accumulation or formation 
 
In the Global South, both public and private investments are critical for economic growth and 
development (Ghazanchyan & Stotsky 2013; Diaconu 2014). Amongst other factors, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) was behind the growth of economies in Southeast Asia (Diaconu 2014) 
and such growth was mainly experienced in policy-oriented industries. The countries that 
invested in Southeast Asia were their neighbours and also those in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Diaconu 2014). For example, the growth of 
countries, such as Thailand, could be attributed to FDI that originated in Japan (Burton 1989). 
Furthermore, Burton (1989: 664) noted that the Asian Tigers managed to attract FDI because 
they “offer hospitable environments for outsiders to do business, with strong government support 
for foreign investment … stable and predictable regulations, respect for contracts, and a good 
trade oriented economic infrastructure including adequate dock facilities and reliable 
telecommunications.” These are positive attributes that should be emulated by countries in SSA 
such as Zimbabwe. It is also clear that improvements in economic regulations and policies can 
improve the rate of FDI in the country.  
 
Government expenditure in African countries should be targeted towards growth stimulating 
investments as is done by some countries in the South. Ghazanchyan & Stotsky (2013) noted that 
government expenditure or consumption in SSA has been dragging the rate of economic growth.  
Ballooning government expenditures in many African countries have crippled economic 
progress, scaring away potential investors. These expenditures have been on non-productive 
sectors with some capital being lost through political graft. It must however be noted that 
increased government expenditure does not always stifle economic growth and development, for 
instance, government expenditure that is directed towards infrastructure that supports economic 




Weinstein 1996; Kimura 2009). Japan for example, has managed to achieve growth through 
increased investments in economic infrastructure (Kimura 2009). Thus, government expenditure 
in productive sectors can positively influence economic growth and development in Zimbabwe. 
 
Closely linked to investment, is the process of capital formation. With the emergence of 
development economics in the 1940s and 1950s, capital formation became central to 
development (Huq & Tribe 2004; Dao 2014). Capital formation entails the increase of capital 
stock over time (Jhingan 2011) by foreign or local investors through social overhead 
investments. The process can be self-reinforcing (i.e. the ability of a system to propel itself) and 
would include the presence and increase in real savings, the availability of credit and financial 
institutions that could divert these savings to desired channels, and the utilisation of savings for 
capital goods investment (Jhingan 2011). Loans, grants, and increased exports can also boost 
capital formation (Jhingan 2011). Capital formation and investments are not only important in 
the achievement of economic growth and development; they can also positively influence 
economic resilience.  The ability to accumulate or form capital that can be utilised in both SOC 
and DPA investments depict the economy’s ability to resist shocks and/or recover from them.  
 
3.3.1.4 Human capital factor 
 
An increase in the efficiency and productivity of human resources (i.e. human capital formation) 
positively influences economic growth and development (Jhingan 2011; Ghazanchyan & Stotsky 
2013; Dao 2014). Human capital formation involves increased spending on education, health, 
and social services sectors (Jhingan 2011), and is consistent with the views of Sen (1985; 2000; 
2003) and Nussbaum (2003; 2011). The labour force with correct and required education and 
training and a high productive efficiency, has the ability to deliver rapid economic growth 
(Jhingan 2011; Armeanu, Vintila & Gherghina 2018). However, high literacy rates in Africa 
have, in some instances, failed to produce the required skill set to drive economic growth. In 
Zimbabwe the shortages of skilled manpower in key fields have prompted a recent focus on 




levels going upwards. This refocus can create a labour force with the right skills that are required 
to achieve rapid growth in Zimbabwe.  
 
In Southeast Asia the improvement of human capital enhanced the operation and maintenance of 
machines (Brueckner & Kraipornsak 2016) that were instrumental in massive export production. 
Accordingly, it can be said that education needs to be tailor-made to the country’s developmental 
needs. In Malaysia the industrialisation process was heavily backed by its focused educational 
system (Tan 2014; Khazanah Research Institute 2018). Government expenditure on improving 
education in Malaysia increased from 500 million to 55.6 billion Malaysian Ringgit7  in the 
period 1970 to 2016 (Khazanah Research Institute 2018). The improvements produced human 
capital with expertise required to drive the industrialisation process (Tan 2014; Khazanah 
Research Institute 2018). These strategies can also be adopted by African countries to improve 
their economies. As part of a strategy to support the current government’s drive towards re-
industrialisation Zimbabwe is currently at an advanced stage of refocusing the education on 
industrial needs. If the educational refocusing programme is able to produce a highly skilled and 
technical labour force Zimbabwe’s prospects to attract foreign investment are likely to increase.  
 
Continual improvement of worker productivity is vital for self-sustaining economic growth 
(Patel 1986) and also for economic resilience, especially in circumstances where worker 
productivity continually increases against prevailing shocks and stresses. However, increasing 
productivity can be influenced by social justice (Patel 1986) and how high productivity is 
rewarded. The prospects of the equitable distribution of the benefits of higher productivity act as 
incentives amongst the labour force to continually increase productivity. The opposite can also 
be true. Widespread economic inequality (for example income inequalities between the rich and 
the poor working class) can frustrate the drive for increased productivity. However, long term 
commitment and investment in firm-specific human capital can improve worker productivity. In 
Japan a strategy called ‘life-time employment’ was utilised that increased worker productivity in 
the long run (Ito & Weinstein 1996). Basically the life-time employment strategy avoided a high 
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turnover of workers. As such, a firm would be able to invest in employees by equipping them 
with the skills required to improve productivity and become competitive in the global market. 
Such a strategy can be helpful in Zimbabwe and other countries in SSA.  
 
3.3.1.5 Politics and administration 
 
The way a government conducts its administration either promotes or discourages economic 
activity in a country (Jhingan 2011). Political stability and strong administration are both critical 
in the achievement of economic growth (Jhingan 2011). Economic development in countries in 
the South is sometimes hindered by weak and corrupt administrations as well as political 
instability (Ndulu et al. 2007; Jhingan 2011; Singh 2012). Emanating from this, an 
administration that is strong, efficient, and incorruptible in the South can improve a country’s 
chances of achieving economic development (Jhingan 2011). In addition, the development of 
good law and its enforcement, is furthermore critical for economic development (Ginting et al. 
2018). Countries where the rule of law is observed and where there is a strict financial discipline, 
give investors a sense of security that their capital is safe (Dao 2014; Ginting et al. 2018). In 
Malaysia, strict discipline in tackling macroeconomic issues also aided in its economic growth 
(Tan 2014).  
 
Politics and administrations are closely linked to policy orientation. The policy orientation of a 
country determines its chances of achieving economic development. A comparison of Africa and 
Asia shows that in the 1990s growth averages in Southeast Asia were double than those of Sub-
Saharan Africa (Lewis 2013). The differences can be explained by different policy approaches to 
development (Burton 1989; Ito & Weinstein 1996; Kimura 2009; Hill 2013; Lewis 2013; 
Brueckner & Kraipornsak 2016). According to Lewis (2013: 52) governments in Southeast Asia 
“sustained macroeconomic stability, promoted diversified exports, and fostered rural 
livelihoods.” African countries, however, did not do well in macroeconomic oversight, as they 
tried to protect their economies from external markets and prioritised industry and urban sectors, 
oblivious of their rural sectors (Lewis 2013). Import substitution and protectionist policies do not 




as they did not produce the expected growth, they were abandoned (Kwon & Yi 2015). However, 
when Korea shifted from import-substitution industrialisation to export-led development in the 
1960s, the shift led to remarkable economic growth coupled with poverty reduction (Kwon & Yi 
2015). At this point it is important to stress that there is no one-size-fits-all in policy strategy. 
What works in one country may fail in another.  
 
In countries such as Japan and Malaysia, the favourable economic institutions and policies were 
some of the factors behind remarkable economic growth (Ito & Weinstein 1996; Kimura 2009; 
Tan 2014). Malaysia’s real GDP per capita increased from US$1160.30 to US$6050 between 
1970 and 2010 (Tan 2014). Both countries managed to combine the strategies of import 
substitution and export promotion in their manufacturing industries (Ito & Weinstein 1996; Tan 
2014). The similarity in terms of development experiences is explained by Tan (2014), who 
observed that the development narratives of Japan and the newly industrialised countries inspired 
the growth strategies in Malaysia. In Japan industries in their infancy received government 
protection against cheap imports but, when they became exporters and competitive on the global 
market, they were exposed to full competition (Ito & Weinstein 1996). A similar strategy was 
adopted in China where the government offered protection to ‘priority industries’ through 
measures such as subsidies, price distortions, and monopolies in some instances (Lin 2013). This 
strategy helped priority industries to remain operational and avoid collapse (Lin 2013) which is 
what happened in Zimbabwe after the implementation of structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs). In the long run, this strategy promoted viability and competitiveness (at both local and 
global levels) of firms in priority industries (Lin 2013). 
 
The strategies utilised by Malaysia, China, and Japan show that a change in policy direction has 
the potential to drive economic growth in countries in SSA. In Zimbabwe specifically, the 
change from populist and politically motivated policies to those purely driven by the genuine 
need for development can deliver economic growth. Protection of priority industries in 
Zimbabwe can positively influence economic growth. One such industry is the Zimbabwe Steel 
Company (ZISCO), that used to supply steel to the whole of Southern Africa but which is 




Zimbabwe (NRZ), which links the country to other trading partners in SSA such as Botswana, 
South Africa, and Zambia, is on the verge of collapse. This has increased the costs incurred by 
industries transporting goods within and outside of Zimbabwe, as they have to consider 
alternative modes of transportation.  
 
The differences in industrialisation focus between Africa and Asia also provide vital insights 
concerning economic growth and development. The industrial transformations that took place in 
the Asian Tigers were mainly dependent on the exports of manufactured products (Heintz 2015) 
rather than that of primary products. In comparison, Heintz (2015: 34) noted that the 
industrialisation process in some countries in the South “was either incomplete or, in the case of 
many low-income countries, never got going.” This limited industrial employment, with the 
agricultural and informal sectors both absorbing surplus labour (Heintz 2015). The export of 
secondary and tertiary products has higher chances of delivering economic growth as compared 
to the export of primary products produced by most countries in SSA. Accordingly, countries in 
SSA should reconsider their development approaches. Diversification of the economic base in 
SSA countries has become increasingly important as agro-based economies have been seriously 
affected by climate change. For example, diversification improved economic growth in Thailand. 
Besides industry development, foreign earnings in Thailand are also obtained from agricultural 
outputs and tourism (Burton 1989). 
 
3.3.1.6 Structural changes in the economy 
 
Another factor able to drive economic growth and development is the structural changes in the 
economy.  This factor implies the migration from a traditional economy backed by agriculture to 
a modern economy based on industrial activity, and entails transforming institutions, attitudes, 
and motivations (Jhingan 2011) in a region or country. Countries in the South need to move from 
being producers of primary goods to the production of secondary and tertiary goods (Jhingan 
2011). This should be buttressed by an increase in secondary and tertiary employment as the 
population moves from primary employment (Jhingan 2011). However, the economies of most 




The history of Japan’s rapid economic growth can explain the importance of structural changes 
in the economy. The transformation of the structure of the Japanese industry over time was 
instrumental in the growth of Japan’s economy (Ito & Weinstein 1996). In the 19th century, the 
agricultural sector was dominant in the Japanese economy and level of technology in Japan was 
low (Ohno 2006). However, in 1931, the output from manufacturing and mining overtook that of 
the agricultural sector (Ito & Weinstein 1996). This trend continued until the country became one 
of the leading producers of high-tech goods. The same can be said about the transformations that 
took place in China (Lin 2013). Accordingly, the history of these countries shows that sustained 
economic structural transformations are important in the achievement of economic growth. This 
is one of the strategies that can be adopted by countries in SSA in order to improve prospects of 
achieving economic growth and development.  
 
In Zimbabwe, industrialisation has regressed since independence. The majority of industries that 
were operational immediately after independence, have either closed down or relocated. The 
reasons for this are manifold. Firstly, the instability of the political and economic systems 
rendered the country a risky investment destination. This prompted investors to move their 
capital to other countries where security was guaranteed. Secondly, labour insecurity has 
increased over the years as industries continued to shut down. Consequently, skilled labour 
started migrating to countries offering better employment prospects, such as South Africa. 
Thirdly, the collapse of the financial system in Zimbabwe made it difficult for both large and 
small corporations to access business finance. The resultant effect has been the downsizing, 
closure, and/or relocation of firms that were mainly dependent on debt financing. Fourthly, in the 
absence of different financing mechanisms, some industries have found it difficult to retool. 
Consequently, plant and machinery in the industries have been overtaken by advancements in 
technology. These are some of the reasons why production costs are high in the country.  
 
3.3.1.7 Social attitudes and institutional factors 
 
A change in social attitudes and institutions influences economic growth (Jhingan 2011; Lewis 




factor that brings about economic development should the savings be invested meaningfully. 
Countries in SSA are more likely to achieve economic growth and development if they adopt a 
culture of generating savings. Some countries, such as Japan and China, managed to utilise 
savings generated within their boundaries as sources of investment finance. In Japan, the high 
rates of domestic savings positively influenced the investment levels in the country (Ohno 2006; 
Kimura 2009). The saving culture of Japanese households made capital available for investment 
without Japan becoming too reliant on borrowing from outside the country’s borders (Ito & 
Weinstein 1996). Japan therefore managed to undertake serious investments in economic 
infrastructure, which were partly funded by local savings and bank loans from inter alia the 
Japan Development Bank and Japan Export and Import Bank (Ito & Weinstein 1996; Kimura 
2009). The same narrative is applicable to China and countries in East Asia such as Singapore, 
Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia (Collins, Bosworth & Rodrik 1996). In China, similar 
high savings by government, households, and private firms, shown in Figure 3.2, resulted in an 
increased rate of investments (Lin 2013). 
 
 
Source: National Statistical Bureau (in Lin 2013: 264) 
Figure 3.2 Government, corporate, and household savings in China (1995-2006) 
 
Japan and China’s saving cultures provide important lessons to countries in SSA, especially 




investment (FDI). Furthermore, savings generated in Zimbabwe can be used for social overhead 
investments, which in turn have the ability to lead to other investments in the economy.  
 
The inability to generate meaningful levels of national savings (the addition of government, 
corporate, and household savings) in Zimbabwe has negatively affected the level of investment 
in social overhead capital (SOC). This has left the country heavily relying on FDI for SOC 
investments. However, with the prevailing political and economic instability, it is difficult for 
Zimbabwe to attract the required levels of FDI as investors are sceptical about the security of 
their capital. In such circumstances, generated savings could go a long way in substituting FDI in 
SOC investments. However, one should not overlook the fact that some Zimbabwean citizens 
have also lost confidence in their government and are slowly moving their capital internationally. 
Trust is important amongst economic actors as a precursor for growth in the level of national 
savings which can then be utilised as investment capital. Similarly, strong economic institutions 
for economic management are vital in the growth of economies in the South. Strong economic 
institutions were behind the success stories of economic development in East Asian countries 
(Kimura 2009: Hill 2013; Brueckner & Kraipornsak 2016).  
 
The existence of entrepreneurship in economic development is critical as it enables the smooth 
development and functioning of industries (Jhingan 2011; Tan 2014).  It is important for a 
country to have patriotic and innovative entrepreneurs working towards achieving economic 
growth and development. In light of this, systems and institutions in a country, including 
monetary and fiscal policies, should encourage and promote, rather than discourage 
entrepreneurship (Jhingan 2011; Khazanah Research Institute 2018). Besides that, scientific and 
technical skills enhancement is necessary as a means of supporting entrepreneurship. The role of 
the state in this case is to import the necessary plant and machinery in support of 
entrepreneurship, and also to lead in the evolvement of technologies that are in tandem with the 







3.3.2 Restrictors of economic growth and development 
 
The drivers and restrictors of development cannot be easily separated as was shown in the 
foregoing discussion where some restrictors were discussed together with the drivers of 
development. The emphasis in this section is therefore on the restrictors that have not been 
adequately addressed in the analysis of development drivers.  
 
3.3.2.1 Colonialism  
 
The colonisation of African countries, with the exception of Ethiopia, partly contributed to their 
lack of economic development (Negussie 2018). The exploitation of Africa’s natural resources 
and its human labour force was meant to benefit the colonisers whilst disadvantaging the host 
regions (Negussie 2018). However, years after most of these countries gained independence, 
they are still failing to achieve remarkable development. In as much as colonialism affected 
them, it cannot therefore be the chief reason behind their lack of development, especially after 
their independence.  
 
Colonisation can be considered as a driver of economic growth in some countries in the South. In 
Malaysia, Ariff (1973: 372) noted that: “Dramatic changes came with complete British 
colonization … . Trade was the vehicle which transmitted economic development from the 
industrial countries to the Malaysian economy.” Besides, a distinction has to be made between 
extractive and settler colonisation. While the former was partly responsible for underdeveloping 
colonies, the latter contributed to economic growth of the same. White settlers in the latter 
believed that they were building new nations (South Africa and Rhodesia are some examples) 
and invested heavily towards national development. This is one of the reasons why Zimbabwe 
inherited a strong economy at independence. However, after colonialism came to an end, the 
growth momentum of independent African states slowed down as the leaders of these states 
(Zimbabwe included) struggled to maintain growth rates left behind by colonial governments. 
One of the reasons behind this, was the insistence of new African leaders to adopt and implement 




their goal to dismantle capitalism proved detrimental as this caused economic growth to slow 
down 
 
The analysis of how colonialism may have affected the development prospects of countries in 
Africa cannot be complete without taking a closer look at the growth of those countries that were 
not colonised, especially Ethiopia. Little has happened in Ethiopia in terms of economic growth 
as its economy is even smaller compared to that of, for example South Africa, which was under 
colonialism up to 1994. As previously highlighted, South Africa benefitted from settler 
colonisation. However, the ills of colonialism and how these affected the development potential 
of the continent cannot be overlooked. If the mineral resources extracted from Africa were used 
to develop the continent, a better level of development could have been attained in its states. This 
assertion assumes that without colonialism, Africans would have devised their own technology 
to extract and process their minerals into finished products traded on the global market.   
 
3.3.2.2 Lack of investment capital 
 
Shortage of capital affects economic development (Ndulu et al. 2007) which can be a result of 
self-reinforced vicious circles of poverty (Jhingan 2011). Most regions in the Global South are 
affected by vicious circles of poverty in the sense that their low productivity leads to low 
income, which in turn results in low savings. This leads to low investment that causes capital 
deficiency and low productivity (Myrdal 1957; Jhingan 2011). The lack of incentive to save and 
invest in countries in the South can be attributed to a lack of adherence to law and order and 
political instability, among others (Jhingan 2011). High investment risks in these countries 
frustrate the little entrepreneurship available. Consequently, investors are mainly involved in the 
export industry, dealing mainly in primary products (Jhingan 2011; Lewis 2013) instead of 
secondary and tertiary goods and services that have the ability to deliver economic growth and 
development. 
 
A lack of capital cripples the chances of economic growth in SSA. Lessons from Japan show the 




produced economic growth in the country (Kimura 2009). The Japanese Development Bank was 
instrumental in providing loans that were used in investments in different sectors as shown in 
Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Amount of loans by Japan Development Bank 1951-1982 
 
Source: Ogura & Yoshio (in Kimura 2009: 7) 
 
As indicated in Table 3.1 the Japanese government made enormous investments in the energy 
and transport sectors, knowing that these sectors are central to the development of any nation. 
These investments boosted production during Japan’s industrialisation process (Kimura 2009) as 
power output improved remarkably. The improvements are shown in Figure 3.3. In comparison, 
the Zimbabwean energy and transport sectors have been characterised by limited investments, 
resulting in dilapidated transport infrastructure and acute power shortages. The power shortages 
in turn, have contributed to high costs of production, making goods produced in Zimbabwe less 
competitive on both regional and global markets. The lack of capital also hinders development 
and improvement of technology in Zimbabwe, leaving the country struggling with low 










        Source: Statistical Bureau of Management and Coordination Agency (in Kimura 2009: 8) 
Figure 3.3 Power generation in Japan, 1926-1984 (in million Kilowatt-hours) 
 
Achieving economic growth in SSA will remain a challenge as long as capital to invest in 
important sectors such as transport and communication, energy generation and distribution, and 
technological advancements, remain scarce.  
 
3.3.2.3 Limited foreign trade earnings 
 
The increase in exports in countries in the South may not contribute much to the development of 
their economies if associated with neglect in other economic sectors (Jhingan 2011). Besides 
that, the overdependence of these economies on exports, exposes them to international market 




development in countries in the South is to some extent affected by dominance of the global 
trade and justice systems of powerful states. This can be inferred from the leadership posts in the 
World Bank and IMF that have always been occupied by either Americans or Europeans. Apart 
from that, powerful states like the USA, China, France, Russia, and Britain have permanent seats 
in the United Nations Security Council thus dominating crucial decisions (Morvaridi 2008). 
Their decisions directly or indirectly impact on the development of poor states.  
 
Geographical factors also influence African countries’ chances of benefitting from international 
trade.  Negussie (2018) noted that some African countries are less competitive because they are 
landlocked. The consequent minimum or no control of ports (Mbaku 1988; Heidhues 2009) 
affects the ability of these landlocked states to achieve economic growth and development. Ports 
are critical for international trade of mainly goods and services transported by sea. Without 
control of ports the trade earnings of some African countries are significantly reduced. Looking 
more closely at countries with and without ports, a difference can be seen in their growth 
patterns. The difference can be witnessed in Southern Africa, where a country like South Africa 
has benefitted from having ports. South Africa has a bigger and more stable economy compared 
to its landlocked counterparts. However, having ports alone is not enough to bring about a 
competitive advantage, ports also need to be able to handle large volumes of goods. Ports 
therefore need heavy infrastructural investments to bring about positive economic advantages to 
the country concerned.  
 
Complex business regulations and procedures also affect the rate of economic growth in Africa 
(Ndulu et al. 2007). Customs and trade regulations, specifically, are major constraints (Ndulu et 
al. 2007). The time it takes to clear both exports and imports is longer in Africa compared to 
other regions. This discourages firms striving to take the advantage of export markets (Ndulu et 
al. 2007). Another disadvantage of African countries is their location in the tropics. Since 90% of 
SSA is within the tropics, the negative impact of tropical diseases on life expectancy, the 
formation of human capital, and the participation of their labour force in economic growth 
activities, is high (Ndulu et al. 2007). This affects the participation of SSA in international trade. 




by tropical diseases (Ndulu et al. 2007). Thus, geographical differences also explain differential 
growth patterns exhibited by SSA versus East Asia, both being regions in the Global South. 
 
3.3.2.4 Social disturbances and terrorism 
 
Social violence has the capacity to affect development as violence leads to instability in a 
country, thereby affecting the performance of investments. According to Singh (2012) social 
violence has affected the image of India as an investment destination. Similarly, terrorism also 
affects development. This factor, though, is not applicable to Zimbabwe. In India, terrorism has 
had an impact on different sectors of the economy (Singh 2012). One of these sectors is the 
industrial sector, where acts of terrorism have affected potential investors and entrepreneurship, 
especially in hard-hit areas (Singh 2012). In addition, the tourism industry, which is responsible 
for approximately 6% of India’s GDP and 9% of its total employment, has also been affected by 
acts of terrorism (Singh 2012). Terrorism not only physically destroys infrastructure vital for 
economic growth (Armeanu, Vintila & Gherghina 2018), it also scares potential investors who 
worry about the security of their investments. As such, acts of terrorism are counterproductive 
and have also, in most cases, diverted the focus of governments from economic growth and 
development to security enhancement (Negussie 2018). 
 
Social disturbances in Zimbabwe have usually taken the form of industrial actions and political 
protests. In some cases these have turned violent, the result being destruction of both public and 
private property. These incidents have created a negative impression about the country, thereby 
scaring away potential investors. Government’s response has often been out of all proportion to 
the protest itself.  As a result, sanctions against the Zimbabwean government have been imposed 
by the US government and its allies. Despite the fact that these sanctions are not full economic 
embargoes, they have a negative effect on the way Zimbabwean entrepreneurs interact and 
transact with foreign investors especially in Europe and the United States. Overall, industrial 
actions and protests in Zimbabwe coupled with the Zimbabwean government’s responses, have 







In this chapter the concept of development was discussed at that hand of different perspectives 
covered in literature. The perspectives are many and varied, giving evidence of the 
multidisciplinary nature of development. Additionally different drivers and restrictors of 
development were explored, explaining how they influence economic growth and development. 
It is clear that there is an opportunity for growth in SSA countries that have abundant natural 
resources, high literacy rates, and growing populations. The region had the potential to develop 
at a faster rate than Asia. However, this did not happen. The restrictors of economic growth in 
these countries, especially in Zimbabwe outweigh and overshadow the potential for growth. The 
interaction of the drivers and restrictors of growth in Zimbabwe is analysed in the next chapter 























CHAPTER 4: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE – A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
“The first notable characteristic about Zimbabwe is that it … [had] a sound industrial base … . 
growth of the Zimbabwean economy … [was] not entirely dependent on the price fluctuations of 




In this chapter the history of economic development in Zimbabwe is interrogated, covering both 
pre- and post-independence periods. The major gist is to explain how the economic development 
trends in Zimbabwe are linked, or not linked, with resilience thinking. In addition, particular 
attention is paid to how the economic policies that were implemented in the country, affected the 
economic resilience of manufacturing industries. However, to enable a smooth flow of the 
chapter, supplemental information on the policies is covered in Appendix B. As such, the 
discussion of policies in the chapter occasionally refers to Appendix B. From a national context, 
the analysis is then taken to the local level with a brief examination of the history of economic 
and industrial development in Bulawayo. The major focus is to explain the factors that 
influenced growth of the metropolitan economy. This also lays a foundation upon which the 
current drivers of industrial decline are viewed and analysed. 
 
4.2 AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE 
  
The history of economic development in Zimbabwe can be subdivided into four distinct periods, 
namely, the early colonial period (1890-1952), the federation period (1953-1963), the unilateral 
declaration of independence (UDI) period (1965-1980), and the period from independence (from 
18 April 1980) (Ndlovu 1994). The period from 1980 until now can also be subdivided into 
different phases depending on the government’s development philosophies. This period is 




neo-liberalism phase (1990-1999), the rapid economic decline phase (2000-2008), and the 
liberalised economic phase (2009-to date). Although the emphasis in this study is on the post-
independence period, the study briefly touches on the economy of the pre-independence era 
under the ‘pre-independence economic development’.  
 
4.2.1 Pre-independence economic development (1890-1979) 
 
In 1890 the British South Africa Company (BSAC) colonised Zimbabwe, which became a 
British colony known as Southern Rhodesia (Arrighi 1967; Ndlovu 1994; Wekwete 1994). In 
terms of Southern Rhodesia’s governance, Ndlovu (1994: 7) noted that: “The colony was 
governed under Royal Charter and attained self governing status in 1923 but only attained 
independence in 1980.” However, the name of the country changed from Southern Rhodesia to 
Rhodesia after the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the Rhodesian Front 
government in 1965 (Ndlovu 1994; Wekwete 1994). Despite the different variations that exist in 
literature surrounding the colony’s name changes, this study utilises the name Southern Rhodesia 
for the period 1890 to the period before UDI in 1965, then Rhodesia for the post-UDI period to 
1979.  
 
The BSAC expected Southern Rhodesia to have abundant minerals (Mlambo & Phimister 2006) 
and hoped to establish a second Rand (after the mineral-rich area surrounding Johannesburg in 
South Africa) (Arrighi 1967; Ndlovu 1994; Wekwete 1994). However, their hopes were dashed 
(Phimister 1980) when it was established that the quantity of available mineral deposits was 
lower than those at the Rand. This triggered the need to consider other economic activities that 
would sustain the newly established settlements. Agriculture became a favourable activity due to 
the existence of large tracks of fertile land (Ndlovu 1994; Wekwete 1994). And so, in the early 
1900s, the economy of Southern Rhodesia, supported by the white rural bourgeoisie (Arrighi 
1967) hinged on the agricultural and mining industries (Sadie 1969; Phimister 1980; Stoneman 
1990; Mlambo & Phimister 2006; Carmody 2008; Mlambo 2017) that were both meant to 
produce for external markets (Patel 1988). Later, in the 1940s, manufacturing was added to the 




Literature on industrialisation in Southern Rhodesia is scarce compared to that on agricultural 
development (Clarke 1973). However, a history of state involvement in industrial development 
was common in Southern Rhodesia. The government invested in industries from iron and steel 
works to cotton spinning (Curtin 1968; Stoneman 1990; Mlambo 2017). Other government 
industries formed in the 1930s and 1940s included power stations and raw material processing 
plants (Arrighi 1967).  These government investments stimulated the economy and led to further 
developments in manufacturing industries (Stoneman 1990). By 1938, 299 manufacturing 
companies were in existence, employing approximately 17 500 people (Ndlovu 1994). The 
manufacturing industry kept growing  ̶  in 1945 there were 495 manufacturing companies and 
1 172 in 1952 (Ndlovu 1994). It was clear that the emergence and growth of textile industries 
was supported by state-led interventions in the cotton growing and ginning industry (Mlambo & 
Phimister 2006). 
 
In spite of the increased efforts by government to promote economic growth, motivation to 
undertake industrial development was low amongst Rhodesians. Industrial development could 
rather be attributed to exogenous factors (Arrighi 1967). One of these factors was the outbreak of 
World War II (WWII) that stimulated economic growth in Southern Rhodesia (Arrighi 1967; 
Curtin 1968; Stoneman 1990; Carmody 2008; Mlambo 2017). The shortages of the country’s 
imports on the global market, created a need to develop local industries (Arrighi 1967). At the 
same time, the war created a huge market for goods and services that could be produced locally 
(Arrighi 1967). These shortages and demands boosted the development of industries in Southern 
Rhodesia (Arrighi 1967). Likewise, the economy got a boost from the influx of post-war 
immigrants and foreign investments during the federation period (Curtin 1968). Furthermore 
domestic markets in Southern Rhodesia were widened by the federation arrangement (Carmody 
2008; Mlambo 2017). This arrangement was centred on the common market approach to 
development, thus producing positive growth in the local economy (Ndlovu 1994). The approach 
entailed the removal of trade barriers amongst Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Southern 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and Nyasaland (now Malawi). Accordingly, resources were allowed 
to freely move from one country to the other. The development approach was meant to serve the 




the federal government (Ndlovu 1994). These factors caused the country to experience an 
expansion of its manufacturing capacity in an effort to meet the federal market demands (Ndlovu 
1994), and had a positive effect on manufacturing employment levels as well as manufacturing 
output. 
 
Another external stimulant of growth in Southern Rhodesia was the influx of international capital 
from the Union (now South Africa) and the United Kingdom (Arrighi 1967). The movement of 
investments especially from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia was influenced by the change of 
government of the Union that took place in 1948. According to Arrighi (1967) the national 
bourgeoisie and white workers had taken over power causing international capitalists to move 
their investments elsewhere as they feared the possibility of nationalisation of their assets. Added 
to this, WWII stimulated the movement of investment capital from the United Kingdom to 
Southern Rhodesia – a country considered a safe destination for investment at the time. The 
country had a well-developed overhead capital, a number of growing industries, and a huge 
market that included many European immigrants (Arrighi 1967).  
 
The UDI period commenced with the imposition of sanctions on the Rhodesian government by 
the United Nations (UN) (Stoneman 1990; Ndlovu 1994; Carmody 2008; Munangagwa 2009). 
This period was consequently dominated by import substitution (Curtin 1968; Zaaijer, 1998; 
Kawewe & Dibie 2000; Mlambo 2017) as a direct response to the sanctions imposed on 
Rhodesia (Curtin 1968; Mlambo 2017). The main focus was to achieve self-reliance. This 
motivated remarkable government involvement in the industrialisation process (Arrighi 1967; 
Curtin 1968; Stoneman 1990; Mlambo & Phimister 2006; Carmody 2008; Mlambo 2017). This 
period became historically significant in terms of economic development, as it shaped the post-
independence form of the economy (Ndlovu 1994). The sanctions imposed stimulated internal 
production and promoted a drive towards self-sustenance (Kawewe & Dibie 2000; Munangagwa 
2009). Accordingly, the sanctions led to the rapid growth of manufacturing industries that were 
expected to produce goods and services that would replace imports (Porter 1978). The 
contribution of manufacturing to the GDP increased from 15.8 % in 1959 to 18.9% in 1965 and 




in driving the economy of Rhodesia (Sadie 1969). The impact of sanctions on the Rhodesian 
economy was therefore minimal (Porter 1978). The slowdown in growth as a result of sanctions 
is indicated in Table 4.1. 8 
 
The growth of the GDP during the time Rhodesia was under sanctions was largely due to capital 
formation (Porter 1978) through government effort and complemented by private investors. 
However, the growth was disrupted by the inception of the liberation struggle in the early 1970s. 
Economic decline was experienced between 1975 and 1978 as a result of the war and the world 
recession (Ndlovu 1994). 
 
Table 4.1 Rhodesia’s economic performance 1963-1975 
Year Real GDP (in million R$ for 1965 figures) Growth Rate (%) 
1963 710.8 -1.9 
1964 709.0 -0.3 
1965 747.0 5.3 
1966 714.3 -4.4 
1967 772.0 8.1 
1968 789.7 2.3 
1969 910.7 15.3 
1970 943.4 3.6 
1971 1053.5 11.7 
1972 1138.3 8.0 
1973 1181.2 3.8 
1974 1314.3 11.3 
1975 1308.4 -0.4 
Source: Adapted from Porter (1978: 105) 
 
The combination of endogenous (the liberation struggle) and exogenous (sanctions and world 
recession) factors affected the growth pattern of the economy. However, in 1979 a recovery was 
experienced (Ndlovu 1994). The Rhodesian government left behind a strong economy that was, 
apart from that of South Africa, one of the most diversified and industrially developed 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa (Stoneman 1990; Helmsing 1999; Carmody & Taylor 2003; 
Carmody 2008; Mlambo 2017).  
                                                 




Economic diversification achieved during the UDI period (Carmody & Taylor 2003) contributed 
to the strength of the economy. The development of the industrial base took place under 
protection against more advanced economies. Normally, only industries in their infancy need 
protection until they are mature and internationally competitive (Stoneman 1990). While this 
might have promoted inefficiency, the protection strategy was motivated by the need to survive 
the sanctions imposed against the country. This has an implication on resilience. The resilience 
of most industries in the pre-independence era of Zimbabwe was, to some extent, artificial as 
these industries were not exposed to global competition. In as much as the diversification in the 
economy enhanced economic resilience, ‘over-protection’ of the industries might have set them 
up for failure in the future. This was evident when sanctions were lifted and the post-
independence government liberalised the economy. Local industries were hard-hit by 
competition from imports and hence started collapsing. The inability of these local industries to 
compete on a regional and/or global market partly emanated from the protection they had from 
government over a lengthy period.  
 
4.2.2 Socialist economic development phase (1980-1989) 
  
On attaining independence in 1980, the new government inherited a strong and stable economy 
(Clemens & Moss 2005). The country had a strong economic base, largely focusing on the 
exporting of raw materials, including gold, asbestos, copper, coal, nickel, chrome, maize, 
tobacco, beef, and sugar (Bratton 1981). The diversified raw material exports underpinned the 
resilience of the economy. In fact, the economy was not affected by the poor performance of any 
one commodity on the world market (Bratton 1981). The inherited economy was also an exporter 
of manufactured goods that included textiles, footwear, and iron and steel products (Bratton 
1981). The country was regarded as a gem in Southern Africa despite being hit hard by having to 
participate in a global market. The country’s comparative advantage was based on the fact that it 
was self-reliant in terms of appropriate technologies (Bratton 1981). Unlike the other African 
countries where growth was hindered by an over-dependence on petroleum, Zimbabwe had the 
ability to utilise coal and hydro-electric power (Bratton 1981). Besides that, it had also managed 




local conditions, but also in some neighbouring countries (Bratton 1981). Accordingly, the 
country’s strength in the export agricultural, manufacturing, and minerals sectors underpinned 
optimism for further development after independence (MacLean 2002).  
 
The early independence period was characterised by the removal of sanctions previously 
imposed on the Rhodesian government, and the commitment of the new government to socialist 
development (Meisenhelder 1994; Ndlovu 1994; Zaaijer 1998; Carmody 2008; Munangagwa 
2009; Masaka 2013). In effect, socialist leaders were taking over a capitalist economy (Zaaijer, 
1998) resulting in a conflict of ideologies. And although economic prosperity was achieved in 
the first two years with growth rates of 12% (Zaaijer 1998), this was followed by a drop in 
growth rates to 3% in the late 1980s (Zaaijer 1998) causing the economic growth to slow down 
(Ndlovu 1994; MacLean 2002; Munangagwa 2009). While Helmsing (1999) attributes this 
economic decline to the drought experienced shortly after independence, the aforementioned 
ideological conflicts were also behind the decline. 
 
The ideological conflicts were both internal and international in nature. At the attainment of 
independence, the white industrialists were sceptical of the idea of socialists taking over a 
capitalist economy. This created tension between industrialists and workers on one hand, and 
government officials on the other. The new government believed in state or public ownership of 
the means of production, and the redistribution of the wealth among the citizens  ̶  the very 
principles the white industrialists were against. The industrialists believed in private ownership 
of the means of production and profit maximisation. As such, socialist policies were a threat to 
capitalistic beliefs and practices. The white industrialists therefore started to slowly move their 
capital to other countries, and withhold further investments, as they regarded the new 
independent country to be an ‘unsafe’ investment destination. On the international platform, the 
new government leaders faced challenges in getting support from global development agencies, 
mainly the Bretton Woods Institutions that strongly supported capitalism instead of socialism. 





In terms of policies, the new government introduced a policy of reconciliation that was inspired 
by nationalist agendas of nation building (Bratton & Masunungure 2011; Zhou & Zvoushe 
2012).  The policy of reconciliation was meant to foster forgiveness amongst races in light of 
crimes and injustices committed during the colonial era and the subsequent liberation struggle. 
Furthermore, the policy aimed to restore togetherness in rebuilding the country. However, the 
policy could also be viewed as a way for the socialist government to try and convince mainly the 
white minority to support government development efforts. Notwithstanding this, Ingham-
Thorpe (1997: 487) noted that, white Zimbabweans “were not, and did not feel obliged to 
integrate … into the new Zimbabwe.” Nevertheless the process of reconciliation was an 
important starting point for building a nation with citizens united behind a common goal of 
achieving national development. 
 
In 1981, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) introduced the Growth with Equity (GWE) policy 
(Bratton 1981; Sylvester 1985; Stoneman 1990; Carmody 2008; Bratton & Masunungure 2011; 
Zhou & Zvoushe 2012), meant to address social and economic inequalities that were rampant in 
Rhodesia (Sylvester 1985; Zhou & Zvoushe 2012). Accordingly, both the GWE and the 
Transitional National Development Plan (see Appendix B) implemented immediately after 
independence, envisaged an annual growth rate of 8% with manufacturing as the leading sector 
(Bratton 1981; Sylvester 1985). Furthermore government supported the protectionist policies that 
encouraged import substitution (Bratton & Masunungure 2011). The principles that informed 
these policies were preservation and the expansion of production, redistribution of incomes and 
services, and redistribution of assets in some sectors (Bratton 1981). However, this ideological 
shift from capitalism to socialism was the root cause of the tension between white industrialists 
and the new government leaders, and the economic decline that was to follow. To the 
industrialists, a society that is socialist and egalitarian was counter-productive and could not 
preserve and expand production. Moreover the new government did not clearly define whether 
redistribution of incomes and services (Bratton 1981) meant enriching ‘those who do not have’ 
by ‘dispossessing those who have’. In as much as the new government wanted to achieve social 





After independence industrialisation was prioritised as a driver of economic development 
(Stoneman 1990). Increased government intervention in industrial development was witnessed 
through investments in companies such as CAPS, Zimpapers, Heinz-Olivine, and Zimbank 
(Stoneman 1990). However, government had to cut imports in order to save scarce foreign 
currency (Zaaijer 1998). This turned out to be devastating for businesses since this move 
hamstrung their ability to import sufficient raw materials (Zaaijer 1998) and forced them to 
operate below capacity. Added to this, the scarcity of foreign exchange reduced investment 
levels as investor confidence diminished (Zaaijer 1998) thus negatively affecting the overall 
industrial production (Thompson 1983). As such, the period 1980 to 1989 was characterised by a 
lack of meaningful industrial investment (Helmsing 1999). Neither the National Transitional 
Development Plan nor the First Five Year National Development Plan produced the expected 
growth in industrialisation. For Zimbabwe, the years from 1980 until 1990 was therefore 
characterised by moderate economic growth and rapid social development (Bratton & 
Masunungure 2011). Development was mainly in the form of construction of new schools and 
the provision of infrastructure in remote areas in line with the government’s socialist drive. 
Primary schools enrolment (catering those of the school-going age) nearly reached 100% while 
80% of eligible students were able to proceed to secondary schools (Bratton & Masunungure 
2011). 
 
The end of the first decade was characterised by a call for the gradual adoption of trade 
liberalisation (Bratton & Masunungure 2011). The idea was to enable the renewal of plant and 
equipment in industries and also to revive the competitiveness of industries in export markets 
(Bratton & Masunungure 2011). Firm resilience was heavily compromised as production levels 
declined compared to the period immediately after independence. The main shocks were the 
change of policy from capitalism to socialism and the shortage of foreign exchange. Additionally 
the newly elected government was spending without building or replenishing the foreign 
exchange reserves left behind by the Rhodesian government. Political graft also characterised the 
spending of government. The shortages were furthermore aggravated by reduced export earnings 
due to the slowdown of growth in industrial operations. These factors all contributed to a general 




4.2.3 Neo-liberalism phase (1990-1999) 
 
The decade from 1990 to 1999 was characterised by neo-liberalisation (Zaaijer 1998; Bhalla et 
al. 1999; MacLean 2002; Masaka 2003; Davies 2004; Raftopoulos & Phimister 2004; 
Munangagwa 2009; Bratton & Masunungure 2011; Zhou & Zvoushe 2012). The shift was as a 
result of international pressure to adopt market friendly policies and because there was a need to 
respond to the domestic calls to end foreign exchange controls (Raftopoulos & Phimister 2004). 
The international pressure was mainly from the Bretton Woods Institutions that were promoting 
neo-liberal economic policies. At a local level, Zaaijer (1998: 12) noted that, “industry in 
Zimbabwe was very much backward. In some manufacturing sectors competition had been 
absent for many years, which caused products to be outdated and of low quality.”  These 
pressures motivated the adoption of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). 
 
In 1991, Zimbabwe introduced the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
(Meisenhelder 1994; Bhalla et al. 1999; Helmsing 1999; Kawewe & Dibie 2000; Munangagwa 
2009; Bratton & Masunungure 2011; Zhou & Zvoushe 2012; Ndiweni & Verhoeven 2013; 
Mlambo 2017) to address the economic challenges of the 1980s (Zhou & Zvoushe 2012). The 
ESAP’s targets were economic recovery and the achievement of sustained growth (Munangagwa 
2009). These targets were supposed to be attained through budget reforms, by boosting the 
private sector, and through trade liberalisation (Munangagwa 2009). However, adopting the 
SAPs symbolised the abandonment of socialist ideologies (Zaaijer 1998). Likewise, the move 
also revealed the neo-liberalistic overtones that were masked by the ruling party’s socialist 
rhetoric (Davies 2004). 
 
The effects of ESAP (see Appendix B) were negative, not only to the manufacturing industrial 
base of the country (Mlambo 2017) but also to the economy as a whole (Zaaijer 1998; Davies 
2004; Raftopoulos & Phimister 2004). The poor performance of ESAP was partly linked to the 
failure of the socialist government to properly implement free market policies. The fact that the 
policy was neo-liberal cannot be fully linked to its failures in Zimbabwe. The colonial 




committed to neo-liberalism. The difference in terms of commitment to neo-liberalism was 
evident in the independent Zimbabwe. The new government struggled to sustain or grow the 
economy even after the removal of sanctions. The government linked neo-liberalism to 
colonialism. As such, abandoning capitalism in favour of socialism was thought to be a total 
defeat of colonialism (Geyer 2006). However, shifting the economy from capitalism to socialism 
proved to be a mammoth task. Even after realising that there is a need to revert back to 
capitalism (or a mixture with socialism), government had mixed feelings. On one hand, some 
officials believed that pursuing socialism was the best strategy, while others were in favour of 
capitalism. Accordingly, it was difficult for the ESAP to stimulate growth while having to deal 
with disagreements, not only in the implementation but also amongst the implementers. 
 
The drought that was experienced in Southern Africa in the early 1990s (Bhalla et al. 1999; 
Helmsing 1999; Kawewe & Dibie 2000; MacLean 2002; Bratton & Masunungure 2011; Mlambo 
2017) exacerbated socio-economic decline linked to ESAP. In ESAP’s year of inception, an 
estimated 1.7 million people were gainfully employed, however this figure was reduced to 1.2 
million by 1996 (Zaaijer 1998). Besides that, rampant strikes and mass industrial actions affected 
the operations of the business sector during this period. With the industrial actions the 
Zimbabwean citizens uttered their rejection of the neo-liberal policy. They were also 
uncomfortable with the reduction in government budget that would culminate in cutting down 
the civil service by 25% over a five-year period (Zaaijer 1998). In addition, fees for health and 
education were introduced, causing a strain mainly on the poor majority who then became 
restive. All of these factors played a role in the downturn of the growth of Zimbabwean 
industries. 
 
Liberalisation exposed the weak and unprepared local manufacturing industry to stiff foreign 
competition (Carmody 2008; Munangagwa 2009). The most affected firms included those that 
enjoyed state subsidies and protection, especially the firms in the manufacturing industry. 
Notwithstanding this, the industry had already been negatively affected by almost a decade of 
policy inconsistencies and tensions between industrialists and the new government leaders. 




decade speculating on the future of the country. Some adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude, closely 
assessing how they were going to be affected by government policy changes. Others did not want 
to risk losing their capital and started moving their investments out of Zimbabwe though it was 
not an easy process. This further weakened the manufacturing industry.  
 
Local manufacturers, especially those in the clothing industry, were affected by not only fierce 
competition from cheap imports from other countries such as China (Carmody 2008; 
Munangagwa 2009), but also by a decline of the wages of their consumers (Munangagwa 2009). 
While local production costs increased significantly, imports became cheaper and cheaper. It was 
difficult for most industries to access loans for re-modernisation or retooling since the cost of 
capital was too high (Zaaijer 1998). The interest rates recorded in 1994 and 1995 were 35% and 
27% respectively (Zaaijer 1998). Old machinery in manufacturing industries, coupled with a lack 
of competition over a period of time, resulted in the production of low-quality goods that could 
not compete with cheap imports from other countries (Zaaijer 1998). Other challenges noted by 
Mlambo (2017: 105) include, “inadequate infrastructure … insufficient and expensive electricity, 
limited telecommunications capacity, and an inefficient and inadequate railway transport system, 
as well as liquidity challenges.” Consequently, around 1994, the decline of the textile, clothing, 
and footwear industries were setting in (Carmody 2008) followed in 1996 by large-scale 
industrial closures, mainly in the textile industry. The sharp decline of production output is 
shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
The sharp decline in output led to the downsizing of some companies or companies that 
completely closed down (Mlambo 2017). This turn for the worst by the textile industry could be 
attributed to how difficult it was for the industries in Zimbabwe to adapt to ESAP, mainly  
because, compared to international standards, their technological capabilities were poor 
(Carmody 2008). It is also possible that the insufficient technological capabilities of 
Zimbabwean industries could further be ascribed to the protection these industries received from 
governments during the pre- and post-independence periods. At the same time, and in sharp 
contrast, the positive growth in the textile industry in Southeast Asia’s newly industrialising 





                                    Source: CSO; UNIDO; Zimbabwe (in Carmody 2008: 325) 
Figure 4.1 Output growth in textile industry in Zimbabwe 
 
To address the industrial decline and to attract foreign investment, government introduced 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in line with the EPZ Act of 1995. Foreign investors were 
offered tax exemptions and duty-free imports of raw materials and capital goods (Bhalla et al. 
1999) as a way of luring them to invest in Zimbabwe. However, the economy per se did not 
regain its momentum, as did the manufacturing industry. The major factor behind this was the 
continued existence of operational restrictions in the country at the time (Bhalla et al. 1999). 
These restrictions included limited freedom in the repatriation of capital and profits, pressure 
exerted by government on foreigner investors to partner with local ones, and the central bank’s 
restrictions on domestic borrowing (Bhalla et al. 1999). Foreign investors could only purchase a 
maximum of 25% of the total equity in a company while individual investors were afforded a 
meagre 5% (Bhalla et al. 1999). Luring foreign investors with such restrictions in existence 





To address the failure of the EPZs, the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social 
Transformation (ZIMPREST) was adopted. However, ZIMPREST got off to a bad start as there 
was a two-year delay before the programme could be implemented in 1998, (Zhou & Zvoushe 
2012; Raftopoulos & Phimister 2004) instead of running from 1996 (Munangagwa 2009). Its 
implementation was preceded by an acute economic and political crisis in 1997 following the 
payment of gratuities to war veterans. Each of them was paid a lump sum of 50 000 Zimbabwean 
dollars (ZWD)9 and offered a monthly pension of ZWD2000 for life (Kriger 2005). By that time, 
US$1 was equivalent to between ZWD12.50 and ZWD16.50. This meant that a lump sum of 
ZWD50 000 was equivalent to an amount of between 3000 and 4000 United States dollars, 
making the total gratuity package approximately ZWD5 billion (Kriger 2005). Since this amount 
was not budgeted for, the central bank had to print money to meet this demand. The resultant 
effect was a sharp decline in the value of the Zimbabwean dollar reaching one of its lowest levels 
on 14 November 1997 (Davies 2004). Following this crisis, it was expected that ZIMPREST 
would stabilise the macro economy, alleviate poverty amongst citizens, facilitate internal 
savings, and promote investment10 (Bhalla et al. 1999; Zhou & Zvoushe 2012). Yet, despite the 
efforts of ZIMPREST to recover the Zimbabwean economy, the downward economic trend 
persisted.  
 
Notwithstanding the plummeting of the economy in 1997, Zimbabwe got involved in the 1998 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war (Davies 2004; Raftopoulos & Phimister 2004; 
Munangagwa 2009; Bratton & Masunungure 2011; Mlambo 2017). The then president of the 
DRC, Laurent Kabila, was fighting rebel groups in his country who were allegedly backed by 
Uganda and Rwanda. Zimbabwe joined the war and sent troops to fight alongside Kabila’s 
government. However, the economy did not benefit much from the participation in the war even 
though the Zimbabwean government encouraged its entrepreneurs to exploit opportunities in the 
DRC market (Raftopoulos & Phimister 2004). In fact, involvement in the DRC war aggravated 
                                                 
9 ZWD denotes the Zimbabwean currency used after independence and was demonotised in 2008. The new 
Zimbabwean currency is denoted by ZWL. 




the decline of the already struggling economy in Zimbabwe. Huge amounts of money were 
required to fund Zimbabwe’s participation, this in turn created additional budget deficits and a 
shortage of fuel in the country. Fuel shortages then negatively affected the competitiveness of 
manufacturing industries due to the diminishing of their productivity.  
 
4.2.4 Rapid economic decline phase (2000-2008) 
 
The economy during the period of 2000 to 2008 was characterised by political chaos and policy 
inconsistencies. The crisis in this decade can be attributed to unsteady economic management, 
loosely controlled government spending, and heavy borrowing (Bratton & Masunungure 2011). 
The main strategy during this era was the survivalist agenda of the ruling ZANU PF party. 
Accordingly, substantial amounts of money were used for party business at the expense of 
government programmes. These factors resulted in a ballooning debt, high rates of currency and 
deficit-induced inflation levels, and excessive interest rates (Bratton & Masunungure 2011; 
Zinyama & Takavarasha 2014). During this phase, the central bank developed the habit of 
printing money occasionally to fund both government and ruling party programmes. Most of 
these programmes were meant to help the ruling party remain in power (as will be seen in the 
following paragraphs). The outcome of the increased money supply, then led to an increase in 
the prices of commodities. 
 
The persistent economic challenges in Zimbabwe reduced political support for the ruling ZANU 
PF. In a move meant to consolidate political popularity amongst agitating war veterans and the 
rural masses, government adopted a Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in the year 
2000 (Davies 2004; Zhou & Zvoushe 2008; Munangagwa 2009; Bratton & Masunungure 2011; 
Mlambo 2017). The major factor underpinning this programme as posited by government, was 
the need to address the land imbalances in terms of ownership and created by the colonial rule. 
After the attainment of independence, 6000 white commercial farmers were occupying 15.5 
million hectares, and 8500 small-scale African farmers possessed 1.4 million hectares. This left 




2003). The FTLRP was based on compulsory acquisition, with compensation paid only for the 
developments that were done on the acquired land. In 2001, the initial target of compulsorily 
acquiring 5 million hectares of land for the resettlement of 91 000 families, had changed to the 
acquisition of 8.3 million hectares to resettle 160 000 families on small-scale farms (A1 model) 
and 54 000 families on medium- and large-scale farms (A2 model) (Sachikonye 2003). This 
target further increased to 11.4 million hectares, with an estimated 300 000 families that had to 
be resettled under the A1 model by October 2002 (Sachikonye 2003). 
 
The FTLRP was highly political (Sachikonye 2003) as ZANU PF was losing grip on power. The 
newly formed Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was fast gaining popularity and 
support from the general citizenry. As such, the FTLRP was ZANU PF’s counter-strategy to 
regain the trust and support of the masses. The majority of beneficiaries were mainly the 
supporters and sympathisers of the ruling ZANU PF though ordinary peasants also benefitted 
(Scoones et al. 2011). However, the programme was violent and chaotic in nature. Politically 
backed youths and ‘war veterans’11 invaded and displaced white farmers from ‘their’ land 
without following due procedure. The invasions resulted in the death of more than 150 people, 
including farm workers and 13 white commercial farmers (Kibble & Vanlerberghe in 
Sachikonye 2003). In addition, 200 000 farm workers (i.e. approximately two thirds of the total 
farm workforce at the time) lost their jobs and approximately 100 000 primary school children 
became dropouts as their schools were closed down (Sachikonye 2003). The new beneficiaries 
had no capacity to re-open closed schools or health facilities (Sachikonye 2003). Overall, by the 
year 2002, 90% of white commercial farmers had lost their farms to the state (Sachikonye 2003). 
The invasions by beneficiaries had an immediate declining effect on agricultural production 
levels (Mlambo 2017; Malinga 2018; Southall 2018). The collapse of agriculture also affected 
the operation of manufacturing industries (Mlambo 2017) that had forward and backward 
linkages with the agricultural sector. The FTLRP had a negative effect on the economic base of 
the country. It was clear that the implementation of the FTLRP was shocking and affected many 
lives well after its implementation. 
                                                 
11There was lack of authenticity as to who exactly was a war veteran at the time (Kriger 2003). However, the term is 
used here to refer to the members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). 




After the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) failed to 
revive the economy, government introduced the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme 
(MERP) in 2000 (Carmody & Taylor 2003; Raftopoulos & Phimister 2004; Bratton & 
Masunungure 2011), with almost similar objectives to those of the ESAP and ZIMPREST 
(Nyoni 2018). The programme was meant to achieve an all-stakeholder effort in implementing 
reforms that would restore macro-economic stability (Sachikonye 2000). Its targets included a 
reduction of the budget deficit to 3.8% of GDP and spending 25% of the total expenditure on 
capital projects (Nyoni 2018). However, like ZIMPREST, MERP and its successor, the National 
Economic Revival Programme (NERP) were both quickly abandoned in succession. NERP was 
meant to restore economic stability and to provide humanitarian support to the general citizens 
following the drought that had occurred in 2000 (Nyoni 2018). Key strategies included the 
devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar (in order to introduce an export support exchange rate) 
and easing price controls (OECD & AfDB 2004). The exchange rate, for instance, was reduced 
to US$1 to ZWD824 from the previous rate of US$1 to ZWD55 (OECD & AfDB 2004).  
 
Both the MERP and NERP failed to achieve their intended objectives (see Appendix B). The 
percentages of the total budget that were set aside for capital projects from 2000 to 2003 
remained way below 25% as envisaged in MERP, ranging around 8%, 4%, 8.1% and 11.7% 
respectively (Nyoni 2018). On the other hand, NERP failed to provide a clear roadmap that could 
be followed to address the macroeconomic imbalances and shortcomings in the productive 
sectors (OECD & AfDB 2004). In between MERP and NERP, the then President Robert Mugabe 
announced a Ten Point Plan (TPP) that was meant to link the land occupations resulting from the 
land reform programme to the broader economic framework (Raftopoulos & Phimister 2004). 
The major pillars of this plan were economic growth anchored on agriculture and the 
accumulation of indigenous capital (Raftopoulos & Phimister 2004). However, nothing much 
was done to link the plan to any budgetary and policy decisions. Instead decisions taken were 
reactionary and mainly benefitted those in the higher echelons of power in the ruling ZANU PF 
party (Raftopoulos & Phimister 2004). Consequently, a significant black elite emerged who 
benefitted from the ZANU PF patronage system (Raftopoulos & Phimister 2004). These black 




takeover declining companies) and foreign exchange (Raftopoulos & Phimister 2004) and caused 
a further decrease in investor confidence. 
 
Government policy inconsistencies, political mayhem, and government over-spending 
(Munangagwa, 2009) were also behind economic decline between 2000 and 2008. Government’s 
policy direction was difficult to discern. Most policies (e.g. MERP, TPP and NERP) were 
implemented and prematurely abandoned. The need by the ruling party to retain power especially 
after the disputed 2002 and 2008 presidential elections resulted in increased brutality against the 
members of opposition parties. As was previously mentioned, government spending during this 
period was mainly directed towards keeping the ZANU PF party in power. As an example, 
government funds were utilised on campaign materials (especially ploughs and tractors) bought 
under the Farm Mechanisation Programme (FMP) and were distributed on a political party basis. 
The FMP was implemented by the central bank in order to support mechanisation efforts in new 
farms created after FTLRP, however most of those who received ploughs and tractors failed to 
use them productively and improve agricultural productivity of their newly acquired farms. 
Overall, these events further soiled the image of Zimbabwe as an investment destination.  
 
The effect of loosely controlled government spending fuelled hyperinflation which in turn led to 
the crash of the local currency in 2008 (Munangagwa 2009; Pilossof 2009; Bratton & 
Masunungure 2011; Mukuhlani 2014; Mlambo 2017). During this period, political instability 
worsened and resulted in an increase in the flight of foreign investors (Munangagwa 2009). The 
risk, instability, and unpredictability associated with the prevailing environment acted as push 
factors driving investors away (Munangagwa 2009). Furthermore, the hyperinflationary 
environment forced many manufacturers to close down their businesses due to huge losses. Most 
of the companies that remained operational were operating below capacity as foreign currency 
shortages, prolonged and regular electricity supply interruptions, and, outdated and 
malfunctioning plant and machinery became rampant (Zinyama & Takavarasha 2014). 
 
Overall, the policies and government interventions for the period 2000 to 2008 only worsened 




decline, the Zimbabwean government introduced the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Programme (IEEP) which was provided for in the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Act 14 of 2007. This programme was meant to improve the participation of the 
indigenous people in the national economy through increased business ownership (Zhou & 
Zvoushe 2012). The IEEP expected investors to give up to 51% of a company’s shareholding to 
the locals but was regarded as too steep a price to pay and was tantamount to disempower 
foreign investors (Zhou & Zvoushe 2012).  It was thus no surprise that the IEEP also negatively 
affected the image of Zimbabwe as an investment destination. Accordingly, the IEEP was one of 
the programmes that further scared off potential investors (Kramarenko et al. 2010). The 
consequences were damaging, mainly to the industrial sector which was severely affected. Hopes 
of the manufacturing industry recovering from this economic shock were slim as the political and 
economic policy interventions failed to turn around the economic downturn in the country. Due 
to the socio-political and economic challenges that followed the failure of economic policies 
implemented by government (Ndiweni & Verhoeven 2013) the informal sector expanded as 
Zimbabwean citizens sought alternative activities to help them eke out a living as the chances of 
doing so in the formal sector became less and less.  
 
4.2.5 A liberalised economic phase (2009-2018) 
 
A time of stability, albeit short-lived, was experienced in the Zimbabwean economy after a 
government of national unity (GNU) introduced the multi-currency system under the Short Term 
Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) in 2009 (Mukuhlani 2014; Zinyama & Takavarasha 
2014; Mbira 2015; Mlambo 2017; Malinga 2018; Southall 2018). The country demonetised the 
Zimbabwean dollar and adopted a basket of currencies that included the United States Dollar 
(USD) and the South African Rand (ZAR). This system curbed inflation (Bratton & 
Masunungure 2011; Sibanda & Dubihlela 2013; Mukuhlani 2014), which, in October 2008, had 
reached a level of 231 051% (Sibanda & Dubihlela 2013). However, as the government stopped 
filing official inflation statistics at the time, that number is not necessarily a reflection of the true 
inflation at that time. Unofficially, it is estimated that the month-over-month inflation rate 




inflation rate recorded in the same month was 89.7 sextillion (89 700 000 000 000 000 000 000) 
per cent (Hanke & Kwok 2009: 355). 
 
The period preceding the GNU was characterised by a declining capacity utilisation amongst 
industries in the country (Mukuhlani 2014). Emanating from this, Sibanda & Dubihlela (2013: 
110) noted that: “The coalition government that took over the reins of power in 2009 
promulgated a more stable and liberalised economic environment … the capacity utilization in 
manufacturing rose from less than 10% in 2008 to nearly 30% in 2010.” STERP was thus meant 
to address the socio-economic challenges brought about by the economic crisis (Zinyama & 
Takavarasha 2014) experienced in the previous years. It was meant to promote production and 
also increase the capacity of key economic sectors, especially agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing, and tourism (GoZ 2009). Inflation was mainly controlled through the use of the 
multi-currency system with the ZAR as the reference currency. The South African Rand was 
however overtaken by the USD, which became the principal currency. The use of multiple 
currencies was permitted in all transactions in the country including business transactions, stock 
exchange trading, payment of taxes, and payment of salaries (GoZ 2009). Thus, inflation was 
reduced through relating the inflation rates of those countries that provided anchor principal 
currencies, especially USA and South Africa. The GNU also maintained strict fiscal discipline 
and increased accountability. Efforts were made to strictly monitor government spending so that 
budget deficits could be avoided or at least minimised (GoZ 2009). 
 
The launch of STERP in 2009, followed by STERP II (see Appendix B) in 2010 brought about 
some positive changes in the economy, especially concerning government revenues (GoZ 2010; 
Kramarenko et al. 2010). Economic recovery was witnessed in the country with the revival of 
manufacturing industries being apparent. There was renewed confidence among local and 
foreign investors after the currency reforms that took place in 2009. Some of STERP II’s main 
objectives were sustaining macro-economic stabilisation and the promotion of foreign 
investment complemented by domestic savings and investment that is above 20% of the GDP 
(GoZ 2010). The GNU period raised hopes for a meaningful and sustained economic recovery in 




in the national election. This outcome was received with scepticism by investors who lacked 
confidence in a ZANU PF-dominated government. Thus, immediately after the election, another 
period of economic collapse set in (Mlambo 2017). 
 
Following the July 2013 elections victory, the ZANU PF-controlled government launched the 
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim Asset) plan which was 
meant to be operational from October 2013 to December 2018. According to GoZ (2013: 6), this 
economic blueprint was meant “to achieve sustainable development and social equity anchored 
on indigenization, empowerment and employment creation … largely propelled by the judicious 
exploitation of the country’s abundant human and natural resources.” Zim Asset therefore 
signalled a shift from agriculture to a mineral resource-backed economy (Malinga 2018). 
Emphasis was on endogenous growth, cognisant of the availability of abundant mineral deposits 
and a strong human resource base (GoZ 2013). In line with Hirschman’s (1958) concept of social 
overhead capital, Zim Asset envisaged building and rehabilitating infrastructure and utilities as 
enablers of economic growth (GoZ 2013). Accordingly, building and rehabilitation projects were 
planned in all types of infrastructure including, but not limited to, energy, transport, water and 
waste water, and information communication technology.  
 
Zim Asset encouraged value addition and beneficiation as a way of increasing the benefits of 
production and export of goods and services. Activities lined up to support this initiative 
included, the establishment of diamond cutting and polishing centres, and also agro-processing 
projects such as canning of fruits and vegetables (GoZ 2013). In 2009, the government partnered 
with international companies and started formal diamond mining. However, it seems that the 
mining sector failed to deliver economic recovery (Malinga 2018). The mining and handling, 
especially of diamonds, initially became a state secret with no transparency on quantities mined 
and sold. The revenue of the sale of diamonds was also not properly accounted for. The 
contribution of the mining sector to national exports started declining around 2014 and is shown 





Source: Malinga (2018: 88) 
Figure 4.2 Contribution of the mining industry to national exports 
 
From 2014 until the start of 2015, the contribution of the mining sector to national exports 
dropped from 56% to 50%. This trend can be explained in different ways. Firstly, the 
contribution of diamonds to the earnings of the mining sector dwindled. The shrinkage was 
attributed to the exhaustion of diamond deposits that were found on the surface (or near the 
surface) and were thus easy to mine. With the exhaustion of the surface deposits it became 
difficult and time-consuming to mine deposits deep in the ground. The difficulties experienced 
were attributed to the lack of adequate mechanisation in the diamond mining industry. As a fairly 
new industry, proper machinery and mining equipment were not fully installed. However, in 
spite of the drop in its contribution to national exports, the mining sector performed better 
compared to sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing (Malinga 2018). A comparison of 
these sectors is shown in Figure 4.3. The mining sector has continued to dominate national 
exports followed by agriculture, and manufacturing, respectively. Of the three sectors, the 
manufacturing sector shows a significant decline between 2011 and 2012 with its contribution to 







                                        Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2020) 
Figure 4.3 Sector contribution to exports in Zimbabwe, 2009-2019 
 
Apart from economic stagnation one of the biggest challenges for the economy of Zimbabwe has 
been the political interferences in the mining industry (Malinga 2018). The subsequent decline in 
the mining industry’s contribution to national exports, negatively affected the country’s foreign 
earnings. However, an improvement has been recorded between 2017 and 2018 as shown in 
Figure 4.3. 
 
The period from 2013 to 2016 was marked by further policy discord. According to Raftopoulos 
(2014: 97) “mixed policy messaging of the Mugabe regime can be attributed both to the 
challenges of seeking fuller international re-engagement while holding on to its empowerment 
programme, and the tensions within ZANU-PF about how to proceed with such a re-
engagement.” Attempts have been made to re-engage the West, though cynicism remained very 
high in the Western community. The re-engagement process proved to be difficult because the 
Mugabe regime could not ‘truly’ reform. The regime did not want to abandon, or at least amend, 
restrictive policies or programmes such as the IEEP previously discussed. As such, 
manufacturing activities remained low in the country (RBZ 2016) and a further decline in 




addition the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) (2016: 18) noted that, “a total of 6 companies 
were placed under judicial management, while 13 were liquidated during the first quarter of 
2016, compared to 11 and 17, respectively, during the same period in 2015.” This trend shows 
that industries have continued to face operational challenges in Zimbabwe.  
 
Then in 2016 the Statutory Instrument (SI) 64 of 2016 was passed to provide relief to the local 
industries (Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries – CZI 2017) that were struggling to withstand 
stiff competition from imports. The SI prohibited the importation of products that are locally 
produced in quantities enough to meet the local demand. Other statutory instruments that were 
passed to control goods that could be imported under the general open import licence, include  SI 
18, SI 19, and SI 20, all of 2016 (CZI 2017). These statutory instruments (including SI 64 of 
2016) were combined under a single statutory instrument, namely SI 122 of 2017, that stipulated 
all the products for which both import and export licences were required (CZI 2017). These 
statutory instruments were effective in increasing capacity utilisation and retooling amongst 
industries (CZI 2017). Since the importation of basic commodities produced locally was 
prohibited, capacity utilisation improved as the demand increased for locally produced goods. 
With improved earnings, some industries were able to retool and expand their operations. 
However, challenges that remained include decreasing demand for domestic products, stiff 
competition from cheap imports, liquidity problems, and capital constraints (CZI 2017).  
 
The changes in capacity utilisation of industries in different subsectors are shown in Table 4.2. 
While the metal and metal products subsector has registered increases in capacity utilisation 
from 2016-2019, others experienced sharp decreases, such as the transport subsector. 
Notwithstanding government efforts to protect local industries, industrialists felt that the level of 
protection was insufficient (Mlambo 2017). Additionally, it was felt that local manufacturing 
companies were less competitive on regional and global markets because of the high import 
duty, taxes, and tariffs that were levied by the government (Mlambo 2017). Consequently, 
Zimbabwe recorded more imports than exports in the last quarter of 2017. South Africa 





Table 4.2 Average capacity utilisation by subsectors 
 
               Source: Adapted from CZI (2019) 
 
The ousting of Robert Mugabe as the president of Zimbabwe in November 2017 and his 
subsequent replacement by Emmerson Mnangagwa brought hope to Zimbabweans for economic 
development (Southall 2018). The new government has introduced the Transitional Stabilisation 
Programme (TSP) together with Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as a way of reviving the 
economy that was continuing in a downward spiral. The establishment of the SEZs, was also 
meant to lure international investment (Southall 2018). However, it is yet to be seen whether 
these policies will manage to achieve economic recovery. The immediate effects of TSP and 
SEZs are discussed in Chapters 6 to 10. 
 
4.3 AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BULAWAYO 
 
The majority of main urban centres in Zimbabwe, including Bulawayo, are located along major 




and communication (Patel 1988). The location was meant to enhance trade by facilitating the 
cheap movement of goods and raw materials from one area to another. Due to the development 
of its road and rail networks, the majority of the largest industries in Zimbabwe were 
traditionally located in Bulawayo. In the early 1950s, textile manufacturing was one of the 
leading industries in Southern Rhodesia (Mlambo & Phimister 2006) and it was during this time, 
that the majority (47%) of these textile industries were located in Bulawayo (Mlambo & 
Phimister (2006: 150). Zaaijer (1998: 23) also noted that: “The city has always been the citadel 
of the textile industry with 5 of the 8 largest textile manufacturers based here, such as Merspin, 
Cotton Printers, Security Mills.” As such, Bulawayo was the industrial capital of Zimbabwe 
(Zaaijer 1998; Mbiba & Ndubiwa 2006; Mbira 2015) before being overtaken by Harare 
(Helmsing 1999).  
 
The industrial agglomerations in Bulawayo were dominated by family businesses. Accordingly, 
Helmsing (1999: 7) noted that: “Most sectors [were] dominated by family owned businesses. 
Their owner/managers … often [had] technical rather than financial orientation.”  This lack of 
financial orientation is seen as one of the weaknesses that compromised the resilience of the 
firms and also the economy of Bulawayo in general. It is difficult for those with only technical 
orientation to sustain the continual growth of industries, especially when confronted with 
economic shocks and/or stresses. A combination of technical and financial orientations would 
have improved the industries’ ability to adapt. 
 
In 1980, both Harare and Bulawayo accounted for nearly 70% of the total manufacturing 
industry (Ndlovu 1994), with the industrial sector’s employment that ranged between 70% and 
76% (Ndlovu 1994; Zaaijer 1998). In 1990 Bulawayo alone was able to contribute 25% to 30% 
of the country’s GDP (Zaaijer 1998) even though the early post-independence economic boom 
did not trigger much change in the city’s economy (Helmsing 1999). The manufacturing sector 
used to represent 38% of the total employment in Bulawayo, followed by the construction and 
education sectors respectively (Helmsing 1999). It can thus be said that the manufacturing 





The implementation of ESAP exposed industries in Bulawayo to stiff competition from cheaper 
and better-quality imports from countries in Africa and Asia (Helmsing 1999). Consequently, at 
the onset of the 1990s a period of decline set in resulting in the city’s position in national 
industrial output to diminish  from 32% in 1979 to 25% in 1995 (Zaaijer 1998). This led to 
massive retrenchments, the placement of some companies under provisional liquidation, the de-
listing of some companies from the stock exchange, and the total collapsing of others (Zaaijer 
1998; Helmsing 1999). Industrial closures led to poor economic performance and massive 
deindustrialisation as well as an increase in unemployment levels. These factors then resulted in 
the dilapidation of the industrial infrastructure (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2011) and in some 
cases total abandonment.  
 
In response to the economic threats of the 1990s, manufacturing firms in Bulawayo adopted 
various strategies including, diversification, downsizing and retrenchment, price reductions and 
lowering of profit levels, and improvement of production processes (Helmsing 1999). However, 
for some companies even these strategies could no longer save them from closing down. The 
post-2000 economic crisis that engulfed the whole country was one of the biggest blows to the 
industries in Bulawayo as some industries had to relocate to other cities or countries (Mlambo 
2017). Being heavily affected had its repercussions as many Bulawayo residents, especially those 
whose livelihoods were dependent upon the manufacturing industry, were in dire straits (Mbira 
2015). In terms of employment, 85% of the manufacturing industries in Bulawayo experienced a 
decline between 2009 and 2014 (Mbira 2015). Only 6% of the industries managed to maintain 
their employment levels while 9% experienced an increase (Mbira 2015). In light of this, only a 
few industries have shown economic resilience. The majority failed to adapt to the prevailing 
economic crisis. 
 
The employment patterns of the manufacturing industries were similar to their capacity 
utilisation trends. Mbira (2015) found that 70% of the manufacturing industries experienced a 
decline in capacity utilisation, whilst 24% experienced an increase in capacity utilisation whereas 
no changes were experienced amongst the remaining 6%. Thus, using capacity utilisation as an 




were economically resilient. Six per cent of the industries managed to maintain their capacity 
utilisation, and 24% achieved an increase in defiance of the on-going economic crisis.  
 
4.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE GROWTH  
 
The strength of the Zimbabwean economy during the colonial era laid in its diversity. The 
economy was anchored on agriculture, mining, and the manufacturing industry. These sectors 
were interlinked, especially the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Besides that, diversity 
was also evident in the goods and services that were produced in the manufacturing sector. This 
arrangement was advantageous in the sense that the poor performance of one or two 
commodities on the international market would not easily throw the economy off its growth path. 
The strength was also buttressed by government intervention in industrial investments, especially 
in the cotton ginning and iron and steel manufacturing industries. These investments gave a 
boost to other industrial investments thereby creating a strong industrial base. 
 
Besides the endogenous growth stimuli mentioned in the above paragraph, the remarkable 
growth of the Rhodesian economy was also influenced by exogenous factors. The sanctions 
imposed on Rhodesia, for instance, triggered successful import substitution industrialisation. The 
demand created on the global market by the Second World War, coupled with foreign 
investment, also benefitted the country. The country was able to attract foreign investors and also 
immigrants (fleeing from World War II) who acted, not only as investors, but also skilled labour 
and consumers of the goods and services locally produced. However, the major weakness of the 
economic arrangement was that it provided too much government protection of industries even 
though this was a direct response to international sanctions imposed on the country. Over-
protection promoted inefficiency and the lack of innovation causing the economy to fail when 
the protection was lifted. 
 
The foregoing summary of the literature review provides important insights for the future of 
Bulawayo in terms of its economic and industrial revival. Diversifying both the economy and the 




Helmsing (1999) found that the economy was anchored in the manufacturing, construction, and 
educational sectors which could spell possible weaknesses for economic resilience purposes. The 
decline in manufacturing can easily affect the construction industry due to the inter-dependence 
between these sectors. The other strategy option for economic resilience in Bulawayo is foreign 
direct investment. The city should be able to attract and retain capital and enterprises from other 




This chapter presented a historical account of economic development in Zimbabwe including the 
growth and decline of the industrial sector. Emphasis was put on how the different programmes 
and policies influenced the economic resilience of both the economy and the industrial sector. 
The different phases were covered starting from 1890 to date. The discussion was however not 
exhaustive in terms of policies implemented during this period. Only those policies that had a 
direct impact on the growth and development of the economy in general and in the industrial 
sector specifically, were selected and reviewed. Generally Zimbabwe had one on the strongest 
economies in Southern Africa at the time of independence in 1980. However, the economy has 
experienced a significant decline, making Zimbabwe one of the poorest countries in the region. 
The causes of the economic decline include policy inconsistencies, poor politics, and weak 
government institutions. The decline in the national economy has negatively affected provincial 
economies including that of Bulawayo. The metropolis that used to be the industrial hub of 
Zimbabwe is now characterised by vacant and dilapidating industrial infrastructure after 









CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 




This chapter details the research methodology that guided the operationalisation of this study. It 
explains the positivist and interpretivist research philosophies including the research approach 
and design adopted in the study. An attempt was made to avoid the trap described by Ménacère 
(2016) as the existence of a die-hard group of researchers who seek to promote a certain research 
approach by discrediting or understating the importance of alternative approaches. The 
researcher acknowledges different debates and viewpoints that exist in research literature 
(Kothari 2004; Crook & Garratt 2005; Runeson & Skitmore 2008; Creswell 2009; 2014; 
Ménacère 2016; Opoku, Ahmed & Akotia 2016; Creswell & Creswell 2018). However, the need 
to address the study objectives influenced the choice of research philosophies, paradigms, design 
and methods adopted in this study. 
 
5.2 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND PARADIGM 
 
The differences between a research philosophy and paradigm are slim and not properly explained 
in literature. While some scholars treat them differently (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; 
Ménacère 2016), others argue that there is no difference between the two (Creswell 2009; 2014). 
However, this study adopts the conceptualisation which separates the two.  
 
5.2.1 Research philosophy 
 
A research philosophy contains vital assumptions about how one perceives the world (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Ménacère 2016). These assumptions guide the research strategy and 




factors, which are ontology, epistemology, axiology, and the typical methodology (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Kivunja & Kuyini 2017).  
 
Ontology refers to those assumptions that relate to the nature of reality, how one views the 
phenomena under study (Krauss 2005; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Knight & Turnbull 
2008; Scotland 2012; Neuman 2014). As such, ontology is about assumptions that are made for 
the phenomena under study to make sense (Kivunja & Kuyini 2017). Ontologically, a researcher 
can either be realist or nominalist (Neuman 2014). Realists assume the existence of ‘the world’ 
independent of humans, and how they interpret it (Neuman 2014). In contrast, nominalists 
assume that people experience reality through interpretive lens and their subjective beliefs 
(Neuman 2014). These assumptions influence perceptions of the research problem under study 
and solutions that can be offered (Kivunja & Kuyini 2017). Epistemology is about what can be 
held as true and valid knowledge (Krauss 2005; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Knight & 
Turnbull 2008; Neuman 2014) or according to Scotland (2012: 9), “what it means to know.”  
Epistemology therefore interrogates what is known as the truth or knowledge in a discipline 
(Kivunja & Kuyini 2017). The axiology mainly covers the values and ethics that the researcher 
has to adhere to in the research process (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Kivunja & Kuyini 
2017). Methodology entails operationalisation of the study in terms of the research design, 
methods, and procedures adopted to address the research questions (Kivunja & Kuyini 2017). 
However, Scotland (2012) noted that the methodology can simply be taken as an action plan or 
according to Krauss (2005), as ways and means to attain knowledge.  
 
This study combines the positivist and interpretivist philosophies in order to achieve a detailed 
understanding of economic resilience in Bulawayo. The dominant philosophy is positivism as 
determined by the nature of the study objectives. A rigorous scientific enquiry was considered 
appropriate to examine economic resilience in Bulawayo. However, the dearth of complete and 
consistent data explains the combination of positivism and interpretivism. The researcher 
gathered the participants’ views, narratives and experiences as a means of verifying and 





5.2.1.1 The positivist philosophy 
 
Positivist philosophy or positivism is a product of various early scholars with Auguste Comte, 
amongst them (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Mack 2010; Scotland 2012; Creswell 2014; 
Kivunja & Kuyini 2017). Comte believed that reality can be observed (Mack 2010). This 
philosophy is popularly linked with quantitative research methods (Creswell 2009; 2014; Opoku, 
Ahmed & Akotia 2016; Creswell & Creswell 2018), rigorous empirical observations and 
research that is value-free (Creswell 2009; 2014; Neuman 2014).  In addition, positivism can be 
utilised in different academic disciplines (Neuman 2014), in which the researcher deals with 
observable reality and aims to produce generalisations (Crook & Garratt 2005; Saunders, Lewis 
& Thornhill 2007a; Aziz, Barker & Tezel 2016). Positivism can therefore be utilised by 
researchers in economics, experimental psychology, criminal justice, and policy analysis, among 
others (Neuman 2014). This research philosophy can also be referred to as post-positivist 
research or post-positivism (Runeson & Skitmore 2008; Creswell 2009; 2014; Opoku, Ahmed & 
Akotia 2016). In this study positivism is used interchangeably with post-positivism though the 
researcher acknowledges that the latter is a slight modification of the former. 
 
Ontologically, positivism takes the realist position (Scotland 2012) while its epistemology 
assumes a scientific method of inquiry with observable and measurable facts that are 
generalisable (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Mack 2010; Aziz, Barker & Tezel 2016; 
Kivunja & Kuyini 2017). According to Scotland (2012: 10), “Positivists go forth into the world 
impartially, discovering absolute knowledge about an objective reality.” Apart from that, the 
philosophy mainly adopts causal relationships that are explanatory and enable predictions to be 
made (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Scotland 2012). However, this assertion is 
problematic as it limits the utility of positivism. A rigorous scientific enquiry usually involves 
diverse sophisticated methodologies that are able to produce objective and verifiable results that 
go beyond causal relationships.  
 
The axiology of positivism assumes value-free research whereby the researcher is objective and 




2012; Aziz, Barker & Tezel 2016). The dominant methods associated with positivism are 
deductive in nature and involve large samples and quantitative methods of analysis (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Mack 2010; Scotland 2012; Kivunja & Kuyini 2017). Positivism 
commences with a theory that is either supported or refuted by the data that is collected 
(Creswell 2009; 2014). This is followed by necessary revisions (based on analysed data) to the 
initial theory after which additional tests are conducted (Creswell 2009; 2014). Accordingly, this 
study is guided by the concepts and theories explained in Chapter 2. A model was developed 
after data analysis indicating how regional economic resilience can be understood and analysed 
from a Zimbabwean perspective. 
 
5.2.1.2 The interpretivist philosophy 
 
This study is also guided by the interpretivist philosophy. The combination of interpretivist and 
positivist philosophies enabled the researcher to view the phenomena under study from two 
different perspectives. The interpretivist philosophy, also known as constructivism (Mack 2010; 
Opoku, Ahmed & Akotia 2016) is anchored in two intellectual traditions which are 
phenomenology (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Mack 2010; Scotland 2012) and 
hermeneutics (Mack 2010; Scotland 2012; Neuman 2014).  
 
Phenomenology concerns the way human beings make sense out of the world around them 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Creswell 2009; 2014; Neuman 2014). A researcher using 
this philosophy seeks to understand the world through the lens of the participants’ views, 
narratives, and experiences (Runeson & Skitmore 2008; Creswell 2009; 2014; Creswell & 
Creswell 2018).  On the contrary, hermeneutics entails an on-going interpretation of the social 
world and how this influences the adjustments in meanings and actions known by human beings 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a). As such, hermeneutics involve deriving hidden meanings 
from the responses given by participants and also the interpretation of texts (Mack 2010; 
Scotland 2012). The data collected from the key informants is qualitative in nature. As a result, 




industrial decline and economic resilience in Bulawayo. Proper understanding, analysis, and 
interpretation of qualitative data were done under the interpretivist philosophy. 
 
The ontology of interpretivism assumes rich and complex realities that have multiple meanings 
and interpretations (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Scotland 2012). Notwithstanding this, 
chances are high of the researcher failing to clearly understand and interpret the participants’ 
perceptions. The researcher’s own views may override the diverse views gathered. As noted by 
Runeson & Skitmore (2008: 76), “[i]n constructivism … qualitative researchers adopt an 
ontology and epistemology that sees reality as a social construct and knowledge as individual 
and context dependent.” This view is problematic in the sense that, knowledge cannot be limited 
to the minds of certain individuals. Instead, knowledge should be common to a certain group of 
people or sections of the society. This is corroborated by Runeson & Skitmore (2008: 76) who 
observed that if knowledge is individually constructed then “there can be no science because 
theories, forecasting and generalised explanations are the essence of science.” Validity is low in 
interpretivist researches because they deviate from an objective and scientific enquiry (Scotland 
2012).  
 
The interpretivist philosophy assumes that the researcher is subjective and value-laden 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a; Scotland 2012). The researcher is also considered to be 
part of what is researched (Scotland 2012; Creswell 2014; Creswell & Creswell 2018). As such, 
generalisability of interpretivist findings is limited compared to positivism. Scotland (2012: 12) 
observed that knowledge generated through interpretivist research “is usually fragmented and not 
unified into a coherent body. Generalizations which are deemed useful to policy makers are often 
absent because [the] research usually produces highly contextualized qualitative data, and 
interpretations of this data involve subjective individual constructions.” Since this study sought 
to produce findings that are generalisable and also inform policymaking in Bulawayo, positivism 
was adopted as the dominant philosophy with interpretivism being subordinate. However, this 
should not be taken to mean that positivism is immune to criticisms. Despite being systematic in 
its endeavour to produce objective reality, the positivist approach is expensive to undertake and 




throughout the research process, otherwise errors may happen in processing and interpreting 
quantitative results. However, this is where some researchers fall short. 
 
5.2.2 The research paradigm 
 
Despite its frequent use in social sciences, the term paradigm has been given multiple meanings 
by different scholars (Mack 2010; Shannon-Baker 2016; Kivunja & Kuyini 2017). While Mack 
(2010) noted that a paradigm concerns the overall research framework, Shannon-Baker (2016) 
views a paradigm as a guide that can be used by researchers to ground their research. In simple 
terms, a paradigm refers to the beliefs and assumptions a researcher holds about the world 
(Neuman 2014; Ménacère 2016; Kivunja & Kuyini 2017). In line with the research philosophies 
discussed earlier, this study adopts the functionalist and interpretive paradigms (Saunders, Lewis 
& Thornhill 2007a). The functionalist paradigm focuses on rational explanations informed by 
positivism, realism and objectivism (Burrell & Morgan 2005). According to Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill (2007a: 113) a researcher who uses this paradigm assumes that, “organisations are 
rational entities, in which rational explanations offer solutions to rational problems.”  As such, 
Burrell & Morgan (2005: 26) observed that the functionalist paradigm seeks to objectively 
“provide practical solutions to practical problems.” 
 
The interpretive paradigm, emanating from the interpretivist research philosophy, seeks to 
interpret and understand how the world works through subjective experiences (Burrell & Morgan 
2005; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007a). This paradigm is nominalist and anti-positivist in 
nature (Burrell & Morgan 2005). However, both the functionalist and interpretive paradigms 
guided the methodology and methods adopted in this study. The functionalist (also known as 
positivist-functionalist) paradigm utilises closed-ended questionnaires to gather data that is then 
analysed quantitatively (Scotland 2012). In comparison, the interpretive paradigm makes use of 
qualitative methods that produce qualitative data. However, the terms quantitative and qualitative 
cannot be equated to paradigms; they are qualifiers that denote different approaches to data 





5.3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
This study heavily draws from the deductive approach although it also utilises the inductive 
approach. The deductive approach, which draws from the positivist philosophy, is commonly 
used in quantitative studies (Creswell 2009; 2014; Leavy 2017).  In this approach, the aim of the 
researcher is to prove, disprove or give credence to theories through the examination of 
hypotheses or research questions derived from theories (Creswell 2009; 2014; Leavy 2017). 
Furthermore, data on variables contained in the hypotheses or research questions is collected and 
analysed in order to confirm or refute the theories (Creswell 2009; 2014). The inductive 
approach is mainly adopted in qualitative studies (Creswell 2009; 2014; Leavy 2017). In an 
inductive approach, the researcher uses the data collected to build broad themes or a theory as an 
end product (Creswell 2014). According to Creswell (2009: 64) the researcher using this 
approach gathers “detailed information from participants and then forms this information into 
categories or themes. These themes are developed into broad patterns, theories, or 
generalizations that are then compared with personal experiences or with existing literature on 
the topic.” Data in the inductive approach is mainly collected through open-ended questions or 
field notes (Creswell 2009; 2014). 
 
The study results are generalised to the whole of Bulawayo thus it was necessary to utilise the 
deductive approach. The use of both approaches enabled the researcher to propose a model that 
can be useful in analysing and understanding regional economic resilience in countries in the 
South, such as Zimbabwe. Thus, combining the two approaches is advantageous (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill 2007a) as it merges their strengths and limits their biases. 
 
5.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In simple terms, a research design is a plan of action that provides a link between research 
questions and conclusions (Rowley 2002; Creswell 2009; 2014; Ménacère 2016; Creswell & 
Creswell 2018). Alternatively, a research design can be perceived as a conceptual structure that 




exercise from the beginning to the end (Kothari 2004). Accordingly, this study adopts a case 
study strategy that is both explanatory and exploratory in nature. The study is also longitudinal 
and takes into account changes that took place in Bulawayo over a period of time as economic 
resilience is best measured over a defined period (Turok 2014; Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016). 
The selection of the design was also influenced by the research philosophies, paradigms, and 
approaches discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. The explanatory part of the study seeks to 
establish and illuminate causality or the relationships between variables (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill 2007b). On the other hand, the exploratory seeks to generate insights about industrial 
decline taking place in Bulawayo and the consequential effects thereof on the regional economy. 
 
5.4.1 The case study strategy 
 
Different views exist in literature with regards to the nature of case studies. In most instances, 
case studies are linked to the interpretivist philosophy or the interpretive paradigm (Scotland 
2012). Some scholars link case studies to mainly qualitative studies (Kothari 2004; Proverbs & 
Gameson 2008). Some doubt the generalisability of case study findings (Stark & Torrance 2005) 
while others regard case studies to be one type of the research designs. Notwithstanding this, 
VanWynsberghe & Khan (2007) refuted the assertion that a case study is a method, research 
design, or a methodology. Instead, VanWynsberghe & Khan (2007: 2) noted that, a case study is 
“a transparadigmatic and transdisciplinary` heuristic that involves the careful delineation of the 
phenomena for which evidence is being collected (event, concept, program, process, etc.).” 
Accordingly, a case study is viewed as a heuristic or a strategy involving the self-discovery of 
knowledge. Furthermore, a case study can be used under any research paradigm whether it is 
post-positivism or constructivism (VanWynsberghe & Khan 2007). Case studies can therefore be 
used in any discipline including social sciences, natural sciences, and business (VanWynsberghe 
& Khan 2007). Levy (2008: 3) agrees and notes that case studies can, “incorporate substantial 
statistical analysis, often with the aim of generalizing to other cases.” This is the context in 





Case studies can be utilised to make predictions within the appropriate scope (VanWynsberghe 
& Khan 2007). Since the aim of hypothesis-generating case studies is to generalise the research 
findings, they can contribute to the development of theoretical propositions (Levy 2008). Case 
studies can also involve testing causal relationships (Levy 2008). Thus, case studies are able to 
produce important or in-depth insights compared to other research approaches (Rowley 2002; 
Kothari 2004; Stark & Torrance 2005) as they utilise multiple data sources (Rowley 2002; Stark 
& Torrance 2005; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007b). However, this is an exaggeration. Any 
research approach utilising the correct methods that are applied in the correct context should be 
equally able to produce valuable insights. In this study, data was collected through 
questionnaires, interviews, observations, and documentary analyses.  
 
5.4.2 Research methods 
 
Research methods are the tools, techniques, and ways of collecting, analysing, and interpreting 
data (Creswell 2009; 2014). In order to adequately address the research question and objectives, 
this study utilises both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis techniques. The 
combination of the two methods can be referred to as mixed methods (Creswell & Garret 2008; 
Creswell 2009; 2014) and can occur at various stages of the research (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & 
Turner 2007). Combining quantitative and qualitative methods in one study enables the 
researcher to view phenomena under study from different standpoints (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & 
Turner 2007; Creswell & Garret 2008). As noted by Creswell & Garret (2008: 326) this approach 
“involves collecting both quantitative and qualitative data … the merging, linking, or combining 
of the two sources of data, and then conducting research as a single study or a longitudinal 
project with multiple phases.” Thus, both quantitative and qualitative data was collected in this 
study. 
 
Amongst the different types of mixed methods research, this study assumes the convergent 
parallel. This type integrates quantitative and qualitative data so that the analysis of the research 
problem is comprehensive (Creswell 2009; 2014). According to Patton (1997: 274) “qualitative 




quantitative data facilitate comparisons because all participants respond to the same questions on 
standardized scales within predetermined response categories.” Patton’s (1997) view on 
qualitative data is corroborated by Opoku, Ahmed & Akotia (2016: 34) who stated that 
qualitative research methods “generate very rich, deep data.” However, this view is another 
overstatement as the meanings ascribed to ‘rich’ and ‘deep’ are ambiguous. Any rigorous 
research enquiry, whether quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods is able to produce valuable 
‘rich’ data. As an example, a systematic and rigorous quantitative research produces data with 
high levels of validity and reliability. Such data can be perceived as ‘rich data’. In line with 
Creswell (2009; 2014), the researcher collected both quantitative and qualitative data at the same 
time. Data was also integrated in the analysis and interpretation of the study results. Areas of 
contradiction and corroboration were noted and explained in the analysis and interpretation of 
both quantitative and qualitative data.   
 
In studying regional economic resilience, mixed methods are useful especially in circumstances 
where the levels of data completeness, consistency, and reliability are low. In such 
circumstances, some economic resilience variables can be measured quantitatively and others, 
qualitatively. There is currently no agreement in economic resilience literature concerning the 
variables that should be used to measure economic resilience (see Breathnach, Van Egeraat & 
Curran 2015). According to Breathnach, Van Egeraat & Curran (2015: 498) the debate concerns 
whether resilience should be measured “in terms of basic indicators such as output, incomes, 
employment and population or in structural terms such as sectoral reconfiguration or enhanced 
entrepreneurial activity.” Notwithstanding the disagreement, variables that have been used to 
measure economic resilience in the North are mainly quantitative in nature. These include GDP 
per capita (Wink 2012; Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016), employment levels (Wink 2012; 
Breathnach, Van Egeraat & Curran 2015; Han & Goetz 2015; Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016), 
and in some cases regional production levels (Wink 2012). The use of the variables can differ 
from one study to another and also from case to case. As an example, employment figures were 
utilised in measuring the resilience of Cambridge and Swansea cities in the United Kingdom 
(Simmie & Martin 2010). Employment levels and not output was also used in the analysis of 




that it takes longer than output to recover from an economic shock (Martin 2012). Apart from 
that, it may happen that a growth in output may be achieved after an economic shock but without 
the corresponding growth in employment (Martin 2012).  
 
In light of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, this study intended to utilise GDP per 
capita and employment levels to measure economic resilience at both firm and regional levels. 
However, due to the scarcity of data, capacity utilisation and employment levels were used at 
firm level and only employment level at a regional level. GDP per capita levels were only 
utilised at a national level in Chapter 10, in order to illustrate the challenges of measuring 
economic resilience in Zimbabwe. Measuring resilience at different levels is supported by 
Sensier, Bristow & Healy (2016) who noted that, although resilience is mainly analysed at 
national level, the analysis could also be done at regional, city, or other smaller scales.  
 
In order to produce reliable and valid knowledge, the variables adopted in this study were 
analysed using quantitative methods in line with the positivist philosophy. However, in 
measuring resilience, statistical data can be combined with subjective assessments of phenomena 
such as identity, pride, and fears (Wink 2012). Accordingly, the measurement and analysis of 
regional economic resilience was also approached from a qualitative perspective. In the study of 
Sheffield City Region, reviewing of regional policy documents was done in order to identify 
themes that might be related to economic resilience (Brooks, Vorley & Williams 2016). 
Secondary data was reviewed in order to have a comprehensive picture of the economy of 
Sheffield City Region (Brooks, Vorley & Williams 2016). As such, archival analysis was 
conducted, which is a method that is mainly used within the interpretivist philosophy and in 
qualitative methods. Semi-structured interviews were also utilised to gather data from 
municipalities, private businesses, and other relevant stakeholders in the Sheffield City Region 
(Brooks, Vorley & Williams 2016). The data was analysed using thematic analysis. Thus, when 
studying economic resilience, the methods used are determined by the variables that are 





5.5 STUDY POPULATION 
 
The study targets formal and informal industries operating in Bulawayo Metropolitan Province 
(BMP). The population therefore consists of registered firms operating in BMP including micro, 
small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs)12 which may not be registered. The reason for 
considering both formal and informal firms can be explained by the continual decline of formal 
industries in the study area and the subsequent proliferation of the informal economy. The 
informal firms have occupied an equally important position in the economy of Bulawayo. Thus, 
important conclusions can be drawn when comparing the resilience of formal versus informal 
industries. Studying the economic resilience of a region through focusing on the performance of 
industries in the concerned region is not something new. Industrial performance was analysed in 
the study of regional economic resilience in Ireland (Breathnach, Van Egeraat & Curran 2015) 
because the concerned industries constituted the economic base, anchoring regional economies 
that were under study. The economy of Bulawayo is mainly anchored on manufacturing industry 
hence, industrial decline in the city negatively affected its economy. Accordingly, important 
insights on BMP’s economic resilience can be generated by studying the performance of 
industries located in the metropolis. 
 
5.6 SAMPLING DESIGN 
 
The study utilised both probability and non-probability sampling methods to select participants. 
To produce a sampling frame, a list of all registered firms (i.e. MSMEs and large enterprises) 
was obtained from the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA). However, the demarcation of 
regions by ZIMRA for tax purposes is different from that of provinces in Zimbabwe. As such, 
the list included firms located outside BMP. Consequently, the list from ZIMRA was cross 
matched with other lists obtained from the Bulawayo Metropolitan Municipality (BMM), the 
                                                 
12 See Appendix C for Zimbabwean classification of MSMEs in different sectors. The classification is adopted from 





Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries 
(CZI), and the Ministry of Women Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises 
Development (MWACSMED). This produced a consolidated list that could be updated. During a 
tour of the metropolis, firms that were omitted from the list because they were not registered 
with any of the mentioned institutions, could be added to the consolidated list after making sure 
they were not already listed. From this exercise 3908 firms were listed on a single consolidated 
list, which list became the sampling frame. Although the list might not have contained all the 
industries operating in Bulawayo, it was comprehensive enough for the purposes of the study. 
 
5.6.1 Sample size determination 
 
The sample size should be carefully considered as it determines the validity and generalisability 
of the study findings (Singh & Masuku 2014). It is thus important that an optimum sample size 
should be selected in order to ensure efficiency, representativeness, reliability, and flexibility 
(Kothari 2004). Furthermore it is vital in any research to balance financial resources with an 
ideal sample size (VanVoorhis & Morgan 2007). For instance, it is possible that a very large 
sample size will not only have cost implications but could also lead to inaccuracies and biases 
(Singh & Masuku 2014). Factors that can be used to determine a sample size, include the level of 
precision which is usually set at (±5%) a confidence level which is usually set at 95%, and the 
degree of variability which is usually set at 0.5 or 50% (Israel 1992; Kothari 2004; Singh & 
Masuku 2014).   
 
For this study the level of precision, level of confidence, and the degree of variability have been 
considered in determining the sample size. The level of precision is taken to mean the sampling 
error (Israel 1992) and a level of (±5%) has been utilised. The confidence level used is 95%. This 
means that 95% of the sample values should have a true population value (Israel 1992) for the 
sample to be considered representative. According to Israel (1992: 2) the degree of variability 
“refers to the distribution of attributes in the population. The more heterogeneous a population, 
the larger the sample size required to obtain a given level of precision.” Thus, for the purposes of 




concerning the distribution of attributes in the population. This is supported by Morrison (1988) 
who notes that when using a formula to determine sample sizes, it is rare in most times for the 
researcher to know the population variance. In such cases, it is therefore advisable for the 
researcher to assume a population variance of 50%. 
 
In order to determine the sample size, a formula developed by Cochran as quoted by Israel 
(1992: 3) was adopted. The formula is given as follows: 
 
    n0 =   (Z
2pq/e2) 
 
 Where, n0  - represents the sample size. 
Z2   -  is an area under the normal distribution curve that represents the 
confidence level. A value of 1.96 is used in the formula. This value is 
obtained from mathematical tables corresponding to 95% confidence 
level.  
p   -  represents estimated proportion of an attribute that is present in the 
population. A value of 0.5 is used in the formula.  
  q   -  is obtained from (1-p). Which is (1-0.5) giving a value of 0.5. 
  e   -  represents the desired level of precision. A value of (±0.05) is used. 
 
Using the chosen precision, confidence, and variability levels, the formula produced a sample 
size of approximately 384 participants. This value was increased to 480 in order to cater for non-
responses13 during data collection. Any number of responses between 384 and 480 was 
considered adequate to undertake the required statistical analyses and also satisfy the power of 
the study. The power of a study is also referred to as the ‘statistical power’ (Singh & Masuku 
2014).  According to VanVoorhis & Morgan (2007: 43), “Power refers to the probability of 
rejecting a false null hypothesis.” This could result in wrong conclusions. VanVoorhis & Morgan 
(2007) noted that when using the rule of thumb, power in studies utilising correlation and 
regression analysis, should have a sample size of not less than 50 participants. Furthermore, a 
                                                 
13 A non-response rate of 25% was determined when a pilot survey was conducted. To cater for non-responses in the 




sample size of at least 20 (with expected cell frequencies being 5 or above) is required for chi-
square analysis and at least 300 participants for a factor analysis. These figures are able to 
produce an acceptable level of power in a research. Accordingly, the sample size utilised in this 
study is regarded adequate to satisfy the requirements of the statistical analyses conducted.  
 
The formula by Cochran has been chosen because the total population of formal and informal 
firms operating in the study area is not known with certainty. Due to the widespread industrial 
closures and relocations in the study area, it is difficult to obtain a population size that can be 
utilised with certainty from published materials. That is why precision, confidence level, and 
variability have been used as the key determinants of the sample size. In any case the power of 
the research has been addressed with a sample that is believed to be large enough. Thus, in 
agreement with VanVoorhis & Morgan (2007) and Singh & Masuku (2014), results from 
statistical tests conducted in this study truly indicate the existence of a significant difference. The 
trueness of conclusions needs to be guaranteed because there are different outcomes that can be 
obtained after undertaking a statistical analysis. The possible outcomes are shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Possible decision rules in statistical analyses 
 
Source: VanVoorhis & Morgan (2007: 44) 
 
Rejecting a correct null hypothesis results in a Type 1 error, while failing to reject a wrong null 
hypothesis causes a Type II error as shown in Table 5.1. Morrison (1988) noted that Type 1 and 
Type II errors should be avoided in a study. Furthermore, a study should also be able to reject a 




5.6.2 Sample selection procedure 
 
Random sampling was used to select study participants. In this sampling method, each and every 
unit has a pre-assigned chance of being selected and included in the sample (Singh & Masuku 
2014). Accordingly, systematic random sampling was utilised to select study participants. 
According to Kothari (2004: 15), systematic sampling is best used “when sampling frame is 
available in the form of a list … . the selection process starts by picking some random point in 
the list and then every nth element is selected until the desired number is secured.” Stratification 
could not be used due to the difficulties associated with an attempt to separate the list into 
different strata. The list had only names of the firms thus any attempt of stratification could have 
resulted in errors.  
 
When using simple random sampling each participant has an equal chance of being selected 
(Kothari 2004). Initially, firms were arranged in an alphabetical order and thereafter assigned 
codes for identification purposes. Random tables were used to pick the first unit, after which the 
8th14 element was successively selected in order to come up with 480 participants. A multi-stage 
random sampling exercise was avoided (i.e. subdividing the industries further into sub-sectors) 
as this method can increase sampling error (Singh & Masuku 2014). Multistage random 
sampling usually involves the selection of research participants in stages, although this may 
involve sampling biases in the process (Singh & Masuku 2014). 
 
The key informants were selected through purposive sampling. In this sampling method, 
participants are selected for a specific purpose (Singh & Masuku 2014) and are therefore 
deliberately chosen by the researcher (Kothari 2004). The key informants include the Bulawayo 
Metropolitan Municipality (BMM), the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), the 
Ministry of Women Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises Development 
(MWACSMED), the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), the Zimbabwe 
Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), the Zimbabwe Investment Authority (ZIA), the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce (MIC), and the Industrial Development Corporation of Zimbabwe 
                                                 




(IDCZ). These informants were specifically selected because they are linked to the operation of 
industries in Zimbabwe. In addition, they have knowledge pertaining to the performance and 
economic wellbeing of industries nationally. Their participation gave general participants 
confidence in the research process. Endorsement of the study by trade associations or 
associations that represent industries is a factor that improves the response rate (Bartholomew & 
Smith 2006).  
 
BMM is the local authority governing the study area. As such, BMM provided data concerning 
the challenges faced by industries, the state of industrial decline, and economic revitalisation 
strategies implemented in the metropolis. In addition, BMM provided the list of firms licensed to 
operate in the metropolis. The CZI and ZNCC provided data concerning the number of industries 
in Bulawayo and also strategy options for firm resilience. The MWACSMED provided data 
specifically on the list of MSMEs operating in Bulawayo, their challenges, and government 
programmes implemented to promote the resilience of MSMEs. Likewise, the MIC provided 
data on national policies that have been implemented to help industries adapt to the current 
economic hardships. ZIMRA provided a database that was useful in determining the number of 
firms in the study area. Both the ZIA and IDCZ provided data on national investment and the 
development of industries in Zimbabwe. In addition, these two institutions provided a national 
perspective on economic and industrial decline, and government interventions to improve foreign 
and domestic investments while assisting industries remain operational. 
 
5.7 DATA COLLECTION 
 
Besides having a good sample size, data should be properly collected in order to be useful 
(Morrison 1988) in addressing the study questions. This study utilised both primary and 
secondary data. Primary data was gathered using questionnaires soliciting data from firms in 
BMP. In-depth interviews were used to collect mainly qualitative data from key informants. In 
addition, observations were adopted as a data collection technique. The use of these tools is 
supported by Zohrabi (2013) who noted that questionnaires, interviews, and observations can be 




analysis. The use of both primary and secondary data enabled the analysis of phenomena from 
different perspectives. According to Hussein (2009: 3), “data triangulation also referred as data 
sources triangulation depicts the use of multiple data sources in the same study for data 
validation purposes.” The use of both primary and secondary data sources therefore validated the 




A questionnaire provides an efficient way of collecting data on a large scale (Kothari 2004; 
Zohrabi 2013). As such, questionnaires were used to collect the views of industrialists on how 
industrial decline has affected their business operations, their employment, and their levels of 
capacity utilisation. The questionnaire was a combination of closed-ended and open-ended 
questions with the majority being closed-ended questions. Questions were structured clearly so 
that they could easily be understood by the participants (Kothari 2004). Apart from that, the 
questions were derived from the study objectives listed in Chapter 1 and were meant to collect 
relevant data to address the overall aim of the study. The response rate was improved by 
administering the questionnaires face to face (Zohrabi 2013). A total of 480 questionnaires were 
distributed, 411 were returned, of which 19 had a very low question response rate and were set 




Personal interviews that involve face to face contact (Kothari 2004) were utilised to gather data 
from key informants. These interviews were held because in-depth information can be yielded 
from them (Zohrabi 2013) since they capture the narratives, opinions, feelings and experiences 
of the subjects (Opoku, Ahmed & Akotia 2016). Semi-structured interviews were used as 
opposed to guided interviews because different data was sought from different organisations. 
Thus, the need for comparability in terms of the qualitative data obtained was limited. Semi-




approached (Opoku, Ahmed & Akotia 2016). The data solicited from these interviews included 
the experiences and perceptions of key informants on the industrial decline in Bulawayo 
 
The key informants selected were considered to have adequate knowledge concerning the 
phenomena under study. Before the interviews were conducted requests for research permission 
were sought from the key informants. After approval was granted, interview appointments were 
made considering the key informants’ free time, this was followed up with face to face 
interviews with each key informant. Interviews have an advantage of being interactive 
(Alshenqeeti 2014) with room for follow-up questions and probing so that the researcher can get 
clear and complete responses (Zohrabi 2013; Alshenqeeti 2014). In any case, face-to-face 





Observation is also a vital method that can be utilised when collecting data (Jones & Somekh 
2005) as it has the benefit that it is not affected by low response rates as in other data collection 
tools (Kothari 2004). Observations can be undertaken with the researcher being a participant or 
non-participant observer (Zohrabi 2013). Thus, data is gathered through the researcher’s own 
observation (Kothari 2004). For this study, non-participant observation was conducted. Deserted 
and operational industrial sites were photographed to augment the industrial decline narrative. 
Efforts were made to limit subjective bias. It is true that the way a researcher perceives the world 
can influence what is observed (Jones & Somekh 2005). However, for this study, both successful 
and unsuccessful cases were observed with due diligence to both. 
 
5.7.4 Archival analysis 
 
Secondary data was gathered through review of existing literature and analysis of reports and 
relevant documents obtained during data collection. Archival data was very useful in this study, 




ZIMRA, ZNCC, and CZI. Data solicited from these organisations includes the economic 
performance of the metropolis over time, the number of industries operating in the metropolis, 
and those industries that have either relocated or closed down. Additional data concerning the 
economic activities in the metropolitan city was obtained from ZIMSTAT and BMM. 
  
5.8 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The successful completion of data collection led to data analysis. However, analysis was 
preceded by the coding and entering of quantitative data into the Statistical Package for Social 
Scientists (SPSS version 16 and 20). After the cleaning process, the data was subjected to 
comparative analysis, simple descriptive statistics, regression analysis, trend analysis, and chi-
square analysis,15 in order to draw meaningful conclusions. Creswell (2014) noted that, in chi-
square analysis the variables should not be normally distributed. Thus, the chi-square test for 
association was utilised to analyse variables that did not fall under the normal distribution.  
 
All chi-square and associated tests in this study were conducted at a 5% significance level. The 
null hypothesis was only rejected if the p values obtained in the tests were less than, or equal to, 
0.05. Accordingly, a p value that is less than, or equal to, 0.05 was interpreted as depicting 
statistical significance while a p value greater than 0.05 depicted an insignificant statistical 
difference. Phi and Cramer’s V coefficients were used to assess the strength of association in chi-
square tests. The former applied to ‘2x2 contingency tables’ while the latter applied to larger 
tables. The interpretation of Phi and Cramer’s V tests that was adopted in this study is shown in 





                                                 




Table 5.2 Interpretation of Phi and Cramer’s V tests 
Measure Interpretation 
0.00 and under 0.10 Negligible association 
0.10 and under 0.20 Weak association 
0.20 and under 0.40 Moderate association 
0.40 and under 0.60 Relatively strong association 
0.60 and under 0.80 Strong association 
0.80 to 1.00 Very strong association 
                                                         Source: Rea & Parker (2014: 219) 
 
Qualitative data was coded and organised into thematic areas using HyperRESEARCH software 
before analysed through content analysis.  
 
The consolidated research methodology is summarised in Table 5.3 indicating how the 
objectives were linked to data collection and analysis techniques. In measuring and interpreting 
economic resilience, Martin (2012) indicated that there are four interrelated dimensions that can 
be used to analyse how economies respond to recessionary shocks. These dimensions are 
resistance, recovery, re-orientation, and renewal. Their relationships are shown in Figure 5.1. 
These dimensions inform the analysis and interpretation of the data in this study. However, the 
disturbance or shock under analysis in the study should be well-defined (Sensier, Bristow & 
Healy 2016) and its onset noted (Han & Goetz 2015). Furthermore, there was a need to 
determine when the shock actually occurred (Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016). It might have 
been easy to determine by looking at closures of firms, but it was difficult to show with certainty 
when a shock such as an economic crisis started (Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016). Thus, the 
study period was taken from 2009 to 2018. The year 2009 was when the Zimbabwean economy 
was dollarised hence, it was used as the base year. Dollarisation brought stability as hyper-
inflation of the preceding years was curtailed. The shock was assumed to have started in 2013 
when ZANU PF won the national election. A period of economic recession followed the election 





Table 5.3 Research methodology matrix 
Objective Data required to address the 
objective  
From whom - 
informants 
Methods, tools & 
techniques 
appropriate 




1. How industrial downsizings 
have affected the economy of 
BMP. 
2. How the economy of BMP 
was affected by industrial 
closures and displacements. 
3. Economic performance 













1. Chi-square tests 




4. Content analysis 





1. Capacity utilisation trends 
2. Firm employment trends 


















5. Content analysis 
6. Phi & Cramer’s V 
coefficients 
3.  1. Economic policies and their 
effects on firm growth. 
2. Industrial policies and their 
effects on industrial 
















2. Content analysis 
3. Descriptive 
statistics 
4.  1. The type of shock and its 
onset. 
2. Strategies to revitalise the 
struggling industries. 
3. Strategies to improve 
attractiveness of the city to 















3. Phi & Cramer’s V 
coefficients 
4. Content analysis 
5. Trend analysis 
6. Fischer’s exact test 
5.  1. Economic resilience 
perspectives in Zimbabwe.  
2. Contribution of the industry 
to regional economic 
resilience. 
















3. Trend analysis 
 
Pre-shock growth trends were considered so as to separate the effects of the shock from long-






Source: Martin (2012: 12) 
Figure 5.1 The dimensions of understanding regional economic resilience 
 
The resistance aspect of resilience in this study was analysed through the sensitivity index by 
Martin (2012: 13). The index is as follows: 
 
βr = [(ΔEr/Er)/(ΔEN/EN)] 
 
Where βr   -    represents sensitivity index. If βr of a region is greater than a unit, it 
means the concerned region has a low resistance (high sensitivity) to a 
recessionary shock. However, a ratio less than a unit represents high 
resistance (low sensitivity). 
ΔE/E    - represents percentage change in employment.  




N    - represents a national level. 
 
According to Martin (2012) if the index is greater than 1 it means the region’s resistance to a 
recessionary shock is low. However, if it is less than 1 the concerned region has a greater 
resistance to a recessionary shock. This analysis was applied to Bulawayo in order to assess its 
level of resistance to shocks. However, the value obtained could not be easily interpreted using 
Martin’s (2012) decision guidelines. As such, two more indices16 were utilised in order to 
ascertain a correct and reliable decision rule. The analysis of other dimensions such as recovery, 
renewal, and re-orientation, was conducted through trend analysis.  
 
5.9 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
 
Validity and reliability of data is vital to consider in the research process (Zohrabi 2013). 
Combining quantitative and qualitative analysis has been adopted to improve validity and 
reliability of this particular study (Ihantola & Kihn 2011; Zohrabi 2013). This triangulation is 




Great care should be taken in developing data collection instruments so as to reduce error in the 
process of measurement (Kimberlin & Winterstein 2008). In order to achieve validity, an 
instrument has to be reliable (Kimberlin & Winterstein 2008) since validity concerns the 
authenticity of the findings (Lewis 2005; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007b). Validity can be 
internal or external (Zohrabi 2013). While internal validity is concerned with an investigation 
being able to measure what it is expected to measure, external validity focuses on the degree to 
which research results can be generalised (Zohrabi 2013; Alshenqeeti 2014). Accordingly, clear 
and straightforward research instruments were utilised to measure the intended variables. Plain 
                                                 
16 The researcher adopted additional indices from Lagravinese (2015) and Faggian et al (2017). The indices are 




language was used to enable participants to fully understand the variable measured by each 
question. External validity was enhanced through the use of a large randomised sample. This 




Reliability refers to the ability of data collection and analysis techniques, procedures, and 
instruments to yield consistent findings (Lewis 2005; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007b; 
Alshenqeeti 2014). Like validity, reliability can also be either internal or external. Internal 
reliability focuses on consistency in terms of data collection, analysis, and interpretation, while 
external reliability is concerned with the degree to which similar results are obtained when the 
study is repeated (Zohrabi 2013). However, reliability is usually threatened by factors such as 
subject or participant error, participant bias, observer error, and observer bias (Saunders, Lewis 
& Thornhill 2007b). While participant error has to do with the participant’s state of mind during 
engagement, participant bias entails the participant giving responses that he or she thinks are 
expected from him or her (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007b). To avoid the participant error 
and bias, participants were engaged during their free times. Though participant bias is difficult to 
control when questionnaires are completed in the absence of the researcher, efforts were made to 
provide clarifications where required.  
 
Observer error may be associated with the way interviewers ask questions (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill 2007b) or the experience of the interviewer. Alshenqeeti (2014) agrees that reliability 
is somehow low when interviews are used while using different interviewing techniques. Some 
researchers are good interviewers while others are not. In this study all key informant interviews 
were conducted by the principal researcher. Research assistants were not engaged for the 
interviewing exercise. This limited the variation of interviewing skills and also the differences in 
experience of those conducting the interviews. Observer bias emanates from how observers 
interpret the responses from the key informants or participants (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 
2007b). However, clarifications were sought in instances where vague responses were given. 




5.10 RESEARCH ETHICS 
 
Researchers need to consider ethical issues throughout the research process from the proposal 
stage to the reporting of the findings (Creswell 2014). Participants should be treated fairly and 
equally (Piper & Simons 2005). This study adhered to standard ethical practices expected in 
undertaking research involving human beings as this is important in social research (Mollet 
2011; Alshenqeeti 2014). According to the Social Research Association (SRA 2003: 15) 
“researchers have an obligation to conform to the ethical standards of the society in which they 
conduct their work.” Researchers should not expose the participants to any potential harm, be it 
physical or psychological (Mollet 2011; Creswell 2014). Ethics are therefore enacted to 
empower participants (Piper & Simons 2005). Steps were taken to avoid exposing participants to 
any harm whatsoever, which could emanate from their participation in this study.  
 
Voluntary participation, as another ethical consideration (Creswell 2014) was adhered to in 
undertaking this study. The participation of all participants was on a voluntary basis. No coercion 
was used to get responses. Participants were allowed to withdraw from participating in the study 
if they wished to do so (Alshenqeeti 2014). Informed consent was sought from participants who 
were fully aware of the risks of participating in the study (Piper & Simons 2005; Mollet 2011; 
Alshenqeeti 2014; Creswell 2014). All the participants were required to complete and sign a 
consent form before they could participate in the study. Study focus and objectives were 
explained to the participants so that they could make an informed decision concerning their 
participation or non-participation. Apart from that, no incentives were used, in order to avoid 
reluctant participants to participate in the study.    
 
Besides informed consent, the study also upheld privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity of the 
participants (Piper & Simons 2005; Mollet 2011; Alshenqeeti 2014; Creswell 2014). The data 
collected was treated with the strictest confidence and was used solely for research purposes. 
Prior consent was sought from participants before recording or photographing them. Language 
barriers and bureaucratic challenges were encountered during the study. However, where 




engaged to assist with data collection and translations. The research assistants were trained 
before commencing data collection tasks and the research focus and the data collection plan were 
fully explained to them. Bureaucracy in government departments was overcome by timely 
application for permits to access official data, and persistent follow-ups. No bribes or facilitation 




This chapter has given a detailed explanation of the research philosophies, paradigms, and 
approaches of this study. The main philosophies guiding the study are the positivist and 
interpretivist philosophies. These philosophies influenced the research paradigms, approaches, 
and methods selected. In line with the research philosophy and paradigm, mixed methods were 
adopted combining the quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis tools. The use of 
mixed methods was justified by the lack of complete and consistent economic data in Bulawayo. 
In such cases, qualitative data can be used to verify and augment quantitative data in measuring 
and analysing economic resilience of firms and regions. Thus, quantitative and qualitative data 














CHAPTER 6: THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL DECLINE ON THE 
ECONOMY OF BULAWAYO METROPOLITAN PROVINCE 
 
“Only a few large companies are still operational in Bulawayo e.g. Kango, Treger, Monarch, 
Lobels Biscuits, Arenel, Pretoria Portland Cement (PPC), and United Refineries. They are not 





In this chapter the effects of industrial decline on the economy of Bulawayo Metropolitan 
Province (BMP) are evaluated. The first part of the chapter provides a summary of the factors 
behind the industrial decline. The emphasis is on the factors indicated by the participants.  This is 
followed by an evaluation of how industrial decline affected the economic performance of BMP. 
Data was collected from industrialists operating in the metropolis through questionnaires, key 
informant interviews, archival analysis, and observations. Furthermore, the data in this chapter 
was analysed with chi-square tests, trend analysis, simple descriptive statistics, and content 
analysis.  
 
6.2 FACTORS BEHIND INDUSTRIAL DECLINE IN BULAWAYO 
 
The process of industrial decline in BMP is not only complex; it is also caused by a litany of 
intertwined factors. Some of these factors were explained in depth through discussions of various 
scholars (Zaaijer 1998, Mlambo & Phimister 2006, Mbiba & Ndubiwa 2006, Mbira 2015; 
Mlambo 2017) and can be found in Chapters 1 and 4 of this study. Accordingly, in this chapter, 
the discourse is taken further by factoring in the temporal aspect of the analysis. The factors that 
influence different processes such as production, competitiveness, and investment prospects in 






Table 6.1 Factors behind industrial decline in Bulawayo  
 Responses17 
Percent of Cases N Percent 
Factors behind industrial 
closures in Bulawayo 
High costs of doing business 259 23.4% 66.1% 
Acute shortages of raw 
materials 
192 17.4% 49.0% 
Political instability rendering 
the business environment risky 
176 15.9% 44.9% 
Poor availability of foreign 
exchange  
156 14.1% 39.8% 
Unstable or unfavourable 
government policies 
151 13.7% 38.5% 
Shrinking market opportunities 79 7.1% 20.2% 
Poor business management 60 5.4% 15.3% 
Stiff competition from illegal 
businesses/smuggled and/or 
cheap imports 
29 2.6% 7.4% 
Disagreements amongst the 
shareholders 
3 0.3% 0.8% 
Total 1105 100.0% 281.9% 
 
The common factors are high cost of doing business and acute shortages of raw materials as 
shown in Table 6.1. 
 
6.2.1 High costs of production 
 
The increasing cost of production is one of the major factors behind industrial decline in 
Bulawayo. This study found that 66.1% of the participants attributed industrial decline and 
closures to this factor. Utility costs such as electricity, water, labour, and compliance to 
regulations, have significantly gone up. Besides, the scarcity of electricity, water, and some raw 
materials, has increased production costs. Prolonged power cuts have pushed firms to utilise 
alternative sources of energy, such as solar power and generators. These alternatives are 
                                                 
17 Tables in this format present multi-responses from 392 participants. Accordingly, ‘N’ represents the number of 
responses given by the participants, the ‘percent’ column represents percentages of responses, and the column 




expensive compared to power supplied by the national power utility.  In agreement Zimbabwe 
Investment Authority (ZIA 2019, Pers com) noted that, “power cuts have reached a serious level. 
Productivity has been reduced while the cost of doing business in the country has generally 
increased … some investors have cited water shortages as their push factor.” Likewise, Mlambo 
(2017) noted the effects of inadequate and expensive electricity to the cost of production. Water 
shortages in industrial areas were disputed by Bulawayo Metropolitan Municipality (BMM) as 
the provision of municipal services to industries is regarded as a priority in BMP. Thus, 
industries do not experience water rationing. However, the discrepancy of water supply can be 
explained by prolonged power cuts that the city experience as these affect water pump stations. 
Consequently, temporary water cuts are experienced which often disrupt industrial operations.  
 
The changes in labour costs have also increased the cost of production. Accordingly, the ZIA 
noted that hyper-inflation in the country has increased the cost of labour as employees seek to 
cushion themselves. However, the cost of labour in real terms has decreased after the 
abandonment of the multi-currency system. An employee who used to earn USD2000 in monthly 
wages is now earning an equivalent of USD520 (ZWL14000) according to current bank 
exchange rates.18 The ZIA noted that the insistency of employees in some organisations to have 
their employers match their former USD salaries has prompted some industries to relocate in 
search of locations with low labour costs. 
 
6.2.2 Shortages of raw materials 
 
Another economic challenge indicated by 49% of the participants is the shortage of raw 
materials. This factor is linked to high operation costs and the industrial decline in Bulawayo. 
This factor can be explained in two ways. Firstly, some industries that mainly depend on 
                                                 
18The official Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe exchange rate is USD1 to ZWL25 as at 15 June 2020. However, the 
parallel market rate (used in 70% of the daily transactions) is between ZWL80-85 per USD1. This means 
ZWL14000 is equivalent to USD165 on the parallel market. The official rate is only used when paying government 
taxes and licenses, e.g. rates and utility bills. For the majority of the remaining transactions, e.g. buying food, 




importation of raw materials, are finding it difficult to access foreign currency needed for their 
purchases. This is in line with 39.8% of the participants that attributed industrial decline in 
Bulawayo to foreign currency shortages. Secondly, those with access to foreign currency 
indicated that the importation of raw materials is increasing the cost of production. This 
explanation is mainly applicable to participants purchasing foreign currency from the parallel 
market. The cost of foreign currency on the parallel market is very high compared to the cost 
stipulated by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). The parallel market is an option for 
industrial sectors that struggle to access the required amounts, because they have a low ranking 
in the RBZ foreign exchange priority list. As a result, products and services produced by local 
industries lack competitiveness in terms of pricing as their prices are higher than those of similar 
imports. Accordingly, 7.4% of the participants agreed with Mlambo (2017), who noted that 
industrial decline in Bulawayo is caused by stiff competition posed by cheap imports. The 
situation is aggravated by the increased availability of smuggled goods that are sold cheaply at 
the expense of locally produced goods. This has driven small companies out of business, 
especially those that are fairly new to the market.  
 
The scarcity of foreign currency in Zimbabwe is corroborated by key informants. The ZIA 
(2019, Pers com) noted that: “It is now difficult for investors to access the foreign currency. 
They are asked a lot of unnecessary questions such as why they need the money and how they 
intend to use it.” This has caused frustration among investors. The stringent measures in place 
make access to foreign currency difficult for some organisations whose line of work is not 
considered a priority by the RBZ. As was previously indicated, some factors behind the 
industrial decline in Bulawayo have been present for many years, such as the overall industrial 
production (immediately after independence) that was negatively affected by the decline in 
foreign exchange reserves (Thompson 1983). Likewise, as far back as 1998, Zaaijer (1998) noted 
that the scarcity of foreign exchange reduced investment levels as investor confidence had 
diminished. The effect of foreign currency shortages and declining investor confidence on 
industrial performance in Zimbabwe has become recurrent. This is consistent with the concept of 
path dependence and the fact that the history of Bulawayo indirectly influences the present 




effect) to a negative economic development path (Simmie & Martin 2010) by poor policies 
implemented in Zimbabwe since 1980 (see Chapter 4). Thus, the lock-in development trajectory 
is perceived as a negative trait affecting the adaptability of Bulawayo’s economy to various 
shocks (Simmie & Martin 2010).  
 
The shortage of raw materials and foreign currency is closely linked to the lack of finance and 
financing mechanisms. Both the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) and the Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce (MIC) noted that the challenges of finance are mainly because funds 
are inaccessible (no financing mechanisms available) or in some instances, funds are available, 
but extremely expensive. This is a challenge mainly faced by micro, small, and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs). These firms fail to access capital due to exorbitant interest rates. The 
predicament is worsened by a lack of financial mechanisms that allow industrialists to access 
capital equipment at zero deposit and repay the capital over a period of time. This has left firms 
with limited options. They have to find a well-resourced partner, downsize, or shut down 
completely. This has been the predicament of many firms in Bulawayo. The shortage of long-
term capital in Bulawayo is comparable to the challenges faced by small firms in hub-and-spoke 
industrial districts and satellite platforms hypothesised by Markusen (1996). However, the 
reasons behind the shortage differ. In a hub-and-spoke industrial district, high returns earned 
from trade are retained and controlled by the anchor firms that invest or reinvest the returns as 
they wish and according to their strategic plans (Markusen 1996). This is not the case in the 
narrative of Bulawayo explained in the beginning of this paragraph. 
 
6.2.3 Political instability  
 
Industrial decline in Bulawayo is also linked to the political crisis in Zimbabwe. Accordingly, 
44.9% of the participants attributed the demise of firms in Bulawayo to political instability that 
has rendered Zimbabwe a risky business environment. Poor politics from as early as 2000 have 
driven away investors that used to operate in Bulawayo. In order to remain popular, the 
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) government implemented various 




observation is supported by 38.5% of the participants who believe that unfavourable policies are 
behind the industrial decline of Bulawayo (see Table 6.1). These findings are consistent with 
those of Sachikonye (2003), Davies (2004), Zhou & Zvoushe (2008), Munangagwa (2009), 
Bratton & Masunungure (2011), Mlambo (2017), and Gambe (2019), who linked poor politics 
with the collapse and relocation of industries taking place in Zimbabwe. In addition, Singh 
(2012) and Negussie (2018) also attributed the collapse of industry in Zimbabwe to a lack of 
political commitment and to weak government institutions. The common thread in these findings 
is that of government failure to create an environment that enables business to flourish. The 
‘unfavourable’ business environments made business forecasting and prediction difficult. Thus, 
in line with the argument of Geyer (2006), investors had to look for alternative investment 
destinations, favourable for business growth and development. 
 
The military-assisted change of government that took place in Zimbabwe on 15 November 2017 
exacerbated the political crisis in the country. This was followed by a disputed presidential 
election in July 2018. Local and international investors had high hopes of a new development 
and political path in Zimbabwe after the ousting of Robert Mugabe. However, their hopes were 
shattered as the expected policy changes did not happen. In fact, militarisation of state 
institutions has increased after the military-assisted change of government, all to the detriment of 
democratic institutional processes. What followed was scepticism and hesitancy among investors 
who wanted to invest in Zimbabwe. Consistent with Ndulu et al. (2007) and Heidhues (2009), 
corruption and weak government institutions have caused capital flight from Bulawayo and 
Zimbabwe in general. 
 
6.2.4 Market shrinkages 
 
The economic decline in Zimbabwe has subdued the demand for goods and services produced 
locally. It emerged from the study that 20.2% of the participants (see Table 6.1) attributed the 
decline of industries in Bulawayo to the prevailing market shrinkages. The currency changes that 
took place in the country, coupled with the drive for prosperity through austerity, generally 




employees’ salaries. Consequently, citizens’ spending habits have changed. The purchase and 
consumption of luxuries is now limited, resulting in decreased sale volumes amongst industries 
in Bulawayo. This has triggered the migration of industries, especially those that are market 
seekers, to other cities such as Harare. The ZIA noted that the relocation of market seekers from 
Bulawayo to Harare is caused by the difference in market size. Bulawayo has a population of 
672 000 against 1.2 million people living in Harare. Accordingly, Harare has a bigger market for 
goods and services. However, expensive duty, taxes, and tariffs also contributed to firms’ pricing 
mechanisms to be less competitive on regional and global markets (Mlambo 2017). 
 
The other form of market shrinkage experienced in Bulawayo is linked to cheap imports and 
smuggled goods as highlighted by 7.4% of the participants. Competition from cheap and 
smuggled imports has reduced the market share of locally produced goods. The study confirms 
the findings of Zaaijer, who in 1998, found that the weak state of industries in Bulawayo made 
them less competitive on local, regional, and global markets. Zaaijer (1998) was analysing the 
impact of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) specifically focusing on 
trade liberalisation. However, 22 years later, the companies in Bulawayo are still struggling to 
withstand stiff competition from imports. Accordingly, the CZI attributed the lack of 
competitiveness to worn out and aging infrastructure. Most industrial machines currently used 
started operating in the 1960s, 1970s, or 1980s. Some of these machines use too much electricity, 
while others cannot be powered by solar systems, or even generators. With prolonged power cuts 
currently experienced in the country, old machinery has significantly reduced production output. 
The operation and maintenance costs of dated machines have become unsustainable to most 
industries often causing them to downsize or close down.  
 
6.2.5 Foreign ownership of businesses 
 
The industrial decline taking place in Bulawayo can also be linked to historical events that took 
place in Zimbabwe. Building or destroying an economy is a process that takes time. In light of 
this, the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) noted that indigenous 




after independence, the majority went into political, social, and security sectors, with a few 
participating in the economy as investors. The economy was largely controlled by white 
Zimbabweans and foreigners. The ZNCC noted that it is difficult to run an economy dominated 
by one race, or by foreigners, who have fragile political relationships with government. 
Whenever the relationship becomes shaky, foreign investors can simply move their capital to 
another country. This explains the capital flight that has been taking place since the time 
Zimbabwean government became ‘unpopular’ in the West. Thus, the dominance of foreigners in 
the economic sector worked against economic growth in Bulawayo.  
 
The aforementioned argument of ZNCC can to some extent be regarded as an overstatement, 
especially when comparing the situation with how the Asian Tigers benefitted from foreign 
investments. Generally, many mistakes were made in the economic and political sectors of 
Zimbabwe that negatively affected the economy. Ideological flip flopping (between socialism 
and capitalism), incomplete and uncoordinated economic policies, policy inconsistencies and 
reversals, widespread graft in government, and poor politics, have frustrated not only foreign 
investors but also local investors. In fact, both groups have moved and are still moving their 
capital out of Bulawayo. 
 
6.2.6 International restrictions on local companies and business people 
 
Industrial decline in Bulawayo has also been linked to international factors. The study indicated 
that international community’s negative perception about Zimbabwe has directly and indirectly 
affected industrial growth in the country’s cities and towns. Bulawayo was no exception, where 
negative publicity has resulted in the loss of international investment, when for instance, some 
industrialists have lost business partners who decided to relocate in lieu of the meltdown of the 
national economy in the 2000s. This was followed by a restructuring process that disturbed the 
smooth flow of businesses in the metropolis. Apart from that, targeted sanctions imposed on 
Zimbabwe indirectly also affected industries in Bulawayo. Participants highlighted the loss of 




restrictions. These partners included companies and firms owned by the ruling ZANU PF party, 
and all individuals who are on the targeted sanctions list.  
 
An example of the seriousness of having been placed under sanctions is the fining of Standard 
Chartered Bank (SCB) Zimbabwe. SCB was fined approximately US$18 million by the United 
States Office of Foreign Assets Control for processing transactions on behalf of individuals on 
the sanctions list, or on behalf of entities in which they have at least 50% stake. The company 
had allegedly processed transactions to or through the United States involving people and entities 
on the sanctions list in Zimbabwe (Mpofu 2019). This was considered a violation of Zimbabwe 
Sanctions Regulations. This example shows how local industries (both suppliers and customers 
of the companies under sanctions) are indirectly affected by international restrictions. Though it 
could be argued that the effects are minimal, these restrictions still have a negative influence on 
the industrial growth and development of Bulawayo.  
 
6.3 EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL DECLINE ON BULAWAYO’S ECONOMY 
 
The performance of a city’s economy is influenced by different factors including the wellbeing 
of its industrial base. A strong industrial base is central to economic growth and resilience of 
industrial cities. Bulawayo used to be the industrial capital of Zimbabwe. Its economy was 
mainly based on industrial production and the export of goods and services. However, other 
factors such as institutional structures and the quality of the labour force are also important for 
the economic wellbeing of the city. According to Simmie & Martin (2010: 30) the success of an 
economy of a region is underpinned by, “the ability of the region’s industrial, technological, 
labour force and institutional structures to adapt to the changing competitive, technological and 
market pressures and opportunities that confront its firms and workforce.” Accordingly, the 
effects of industrial decline are analysed while paying particular attention to the impact of 
industrial decline on the structure of the current industry in Bulawayo, changes in employment 






6.3.1 The current structure of the industry in Bulawayo 
 
The structure of industry in Bulawayo, being the erstwhile industrial capital of Zimbabwe, has 
significantly changed since independence in 1980, as is illustrated by the abandoned and 
dilapidating industrial infrastructure lying idol in some parts of the city’s industrial areas 
(Ndlovu 1994; Zaaijer 1998; Mbiba & Ndubiwa 2006; Mlambo & Phimister 2006; Parliament of 
Zimbabwe 2011; Mbira 2015). The majority of big industries that were traditionally located in 
Bulawayo, include Zimbabwe Engineering Company (ZECO), Hubert Davies, Radar Metal, 
National Blankets Limited, Treger Group, Hunyani Holdings, and Cold Storage Commission 
(Parliament of Zimbabwe 2011). While both Radar Metal and Treger Group are still operational, 
others such as Hunyani Holdings, Hubert Davies, and National Blankets Limited have closed 
down. At the time of independence Harare and Bulawayo accounted for nearly 70% of the total 
manufacturing industry (Ndlovu 1994). However, this is no longer the case, in fact, the city that 
used to be the industrial capital of Zimbabwe now only lives in the memories of retrenched 
employees and the elderly who witnessed its former glory.  
 
A prolonged period of industrial decline has caused dramatic changes in the industrial structure 
of Bulawayo. The metropolis is now dominated by MSMEs, mainly owned and run by the 
indigenous Zimbabweans. The classification of the industries was informed by employment 
levels shown in Figure 6.1. According to the classification of MSMEs provided for in the Fourth 
Schedule of the Small and Medium Enterprises Act [Chapter 24:12] a micro enterprise is any 
organisation with a maximum number of 5 employees while a small enterprise has a maximum 
of 30 or 40 employees, depending on the sector (see Appendix C for the classification schedule). 
A medium enterprise is any organisation with a maximum number of 75 employees. In light of 
this, the study revealed that the majority (81.6%) of the participants fall within the micro and 
small enterprises group with employee classes from 1-20 and 21-40 respectively, as shown in 
Figure 6.1. Approximately 9% of the participants are within the medium enterprise group while 
around 10% represent the large enterprises. Industrial decline in Bulawayo changed the city’s 
industrial structure. The dominant industries now mainly operate locally, servicing the local 




The industrial base of Bulawayo has been shrinking over time as is clear from the small 
percentage of medium and large enterprises operating in Bulawayo. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Firm employment levels in Bulawayo 
 
Only a few enterprises amongst these are exporters. In support of these findings ZNCC noted 
that the number of large enterprises operating in Bulawayo has declined significantly and the 
majority is operating below capacity. This means their supposed positive impact on the economy 
is not fully realised. Their levels of production are weak and their employment levels low. 
Consequently, the ability to attract monetary inflows into the metropolis is reduced which is to 
the detriment of Bulawayo’s economy. According to Stimson, Stough & Roberts (2006) 
economic base expansion results in the increase of export goods and services while at the same 
time improving cash inflows that can be used to generate new local consumption. However, it is 
difficult to have new local consumption in Bulawayo because of reduced exports and resultant 




The majority (80.9%) of firms operating in Bulawayo were established after 2000 as is shown in 
Figure 6.2. The remaining 19.1% of the participants have been operating in the metropolis for 
more than two decades. The trend in Figure 6.2 fits with the historical context of Bulawayo and 
also the rest of the country.  
 
 
Figure 6.2 Year participants started operating in Bulawayo 
 
The 1990s represents the decade in which ESAP was implemented in Zimbabwe. Massive job 
losses took place as both government and private entities retrenched thousands of workers in 
order to promote efficiency. Employees who failed to return to the formal job market had to find 
alternative placements in the informal sector. Accordingly, many indigenous companies were set 
up in the period from 2000 to 2009, as most citizens decided to venture into entrepreneurship and 





The launch of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Programme (IEEP) in 2008 also 
explains the number of new companies that opened from 2009 onwards. Likewise, with the 
Zimbabwean dollar being demonetised in 2008, the multi-currency system introduced in 2009 
gave citizens better opportunities of starting up new businesses. During this period, Zimbabwe’s 
economy as a whole, attained some form of stability as inflation was curtailed. New companies 
that were set up during this decade had a better chance of survival as business forecasting and 
planning was made possible by the stability brought about by dollarisation. Apart from that, the 
adoption of the multi-currency also improved foreign investment in the country. Both local and 
foreign investors regained confidence in the country’s administration consequently the levels of 
investments in new industries increased. These findings are confirmed by the Government of 
Zimbabwe (GoZ) (2009), GoZ (2010), Kramarenko et al. (2010), Sibanda & Dubihlela (2013), 
and Zinyama & Takavarasha (2014). Consistent with GoZ (2009) and GoZ (2010), the study also 
found that an increase in capacity utilisation was experienced in the whole country after the 
adoption of the multi-currency system. However, the majority of the industries that set up in 
Bulawayo from 2000 onwards, are mostly micro to small enterprises making their contribution to 
the growth and development of the formal economy, minimal. This is exacerbated by the fact 
that some of these enterprises are unregistered, and therefore operate outside the formal 
economy.  
 
In terms of firm ownership, this study found that 89.8% of the participants are fully owned by 
indigenous Zimbabweans while only 1% represents exclusively foreign-owned entities. In 
addition, only 9.2% of the participants represent partnerships, where firms are owned by both 
foreign and local investors. These findings confirm the previously mentioned flight of foreign 
capital from Bulawayo. Chi-square tests were conducted to establish whether there is any 
significant evidence at 5% level between the period of operating in Bulawayo and the period of 
decline (e.g. 10 years, 5 years, or 1 year) the participants experienced. The chi-square tests 
revealed that, at 5% level, there is significant evidence to suggest an association between the 
time period participants have been operating in Bulawayo and the period they have been 




p value of 0.000.19 The values are less than 0.05 therefore the null hypotheses are rejected in 
favour of the alternative hypotheses.  
 
Table 6.2 Chi-square tests - period of operation in Bulawayo vs. industrial decline 
 





Decline in 5 years Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 90.026a 4 0.000 Pearson Chi-square 33.814
a 4 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio 97.597 4 0.000 Likelihood Ratio 34.096 4 0.000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 66.111 1 0.000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
27.000 1 0.000 
N of Valid Cases 392 N of Valid Cases 392 
a. 1 cell (10.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 2.61. 
a. 1 cell (10.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 4.04. 
 
The tests generated Cramer’s V coefficients of 0.294, depicting a moderate association (Rea & 
Parker 2014). The same test was repeated for industrial decline that took place over a period of 
one year. The results showed no evidence at 5% level of a significant relationship between the 
period the participants have been operating in Bulawayo and whether or not they faced decline in 
a period of one year preceding the study. The chi-square test produced a p value of 0.552.  
 
The overall results of the chi-square tests show that the industries that have been operating in 
Bulawayo for a long time have undergone a prolonged period of decline compared to those that 
set up between 2010 and 2019. This explains why the city’s economy is now dominated by fairly 
new industries. The majority of old industries, some of which were foreign-owned have either 
closed down or relocated from Bulawayo. However, the type of industry and goods produced 
may also explain the business ownership structure in Bulawayo. As noted by BMM, in this fast-
changing world the industries of yesteryear cannot survive today. The hard-hit industries are 
mainly those who specialised in textiles. Most industries in this sector failed to withstand 
                                                 
19 The value of 0.000 in chi-square analysis is not equal to zero. This only means the real value is less than 0.001 




economic recession and thus closed down. Such industries left behind vacant and dilapidating 
industrial buildings such as those shown in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. It is no wonder that the 
Parliament of Zimbabwe (2011) found that poor economic performance and the current 




Figure 6.3 Vacant industrial building in Bulawayo 
 
Figure 6.3 shows buildings that used to house one of the largest blanket-making companies in 
Zimbabwe. This company is currently under liquidation and since it closed down, many of its 
employees were left unemployed. This is consistent with Mbira (2015) who noted that industrial 
decline mostly affected those residents whose livelihoods were dependent upon the 
manufacturing industry.  
 
Another example is of a heavy engineering company that has closed down. Its former premises 
are currently dilapidating as shown in Figure 6.4. These findings are similar to those of Geyer 




vacant, abandoned, and dilapidating infrastructure and increasing informality. Furthermore, 
Geyer (1989) noted that most urban economies in Southern Africa are dualistic in nature, for this 
reason, the integration of formal and informal urban sectors provides prospects for better 
economic growth. In order to reduce dilapidation of unused industrial buildings, BMM has 
allowed some adaptive re-use. Despite its state of repair, the building shown in Figure 6.4 is 
utilised by MSMEs.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 Dilapidating industrial building in Bulawayo 
 
However, the MSMEs fail to repair and properly maintain the building, due to its specialised 
nature. The revenue generated from the firms’ activities is hardly enough to repair and refurbish 
a building of that size.  
  
6.3.2 Effects on the city’s export levels 
 
The importance of basic industries in a region’s economy can never be overstressed. Basic 




region. This study found that the majority of the industries in Bulawayo sell their goods and 
services locally, as shown in Figure 6.5. As a result of the industrial decline in the city, 45.4% of 
the participants sell almost all their products (81-100%) in Bulawayo while 27.6% of the 
participants indicated that 61-80% of their goods and/or services are consumed locally. Overall, 
73% of the participants have the bulk of their goods and services sold locally. To support this, 
BMM indicated that firms in Bulawayo are mainly producing for the domestic market. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Goods produced and sold in Bulawayo  
 
In addition, their ability to lure highly specialised labour is also minimal. However, these 
findings also indicate the existence of investment opportunities in export production. This is in 
line with the effort by central government to lure foreign direct investment in the metropolis 





The level of exports from Bulawayo is very low as shown in Figure 6.6. The majority (76%) of 
the participants are non-exporters. However, 22% of the participants export between 1-40% of 
their products while a combined 2% are able to export 41-100% of their goods and services. 
Prolonged industrial decline has affected the city’s economic base with the basic industries 
downsizing, relocating, or completely closing down. These findings mirror what has been taking 
place in the national economy. According to the RBZ (2018) economic decline in Zimbabwe has 
resulted in more imports than exports in the last quarter of 2017. South Africa accounted for 
40.5% of these imports (RBZ 2018).  
 
  
Figure 6.6 Exports from Bulawayo 
 
Similarly, Mlambo (2017) noted massive out-migration of firms from Bulawayo as a result of the 
national economic crisis. 
 
The proportion of basic versus non-basic industries in Bulawayo can also be explained by the 
competitiveness of goods and services produced in the metropolis. It emerged from the study that 
50.5% of the participants rate the competitiveness of their goods and services as average 
compared to imports while only 37.5% of the participants believe that their goods are highly 




compared to imports. Only a few firms with competitive products are able to export. This is 
corroborated by data collected from key informants. The ZNCC revealed that some of its 
members are still involved in exporting. These members are normally given awards on a yearly 
basis in the category of the best exporter. Currently, the manufacturing and tourism sectors are 
leading in exports, followed by agriculture and mining.  
 
6.3.3 Effects on employment levels 
 
Industrial decline in Bulawayo has caused an increase in unemployment. However, the impact 
has been less depressed for formal employment as shown in Figure 6.7.  
 
  
Source: ZIMSTAT (2019)20 
Figure 6.7 Formal employment figures in Bulawayo 2005-2018 
                                                 
20 As noted by ZIMSTAT, the data in the figure should be understood in light of the following: (1) data only 
presents annual average numbers of formal employees, (2) data excludes all mining companies and employees of 
small agricultural units and small businesses in rural areas, and (3) data for formal employment in the agriculture 
sector used to include persons only employed in the Large Scale Commercial Farms (LSCFs). For consistency and 
comparability purposes the data now includes employees and earnings for A1, A2 farms as these previously 




The period from 2005 to 2008 was marked by acute economic decline while 2009 to 2013 was 
characterised by economic stability after the adoption of the multi-currency system. Another 
wave of economic decline set in around 2011. The slight increase in formal employment figures 
that was experienced from 2008 to 2011 can be attributed to the economic stability prevailing in 
the country at the time that saw confidence improve amongst investors amid this section of the 
multi-currency era, and that led to new investments and re-investments. The decline from 2012 
to 2015 can be explained by the deterioration of the political situation in the country during the 
run up to the 2013 national election and immediately after. This period was characterised by 
disagreements between ZANU PF and opposition parties, each party trying to win support from 
the citizens in the impending election. Then, the post-2013 election period triggered scepticism 
amongst investors who were not confident in a ZANU PF-led government. As a result, investors 
adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude with negative effects on formal industry employment. 
 
Another factor that influenced the decrease of employment levels between 2011 and 2015 was 
the cost of labour. The study revealed that paying labour charges in USD or ZAR was expensive 
for most firms and that it significantly increased production costs. As such, rationalisation of 
employment was inevitable as companies sought to remain competitive. Accordingly, the ZNCC 
noted that using USD for production was expensive and that it affected the competitiveness of 
Zimbabwean products on the global market. The influence of the USD was underrated during the 
multi-currency era. Goods and services were generally overpriced, thereby affecting 
competitiveness on both regional and global markets. These are some of the reasons that explain 
the decrease in employment that took place between 2012 and 2015.  
 
The subsequent increase in employment figures between 2015 and 2016 (actual trend) was 
minimal. This can be attributed to the introduction of Bond currency in Zimbabwe, which 
slightly reduced the cost of labour. In contrast, the ‘adjusted’ line graph represent employment 
levels inclusive of employment data from A1 (small-scale) and A2 (medium- and large-scale) 
farms, that were captured for the first time in 2016 (ZIMSTAT 2019, Pers com). The inclusion of 
formerly excluded employees has resulted in the sharp increase recorded between 2015 and 




the value of employees’ earnings and benefits in USD terms have continually increased as shown 
in Figure 6.8. The increase in earnings (including benefits) of formal employees in Bulawayo is 
not consistent with the changes that took place in employment levels as shown in Figure 6.9. The 
earnings recorded a sharp increase from 2009 to 2012 before a reduction can be seen in the rate 
of increase up to 2015.  
 
 
Source: ZIMSTAT (2019) 
Figure 6.8 Annual earnings for Bulawayo in US$ million, 2009-2018 
 
As discussed before, the ‘adjusted’ line graph from 2015 to 2018 shows an increase in earnings 
linked to additional employees that were not previously accounted for by the data generated by 
ZIMSTAT.  
 
Despite the fluctuations in the earnings curve, the employment curve remained almost constant 
with a slight increased being recorded between 2015 and 2016. The relationship between the 
annual number of employees and earnings was tested using linear regression at 5% significance 
level. The regression analysis produced a p value of 0.215 which is greater than the significance 




number of employees in Bulawayo cannot be effectively used to predict the changes in earnings. 
This is supported by the R Square value of 0.185 and an adjusted value of 0.083. An Adjusted R 
Square of 0.083 can be interpreted to mean that only 8.3% of the variation in the earnings is 
explained by changes in employment. 
 
 
Source: ZIMSTAT (2019) 
Figure 6.9 Number of employees versus earnings in Bulawayo, 2009-2018 
 
Thus, the relationship is insignificant. However, the increase in earnings is considered to be one 
of the factors that contributed to high production costs and consequently, the decline of 
industries in Bulawayo.  
 
Table 6.3 Number of employees versus earnings regression analysis 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5.853E16 1 5.853E16 1.811 0.215a 
Residual 2.586E17 8 3.233E16   
Total 3.172E17 9    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Employees 
 
An analysis of employment trends indicated a sharp departure from some statistics in literature. 




in employment as compared to only 9% between 2009 and 2014 reported by Mbira (2015). 
Furthermore, Mbira (2015) found that 85% of the industries in Bulawayo experienced a decline 
between 2009 and 2014. On the contrary, this study found only 34% between 2009 and 2018. 
Another difference is the industries that managed to maintain their employment levels. While 
Mbira (2015), found only 6%, this study found 22.6%.  The differences may be accounted for by 
the temporal aspect as Mbira (2015) studied a period of 6 years, while this study covered a 10-
year period. The other discrepancy concerns Mbira’s (2015) sample size which comprised 33 
participants versus the 392 participants in the current study. More important is the fact that Mbira 
(2015) only focused on manufacturing industries while the current study focused on various 
sectors.  
 
6.3.4 Effects on the Bulawayo’s attractiveness  
 
Economically resilient cities are those that are able to attract and retain high growth and 
innovative industries. They should also attract migrants from other cities and/or countries. 
However, measured against this yardstick, Bulawayo is failing to attract and retain high growth 
industries. A few high-growth industries that are still operating in the metropolis have been 
established decades ago. Prospects for new foreign investments are slim. In comparison, Harare 
has recently attracted a company called Varun Beverages (Pty) Ltd. The company set up the first 
phase of its bottling plant in 2018 at an estimated cost of USD30 million. In 2019 the second 
phase was completed and commissioned with an additional plant worth USD20 million. The 
company produces and distributes different types of beverages, the most common being Pepsi, 
Mirinda, and Mountain Dew.  
 
Bulawayo’s ability to attract capital and skilled labour from other cities and countries has 
remained low. For example, the current percentage of foreign-owned firms stands at 1% of the 
participants. In light of this, the ZNCC (2019, Pers com) noted that, “we have a few members 
that are foreign-owned whilst the majority is locally owned. Many foreign-owned members have 
since closed down because of viability issues and operational challenges.” The main factor that 




for their products. As shown in Table 6.4, 51.8% of the participants operating in Bulawayo were 
influenced by the availability of a market. However, with the current market shrinkages, the 
attracting factor is suddenly converted into a disincentive, prompting market seekers to find 
alternative markets. Those contemplating investing in the metropolis are thus discouraged as 
competitiveness is a key factor that determines firm location and relocation decisions. 
 
Table 6.4 Participants reasons for locating in Bulawayo 
 Responses 




Availability of a market 203 32.1% 51.8% 
Business owners stay in Bulawayo 181 28.6% 46.2% 
Location closer to raw materials  64 10.1% 16.3% 
Locating closer to other industries (purchasers & 
suppliers) 
63 10.0% 16.1% 
Expansion strategy (had other branches in some 
cities) 
61 9.7% 15.6% 
Availability of land suitable for company 
operations 
30 4.7% 7.7% 
Low costs of transport and communication 16 2.5% 4.1% 
Availability of cheap/skilled labour 8 1.3% 2.0% 
 Tax incentives 6 0.9% 1.5% 
Total 632 100.0% 161.2% 
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1. 
 
The industries relocating from Bulawayo to other cities are mainly driven by the desire to remain 
competitive. In addition, industries with branches outside Bulawayo are quick to relocate the 
moment the economy becomes unfavourable. In light of this, BMM (2019, Pers com) noted that: 
 
After a long time of monitoring the behaviour of industries in the city, we realised 
that most of them are not relocating per se but downsizing in such a manner that 
forces them to close their branches other than their head offices. Since most 
companies would want to have their head offices in the capital Harare, the 
downsizing exercise therefore appears as if industries are relocating from 
Bulawayo to Harare … that is not the case! Normally when industries shrink, they 
choose to move to their base and hope to service the other areas from there.  
 
BMM’s comment demonstrates that the generally perceived mass relocation of industries from 




the country has forced companies to shut down their branches other than the head offices. These 
findings are consistent with those of Birkinshaw et al. (2006) who noted that the need to remain 
competitive pushes firms to move from one location to the other. In addition, Gambe (2019) also 
noted similar findings in Harare. Thus, normally industries do not want to set up or continue 
operating in a city that negatively affects their competitiveness. The findings also partly support 
the firm’s location patterns described in Markusen’s (1996) satellite platforms. Some of the firms 
that closed down or relocated from Bulawayo were branches externally controlled by corporate 
headquarters. One of the reasons for their closure or relocation was the shortage of patient capital 
in the metropolis. However, Bulawayo is not considered a periphery in terms of the city 
classification in Zimbabwe. Instead, Bulawayo is a ‘core’ together with Harare, the capital city. 
As such, it would be erroneous to treat Bulawayo as a city with its business and industrial 
structures being dominated by large external firms that dominate important investment decisions.  
 
The second most important factor that influenced participants to establish their businesses in 
Bulawayo is being domiciled in the metropolis. As shown in Table 6.4, 46.2% of the participants 
established firms in Bulawayo because they reside in the metropolis. However, these participants 
own and operate firms of different sizes.  A chi-square analysis conducted at 5% level showed 
that there is an association between the investor’s area of residence and the size of the firm 
owned. The test produced a p value of 0.000 as shown in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5 Chi-square test – investor’s area of residence vs. size of firms  
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 36.942a 5 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio 42.893 5 0.000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 33.031 1 0.000 
N of Valid Cases 392   
a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.69. 
 
The majority (54.7%) of micro and small enterprises (firms with 1-20 employees) are owned and 
operated by entrepreneurs based in Bulawayo. Large enterprises are mainly owned and operated 
by investors domiciled outside Bulawayo. However, 3.7% of firms with more than 100 




prolonged period of industrial decline in the metropolis which caused the collapse of mainly 





Industrial decline and deglomeration are taking place in Bulawayo. However, the deglomeration 
process takes a new form defined in Chapter 1 as the deconcentration of industries that were 
previously agglomerated in a cluster or district, due to factors such as poor and unfavourable 
national economic policies (that cause a general economic decline and flight of investors), 
strained natural resource base necessary in production e.g. water, and interrupted production 
systems due to factors such as regular power outages. This process is different from polarisation 
reversal by Richardson (1980). There is no evidence that the industries are relocating from 
Bulawayo to other peripheral regions of the city system. Instead the relocation is mainly from 
Bulawayo to other core regions such as Harare. This form of relocation does not entail closing 
down operations in Bulawayo and re-opening in Harare. The relocation is to an extent a form of 
downsizing with small branches shrinking back to their headquarters, mainly located in Harare.  
 
The process of industrial decline has negatively affected the economy of the Bulawayo 
metropolis. The main aspects of the economy mostly affected are, the form and structure of the 
industry, the metropolis’ export levels, employment levels, and the metropolis’ attractiveness to 
foreign capital. The structure of Bulawayo’s industry is now dominated by MSMEs that are 
mostly owned by indigenous people. These enterprises are in most cases non-basic hence their 
contribution to monetary inflows into the metropolis is limited. Despite the existence of 
exporters in the metropolis, their percentage is very small compared to non-exporters. Overall, 
the metropolis is still struggling to attract and retain foreign capital as well as industries 
characterised by high and sustained growth levels. These findings have prepared a base upon 
which the next chapter is grounded. In its attempts to assess different strategies adopted by the 
participants to remain operational in Bulawayo, the next chapter substantially draws from the 




CHAPTER 7: STRATEGY OPTIONS FOR FIRM RESILIENCE IN 
BULAWAYO METROPOLITAN PROVINCE 
 
“We have remained operational for 30 years because we refused to give up ... we have worked 
hard to be where we are today.” Anonymous participant. 
 
There is good reason to argue that understanding regional resilience, and thus any 
measure of it, implies an understanding of the resilience of individual firms and their 
specific capacities to cope with, adapt to and reconfigure their technological, network 
and organizational structures within a constantly evolving economic environment. 




Firm resilience is an important aspect of regional economic resilience especially in industrial 
cities. This emanates from the understanding that resilience can be analysed at different levels, 
for example, individual, community, firm, sub-regional, regional, sub-national, and national 
levels (Vale 2014; Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016). Accordingly, the analysis of firm resilience 
underpins the overall conceptualisation of Bulawayo’s economic resilience. Gambe (2019: 89) 
noted that firm resilience can be taken to mean “the ability of a firm to continually produce 
goods and services that are demanded in the market while managing to maintain and/or improve 
its productivity, capacity utilisation, employment and profit levels.” This is the conceptualisation 
adopted in this chapter. Capacity utilisation and employment trends are therefore utilised as the 
main variables to analyse the resilience of firms in Bulawayo. The main data analysis strategies 
adopted include trend analysis, comparative analysis, and the chi-square test of association.  
 
7.2 FIRM RESILIENCE IN BMP  
 
Despite the operational challenges experienced by firms in Bulawayo metropolis, some have 
managed to withstand the effects of economic meltdown. This study found that, 40% of small 




changes. Using capacity utilisation as a measure of resilience, 49.7% (92) of the small firms 
showed signs of resilience compared to 45.4% (84) with declining capacity utilisation trends and 
4.9% (9) considered invalid because they had a single entry. For medium-sized firms, only 
21.9% (7) showed signs of resilience as opposed to 78.1% (25) that indicated they were 
struggling to grow or to maintain their capacity utilisation levels. A similar trend is also shown 
by large firms with only 37% (10) showing some evidence of resilience. The remaining 63% (17) 
are showing declining capacity utilisation trends. 
 
An overall picture shows that micro and small firms are more resilient than medium-sized and 
large firms.  The majority of small firms in Zimbabwe do not pay the level of taxes and duties 
payable by medium-sized and large firms. Consequently, micro and small firms tend to have 
lower operational costs. This gives them mileage in terms of the ability to maintain their capacity 
utilisation levels. Besides that, economic recession in Zimbabwe mainly affected the capacity 
utilisation trends of large firms and most of them have closed down. In comparison, small firms 
did not register much change in capacity utilisation thus, becoming more resilient. The capacity 
utilisation curves generated from the firms showing signs of resilience are shown in Figure 7.1 
(small firms), Figure 7.2 (medium-sized firms), and Figure 7.3 (large firms).  
 
 




Figure 7.1 illustrates the capacity utilisation of 15 resilient firms. The number of firms so 
illustrated was limited to 15 in order to improve the visual outcome of the figure as 92 small 
firms that demonstrated resilience could not fit in a single graph. On the other hand Figures 7.2 
and 7.3 present all medium-sized and large resilient firms respectively as their numbers are 
limited and can easily fit within a single line graph. The trends shown in Figure 7.1 fit into the 
different categories of resilience found in literature. As an example resilience can be perceived in 
terms of resistance, recovery, or a total reconfiguration that can sometimes be referred as 
adaptation (Simmie & Martin 2010; Martin 2012; Simmie 2014; Han & Goetz 2015). Despite the 
fact that these categorisations are mainly used in the analysis of variables depicting regional 
economic resilience the same categorisations can be useful in analysing indicators of firm 
resilience. Thus, capacity utilisation trends for small, medium, and large firms are analysed in 
light of different categories of resilience.  
 
A sizeable number of capacity utilisation trend lines show resistance as a form of resilience in 
Figures 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3.  
 
 





Resistance as a category of resilience, covers firms that did not experience a change in their 
capacity utilisation due to the recessionary shock recently experienced in Zimbabwe. Such firms 
can be further divided into two sub-categories. The first sub-category covers firms that have 
maintained a constant capacity utilisation curve throughout the period under review. Examples of 
these include Firms 8 and 9 in Figure 7.1, and Firm 7 in Figure 7.3. The second sub-category 
covers firms that continually increased their capacity utilisation in spite of the economic decline 
prevailing in Bulawayo. They defied the effects of economic meltdown.  These firms turned the 
economic meltdown into a catalyst to improve their scale of operations. They are Firm 6 in 
Figure 7.1, Firm 5 in Figure 7.2 and Firm 5 in Figure 7.3. Overall, these firms have managed to 
resist the effects of economic meltdown.  
 
 
Figure 7.3 Capacity utilisation trends for large firms in Bulawayo 
  
Besides the resistance category, some capacity utilisation trend lines show signs of recovery. 
This category covers firms with trend lines that commence with a positive growth, followed by a 
decline, and then recovery. Recovery21 results in the firm getting back to its pre-shock growth 
                                                 




path. However, the rate of growth may as well be above the pre-shock level. An example that 
best fit this explanation is the trend shown by Firm 10 in Figure 7.1. After undergoing a decline 
between 2011 and 2012, the firm managed to increase its capacity utilisation at a rate higher than 
the pre-shock level. This is similar to what Martin (2012) refers to as recovery followed by a 
sustained higher growth (see Appendix A). The other capacity utilisation trend lines exhibit 
resilience in the form of reconfiguration. The firms in this category changed their growth path 
after being thrown off course by a shock. Usually the new growth path is below the pre-shock 
level. According to Martin (2012) these are firms that experienced a permanent decline in growth 
level followed by either a pre-recession or lowered growth rate. Examples of trend lines in this 
category are Firm 6 in Figure 7.2 and Firm 8 in Figure 7.3. These firms have reconfigured their 
capacity utilisation and started growing at a rate lower than the pre-shock level. 
 
The same analysis conducted using capacity utilisation was repeated using employment trends. 
As with capacity utilisation, employment trends showed that small firms are still taking the lead 
in terms of resilience. A total of 69.4% of the small firms (200 firms with increasing and 
constant employment trends) managed to defy the effects of the economic meltdown as shown in 
Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1 Firm employment trends in Bulawayo 
 Employment trends 
Total Increasing Decreasing Constant Invalid 
Firm 
sizes 
Small firms (1-40 
employees) 
Count 125 79 75 9 288 
% within total number of 
employees 
43.4% 27.4% 26.0% 3.2% 100.0% 
Medium firms (41-80 
employees) 
Count 7 25 1 0 33 
% within total number of 
employees 
21.2% 75.8% 3.0% 0% 100.0% 
Large firms (more 
than 80 employees) 
Count 8 19 2 0 29 
% within total number of 
employees 
27.6% 65.5% 6.9% 0% 100.0% 
Total Count 140 123 78 9 350 
% within total number of 
employees 






Out of the 69.4% of the participants who defied the effects of economic meltdown, 43.4% 
managed to continually grow their employment levels, while 26% did not experience any 
changes. In contrast, only 24.2% of medium-sized firms and 34.5% of the large firms showed 
signs of resilience. Likewise, their employment trends also fit into the different categories of 




Figure 7.4 Employment trends for small firms in Bulawayo 
 
The majority of firms in Figure 7.4 increased their employment levels while the remainder had 
constant curves. The trend lines display resistance more than recovery and reconfiguration. The 
increase in employment trends at medium-sized firms is shown in Figure 7.5. None of the firms 
in Figure 7.5 show a significant decline in employment from 2009 to 2018. Firm 5 experienced a 
slight decline between 2014 and 2015, before recovering and levelling out. Firm 2 presents a 






Figure 7.5 Employment trends for medium-sized firms in Bulawayo 
The employment trends of large firms operating in Bulawayo are clustered with two of them 
being outliers. Eight firms are clustered between 80 and 250 employees as shown in Figure 7.6. 
 
 




The outliers are Firms 3 and 6. Firm 3 managed to increase its employment levels from 550 to 
865 while Firm 6 increased its employees from 300 to 760. These are the largest firms that 
participated in this study. Firm 3 is a manufacturer and distributor of drinks and beverages while 
Firm 6 manufactures different types of foodstuffs. Firm 3 was established before 1980, whereas 
Firm 6 was established between 1980 and 1989. Both Firms 3 and 6 managed to withstand the 
economic meltdown prevailing in Bulawayo. Their growth rates are higher than that of their 
counterparts. Whereas the employment curves of Firms 3 and 6 symbolise resistance to 
economic decline their counterparts mainly show recovery after experiencing minor levels of 
decline.  
 
Overall the findings on employment trends in Bulawayo are consistent with Gambe (2019), who 
noted a general drop of employment levels among small and medium enterprises in Harare. The 
decline in employment among firms in Harare was also linked to the economic meltdown in 
Zimbabwe.   
 
7.3 FIRM RESILIENCE STRATEGIES IN BMP 
  
The economies of industrial cities are driven by different types of industries, although in the 
Global South, manufacturing is often the dominant industry. It should be noted that 
manufacturing usually locates in any region with a competitive edge (Krugman 1991; Wilson 
2011). Accordingly, it is important to analyse the strategies adopted by firms in BMP to remain 
operational. These strategies are shown in Table 7.2. The most popular strategies are the 
diversification of products and/or services, maintenance of a broad customer base, and the 









Table 7.2 Firm resilience strategies in Bulawayo 
 Responses22 
Percent of Cases N Percent 
Strategies 
adopted by 
participants to  
remain 
operational 
Diversification of products/services  192 17.2% 49.0% 
Broad customer base kept the organisation in 
business  
186 16.7% 47.4% 
Using a US dollar-based pricing system to avoid 
losses through currency reforms 
180 16.2% 45.9% 
Adoption of new technology in the production of 
goods and services 
131 11.8% 33.4% 
A stronger control on the organisation’s cash flow 124 11.1% 31.6% 
Downsizing as a coping strategy (reducing 
unnecessary expenses) 
122 11.0% 31.1% 
Networking/strategic alliances with other 
industries/companies doing well  
66 5.9% 16.8% 
Utilising the company’s reserve foreign exchange 
for purchasing inputs not locally available 
43 3.9% 11.0% 
Disinvesting in other investments and focus on the 
main company 
25 2.2% 6.4% 
Joining mergers created by declining 
industries/companies 
18 1.6% 4.6% 
Relocation of some branches to locations outside 
the country so that they help support those local 
9 0.8% 2.3% 
None of the above 18 1.6% 4.6% 
Total 1114 100.0% 284.2% 
 
 
The strategies in Table 7.2 are analysed using chi-square tests as the main analysis tool. There is 
need to test for associations that may exist between resilience strategies and different firm 




                                                 
22 Tables of this format in this chapter capture multi-responses from 392 participants. Asccordingly, ‘N’ represents 
the number of responses given by the participants, the ‘percent’ column represents percentages of responses, and the 




7.3.1 Diversification of products and services 
 
To remain operational in the face of economic decline, the most common strategy adopted by 
firms in Bulawayo is the diversification of goods and services. This study found that 49% of the 
participants have adopted this strategy. Firms have resorted to production of more than one 
product and service, thus the failure of one product or service on the market does not completely 
affect the economic wellbeing of the firm. These findings are consistent with those of Burton 
(1989) who noted positive economic growth in Thailand due to diversification. Burton (1989) 
found that foreign earnings in Thailand were obtained not only from industrial operations, but 
also agriculture and tourism. Though Burton (1989) was referring to regional economic 
resilience strategies, the same can also be applicable to firm resilience. Diversification of 
products and services provides security to firms in times of economic distress.  
 
A chi-square test was conducted to test whether the age of a firm is associated with the adoption 
of a diversification strategy. The test showed no significant relationship between the age of a 
firm and the adoption of a diversification strategy. The test produced a p value of 0.326 thus, 
diversification as a strategy is important to firms regardless of their age. Another chi-square test 
was conducted at 5% significance level to test for association between the size of a firm and the 
adoption of a diversification strategy. The results again showed no association between the two 
variables. The test produced a p value of 0.102 as shown in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3 Chi-square test – firm size vs. adoption of diversification strategy 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 9.179a 5 0.102 
Likelihood Ratio 9.775 5 0.082 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.126 1 0.289 
N of Valid Cases 392   
a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.92. 
 
 
Accordingly, diversification as a strategy is not affected by either firm size or ownership type. A 




relationship between firm ownership type and diversification strategy. As such diversification of 
goods and services is important for resilience at different levels such as on a firm, regional, or 
national level. As an example, Bratton (1981) noted that Zimbabwe had a sound industrial base, 
exporting a diversified range of raw materials, including gold, asbestos, copper, coal, nickel, 
chrome, maize, tobacco, beef, and sugar. Diversification of products therefore underpinned the 
resilience of the economy.  
 
7.3.2 Broad customer base and loyalty 
 
The size and nature of the market is also an important determinant of firm resilience. The second 
most important firm resilience strategy in Bulawayo is the firm’s ability to maintain a broad 
customer base. A total 47.4% of the participants reported that this strategy has kept them 
operational. This is corroborated by the Industrial Development Corporation of Zimbabwe 
(IDCZ), who noted that good customer relationship management has managed to keep its 
enterprises operational despite Zimbabwe’s prevailing economic meltdown. However, this 
strategy is controlled by three main factors. Firstly, population size is an important determinant. 
Cities or regions with huge population sizes have an advantage over those with small 
populations. This explains the earlier assertion by the Zimbabwe Investment Authority (ZIA) 
that some firms were relocating from Bulawayo with its small population (672 000), to Harare 
with a population of 1.2 million people, in search of bigger markets. These findings are 
supported by Mbaku (1988), Sachs & Warner (1997), Ndulu et al. (2007), and Heidhues (2009). 
These scholars noted that huge population sizes in a city, region, or country help cushion firms in 
times of economic decline. However, it is worth noting that competitive firms are often able to 
command a huge regional, national, and global market share, regardless of location. 
 
The second and third factors that help firms attract and maintain a huge customer base are the 
quality and pricing of goods and services. These two factors should be in tandem. Good quality 
products and services create a loyal customer base. Examples of such products produced in 
Bulawayo include Olivine cooking oil, Buttercup margarine and Lobels biscuits. These products 




products are well known and became trusted brands over time. They have enabled their 
producers to remain operational due to the products being in high demand. In addition, their 
pricing has been in tandem with their quality. Thus, overall good customer relationship 
management is important for firm resilience. 
 
Chi-square tests were conducted to assess the level of association between the broad market 
share strategy and other variables such as age, size, and ownership of firms. The test on the age 
of a firm versus the expansion of a customer base strategy produced a p value of 0.931, the 
second had a p value of 0.656, and the third one produced a p value of 0.138. The three tests 
produced p values above 0.05. As such, the strategy of expanding and maintaining a huge 
customer base is not influenced by the age, size, or ownership of the firms. Instead, firms of 
different ages, sizes, and ownership types have a better chance of improving their resilience if 
they adopt this strategy. As previously discussed, what matters are the population size within its 
sphere of influence, the quality, and the pricing of goods and services.  
 
7.3.3 USD-based pricing system strategy 
 
Charging goods and services in US dollars was for some time forbidden in Zimbabwe.23 This 
decision came into effect on 24 June 2019 when the central government passed Statutory 
Instrument (SI) 142 of 2019. The SI made the Zimbabwean dollar (ZWL) the sole currency for 
trade. However, most firms have disregarded this SI. They continued to charge their goods and 
services in US dollars. Accordingly, 45.9% of the participants in Bulawayo adopted this strategy 
to remain operational. The currency crisis in the country has caused firms’ savings to erode, thus, 
to preserve the value of their savings, firms have resorted to USD-based pricing system.  
 
                                                 
23 This refers to the general position from mid-2019 to mid-2020. However, government has relaxed its stance on the 
use of foreign currency in local transactions. The use of free funds in local transactions is now permissible, with 




The difference between official and parallel market rates for USD is significant. Consequently, 
MSMEs utilise parallel market rates in their pricing systems. As an example, the official RBZ 
exchange rate on 15 June 2020 was at USD1 to ZWL25. In comparison, the parallel market rate 
for USD1 was ZWL85. The parallel market rate applies to the Zimbabwe electronic transfer 
settlement system (ZETSS). The cash rate was a bit lower at USD1 to ZWL55. These differences 
motivated firms in Bulawayo to adopt a USD-based pricing system in order to remain 
operational. However, the adoption of this strategy is not affected by a firm’s age, size, or 
ownership. A chi-square test conducted at 5% level to test for an association between the age of a 
firm and whether or not a firm utilises a USD-based pricing system produced a p value of 0.355. 
Accordingly, no significance evidence was found of a relationship between the age of a firm and 
the adoption of a USD-based pricing system as a resilience strategy.  
 
Another chi-square analysis was conducted to test for an association between firm sizes and 
whether or not the firms adopted a USD-based pricing system. The test produced a p value of 
0.477, showing no significant evidence of a relationship between firm sizes and the adoption of a 
USD-based pricing system as a resilience strategy. Similarly, no relationship was found between 
firm ownership and the adoption of a USD-based pricing system. The test produced a p value of 
0.939. However, these results are not in tandem with the general belief in the market. In the 
market, large retail firms receive USD allocations from the RBZ to import some of their wares. 
As such, these firms are expected to use the official bank rate when pricing their goods, but this 
is not the case as they use the parallel market exchange rate. However, whereas MSMEs review 
their ZWL prices on a daily basis according to fluctuations in the parallel market exchange rates, 
large firms usually review their prices only once a week or once a fortnight depending on the 
percentage increases.  
 
The USD-based pricing system as a resilience strategy became popular after the abandonment of 
the multi-currency system in 2019. A chi-square test conducted to test for association between 
industrial decline over one year and utilisation of USD-based pricing system as a resilience 














Pearson Chi-square 9.452a 1 0.002   
Continuity Correctionb 8.839 1 0.003   
Likelihood Ratio 9.494 1 0.002   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.002 0.001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.427 1 0.002   
N of Valid Casesb 392     
a. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 88.16. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
The test showed a significant relationship at 5% level, between industrial decline experienced 
over a year’s period and adoption of a USD-based pricing system. The strength of the association 
was weak as evidenced by a Phi coefficient of 0.155. As previously indicated, this strategy only 
became common after the multi-currency system was banned in Zimbabwe. As such, the 
majority of the firms that adopted this strategy are the MSMEs, some of which are even 
accepting USD payments against government regulation.  
 
7.3.4 Adoption of new technology 
 
The adoption of new technology and new ways of producing goods and services has enhanced 
the resilience of 33.4% of the participants. Their products have improved, compared to those of 
their local counterparts. The products are now faring better in terms of competition against 
imports. Accordingly, the CZI noted that firms in Bulawayo and Zimbabwe in general should 
embrace new equipment and new technology if they are to remain competitive. The 
competitiveness of their goods and services is mainly affected by old and worn out industrial 
infrastructures. As such, upgrading production technology gives firms a competitive edge. This 
is a strategy that the IDCZ has already benefitted from. The IDCZ (2019, Pers com) indicated 
that, “adopting and learning new technology has proved beneficial … . We have defied the 
current economic decline as our firms have remained operational and our products competitive in 




India, Singapore, and China) and had setup firms in Zimbabwe that produce cooking oil, 
agricultural chemicals, and detergents. These partnerships facilitated technology transfers. One 
of the firms under the partnership arrangement has acquired world-class and efficient machinery 
that enables fast processing and packaging, for instance, its processing plant has a capacity to 
crush more than 500 tonnes of soya beans per day. With such technology the firm’s products 
have dominated the market both nationally and in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) region. 
 
Chi-square tests were conducted to assess the utility of technology as a factor of firm resilience. 
The first chi-square test was meant to test for association between the age of a firm and the 
adoption of new technology as a resilient strategy. This test produced a p value of 0.251, thus no 
significant evidence of a relationship between the age of a firm and the adoption of new 
technology as a resilience strategy, was shown. Regardless of their age, firms need to constantly 
adapt to changes in technology. Those outpaced by technological advancements risk becoming 
uncompetitive and may eventually fold. Another chi-square test was conducted to test for 
association between firm ownership and adoption of new technology. The test produced a p 
value of 0.043 as shown in Table 7.5. 
 
Table 7.5 Chi-square test – firm ownership vs. adoption of new technology  
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 6.286a 2 0.043 
Likelihood Ratio 6.592 2 0.037 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.768 1 0.381 
N of Valid Cases 392   
a. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.35. 
 
This test showed a significant relationship between firm ownership type and adoption of new 
technology as a resilience strategy. The Cramer’s V coefficient was 0.127. This represents a 
weak association (Rea & Parker 2014). Out of 33.4% of the participants who adopted new 
technology, 83.6% were private firms, 10.7% public firms and only 3.1% represented mixed 




firms are better able to adopt new technology as compared to public firms.  Decision-making 
processes are more effective and efficient in private, as compared to public firms that are usually 
characterised by red tape.  
 
Other factors that influence the firm’s adoption of new production technology include the size of 
the firm and its magnitude of operations.  A chi-square test was conducted to assess whether 
there is an association between firm sizes and the adoption of new technology as a resilience 
strategy. The test produced a p value of 0.006 as shown in Table 7.6. 
 
Table 7.6 Chi-square test – firm sizes vs. adoption of new technology 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 16.206a 5 0.006 
Likelihood Ratio 18.678 5 0.002 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.798 1 0.180 
N of Valid Cases 392   
a. 1 cell (8.3%) has an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.67. 
 
Accordingly, the test showed significant evidence of a relationship between the size of a firm and 
the adoption of new technology as a strategy to remain operational. The Cramer’s V test 
produced a coefficient of 0.203, depicting a moderate association. Accordingly, only 33.8% of 
micro and small firms (with less than 20 employees) managed to adopt new technology, as 
compared to 55.6% of large firms (with more than 100 employees). The discrepancy can be 
explained by different levels of affordability. While large firms are able to afford upgrading their 
technology from time to time, the same cannot be said about small firms. Most of them can 
afford primitive technology that only allows them to be functional. However, the ‘primitive’ 
technology is sometimes considered adequate for the competitiveness of micro and small firms. 
Improved technology does not always make a difference in their operations. This explains the 
low uptake of improved technology among small firms compared to large firms.  
 
The study findings on the importance of adopting new technology in production processes are in 




technology as a key determinant of economic growth (Parthasarathy 1994). However, 
technological advancement can take different forms including developing new technology, or 
importing and adapting technology meant to achieve higher productivity and growth 
(Parthasarathy 1994). In the case of Bulawayo, it is possible for firms to import and adapt 
technology from other regions and/or countries. This has also happened in countries such as 
Japan and China. Japan, for instance, managed to successfully integrate informal and formal 
production technology (Ito & Weinstein 1996; Kimura 2009; Jhingan 2011). This strategy 
lowered production costs and created beneficial synergies between formal and informal 
industries. Eventually these synergies provided a platform for informal industries to expand and 
become large enterprises. In addition, informal industries also became part of the basic industries 
in Japan. As a resilient strategy, firms in Bulawayo could also try the Japanese strategy. 
Combining formal and informal production technologies can be helpful in terms of reducing 
production costs – that are already a challenge in the metropolis. 
 
China also imported and adapted technology from other countries, that resulted in massive 
production which led to a rapid increase in international trade (Lin 2003). The technology 
enabled China to produce high-tech machinery and information and communications technology 
(ICT) products (Lin 2013). These strategy options could be utilised in Bulawayo. Zimbabwe is 
no stranger to such strategy options as the IDCZ has, on a national level, managed to achieve 
technology transfers through partnerships with investors from countries such as Italy, India, 
Singapore, and China.  
 
The importance of technology and innovation in Bulawayo can also be analysed in light of the 
core-periphery theory. In this theory, the driver of differential growth is innovation, viewed by 
Friedmann (1967) as an anchor of development. Furthermore, chances of innovation are higher 
in large cities or urbanised regions within a spatial system (Friedmann 1967). According to the 
ranking of cities in Zimbabwe, Bulawayo together with Harare, constitute such a core. Yet, the 





7.3.5 Strict financial control 
 
A strict financial control has been adopted by 31.6% of the participants in order to survive the 
prevailing economic decline. This strategy reduces both wastages and leakages in firms, 
regardless of their age and size. A chi-square test conducted to assess whether there is an 
association between the age of a firm and adopting strict financial control as a resilience strategy, 
produced a p value of 0.195. Accordingly, no association was evident between the age of a firm 
and the adoption of strict financial control as a resilience strategy. Likewise, no association was 
found between the size of a firm and strict financial control as a strategy for firm resilience. A 
chi-square test conducted at 5% level produced a p value of 0.667.  
 
The narrative changes when firm ownership is considered. This study found that, there is an 
association between the type of firm ownership and strict financial control in firms. A chi-square 
test produced a p value of 0.043 as shown in Table 7.7. 
 
Table 7.7 Chi-square test – firm ownership type vs. adoption of strict financial control  
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 6.296a 2 0.043 
Likelihood Ratio 5.929 2 0.052 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.165 1 0.685 
N of Valid Cases 392   
a. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.91. 
 
The association is weak as evidenced by a Cramer’s V coefficient of 0.127. This strategy was 
adopted by 51.7% of the public firms, 30.5% of private firms, and 24% of those in the mixed-
ownership category. As such, the strategy has been more useful to public than private and mixed-







7.3.6 Downsizing strategy 
 
Downsizing is one of the strategies that have enhanced firm resilience in Bulawayo. The 
perception of downsizing in this section involves the reduction of capacity utilisation and 
employment levels by firms as a means to remain operational. In light of this, 31.1% of the 
participants have intentionally downsized in order to survive the economic meltdown in 
Zimbabwe. One of the participants who specialises in timber products stated that, “we have 
downsized so that we remain operational … we used to have more than 85 employees but we are 
now keeping a manageable number of 35. We sold one of our premises so that we settle our 
loans.” Although the participant indicated that there was slight drop in the market share after 
downsizing, the exercise proved to have worked for the firm. As a small firm, the participant 
reported having manageable expenses and being able to operate within means. These findings are 
consistent with those of Gambe (2019), who found that small and medium firms in Harare, 
downsized as an adaptation strategy. With the prolonged economic meltdown in Zimbabwe, 
firms have to operate within their means.  
 
A chi-square test was conducted to test for association between the age of a firm and downsizing 
as a resilience strategy. The test produced a p value of 0.001 as shown in Table 7.8. 
 
Table 7.8 Chi-square test – age of a firm vs. downsizing strategy  
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 18.598a 4 0.001 
Likelihood Ratio 17.598 4 0.001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 16.312 1 0.000 
N of Valid Cases 392   
a. 1 cell (10.0%) has an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.67. 
 
The test showed significant evidence of a relationship between the two variables. The level of 
association was moderate as is evident from the Cramer’s V coefficient of 0.218. The researcher 
found that, 54.1% of the participants that have been operational for more than 40 years have 
downsized to enhance their resilience. In comparison, 53.3% of participants in the 31-40 years 




the lower categories (11-20 and 0-10 years) are considered. Participants who downsized in these 
categories constitute 25.9% and 25.7% respectively. Accordingly, the age of a firm is an 
important determinant in the downsizing process.  In general, those firms that have been 
operational for more than 20 years have downsized in order to remain operational. As previously 
indicated under section 7.2, some firms have failed to return to their pre-shock growth path. 
Instead, they have adopted new growth paths that they could sustain. This is consistent with the 
adaptive approach to resilience (Martin 2012; Simmie 2014). In this instance, firm resilience can 
be perceived as the firm’s capacity to reconfigure and/or adapt its structure so that it is able to 
maintain sustainable growth levels in terms of output, employment, and wealth over a given 
period of time (Martin 2012).  
 
The size of firms is also an important factor that determines adoption of downsizing as a 
resilience strategy. A chi-square test conducted at 5% significance level showed that there is an 
association between firm sizes and downsizing. The test produced a p value of 0.005 as shown in 
Table 7.9. 
 
Table 7.9 Chi-square test – firm sizes vs. downsizing strategy  
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 16.679a 5 0.005 
Likelihood Ratio 15.609 5 0.008 
Linear-by-Linear Association 14.905 1 0.000 
N of Valid Cases 392   
a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.49. 
 
The strength of the association was again moderate as evidenced by Cramer’s V coefficient of 
0.206.  The general trend in Bulawayo shows that large firms are downsizing more than smaller 
ones. This trend is also linked to the outcome of another chi-square test conducted to test for 
association between firm employment trends and downsizing as a resilience strategy. The test 
produced a p value of 0.000 as shown in Table 7.10. The test showed significant evidence of a 
relationship between the nature of employment trends and downsizing as a resilience strategy. 





Table 7.10 Chi-square test – employment trends vs. downsizing strategy  
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 20.340a 3 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio 20.064 3 0.000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.580 1 0.108 
N of Valid Cases 350   
a. 1 cell (12.5%) has an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.67. 
 
While this test showed a relationship between the nature of the employment curves and 
downsizing, there is no evidence at 5% level to suggest the same when capacity utilisation curves 
are considered. In fact a chi-square test conducted at 5% significance level produced a p value of 
0.106. Likewise, a chi-square test conducted at 5% level produced a p value of 0.593. This test 
showed no evidence of an association between firm ownership and the downsizing strategy. 
 
7.3.7 Additional firm resilience strategies utilised in Bulawayo 
 
The other strategies employed by the participants to remain operational are creating alliances 
with resilient firms (16.8%), utilising firms’ foreign currency reserves to purchase inputs not 
locally available (11.1%), reducing the number of additional investments (6.4%), creating 
mergers of declining firms (4.6%), and relocations (2.3%). Although these strategies have lower 
percentages, they remain important for the resilience of firms in Bulawayo. Alliances created 
between resilient and declining firms have helped enhance the resilience of the declining ones. 
Large firms in Bulawayo would offer financial and management assistance to smaller ones in the 
form of low interest loans, trainings, and outsourcing. For instance, small firms would be 
contracted to produce items needed by large firms. The Ministry of Women Affairs, Community, 
Small and Medium Enterprises Development (MWACSMED) has been playing a key role in this 
regard. As an example, the MWACSMED has managed to link small firms producing plastics 
with Bakers Inn, one of the biggest producers and distributors of bread and other bakery products 
in Zimbabwe. Through the efforts of MWACSMED, MSMEs were awarded tenders to supply 
Bakers Inn with plastics for packaging. These ventures are comparable to the strategy 




technology through encouraging large firms to outsource production of some items to smaller, 
informal industries (Ito & Weinstein 1996; Kimura 2009; Jhingan 2011). 
 
In order to overcome the economic decline in Zimbabwe, some firms in Bulawayo (11.1%) with 
access to foreign currency outside Zimbabwe, have resorted to utilising their foreign currency 
reserves to import inputs not available locally. Those without foreign currency reserves had to 
investigate alternative ways of acquiring inputs. One of the participants introduced toll 
manufacturing. The firm manufactures products mainly consumed by mining and manufacturing 
firms. However, the bulk of the firm’s raw materials can only be found outside Zimbabwe and 
without access to foreign currency it would be difficult to purchase such raw materials. To 
address this issue, the participant has made toll processing arrangements with its clients. Clients 
that need products manufactured by the participant have to import raw materials required in the 
production process. The participant only charges labour and other miscellaneous costs. It is 
worth noting that the participant also accepts raw materials as a form of payment for services 
rendered. An arrangement is made in such a way that the client imports extra quantities of raw 
materials with a value equivalent to the labour charges indicated on the quotation. This strategy 
has managed to keep the participant’s plant and machinery running.  
 
A sizeable number of participants are joining mergers created by declining firms in order to 
remain operational. This strategy was adopted by 4.6% of the participants. The firms pool their 
resources so that they are able to operate jointly in a bid to overcome operational challenges 
posed by economic decline. This strategy appears to be common among micro and small leather 
firms which have been hit hard by economic decline. These firms organised themselves and 
formed the Bulawayo Leather Cluster (BLC). This cluster is mainly made up of micro and small 
firms that could not continue operating individually. With the assistance of the MWACSMED, 
BLC has managed to enter into a partnership with Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA). In this partnership COMESA has provided new machinery needed by the 
cluster. This is one of the benefits of global regionalisation. Bilateral and multi-lateral 




have created wide markets for goods and services. It has to be noted that central government has 
also assisted BLC with rental payments.  
 
Relocation is one of the strategies that have enhanced the resilience of 2.3% of the participants. 
This strategy involves relocating some branches from Bulawayo to new locations outside the 
region or country. Inflows generated by the establishments outside the region or country are then 
used to support local operations. This strategy is commonly discussed in firm relocation 
literature. Generally firms favour locations with favourable cost conditions (Brouwer, Mariotti & 
Van Ommeren 2004). The relocation of firms from one region to another can be understood as a 
direct response to shocks. Accordingly, Gambe (2019) noted that the relocation of firms from 
inner-city Harare to the surrounding suburban areas constituted an adaption strategy. However, it 
is vital to note that the relocation of firms from one region to another has implications for 
resilience of both the sending and receiving regions. While the receiving region can improve in 
terms of its economic resilience, the sending region may be negatively affected especially if 
these firms are basic in nature (Gambe 2019).  The study findings can also be interpreted in light 
of relocation theories. Pellenbarg, Van Wissen & Van Dijk (2002) noted that firms relocate in 
response to changes in economic factors. According to the neo-classical approach of relocation 
theories, firms relocate from unprofitable to profitable locations (Brouwer, Mariotti & Van 
Ommeren 2004). Thus, the decision taken by participants to relocate some operations from 
Bulawayo to locations outside the region or country can be motivated by the profit-maximisation 
drive. 
 
7.3.8 Skills trainings and linkage programmes 
 
Firms in Bulawayo have benefitted from workshops and skills training offered by various 
organisations, especially industrial associations. The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries 
(CZI) is one of the associations that have arranged training for its members. Accordingly, the 
CZI (2019, Pers com) stated that, “we also assist members who require different training. In spite 
of economic challenges, there are measures industries can adopt at enterprise level to alleviate 




have.” The CZI is rolling out programmes to help industries improve efficiency. Examples of 
these programmes are LEAN Management and Six Sigma. For these programmes CZI facilitates 
visits by both foreign and local consultants who assist with training that focus on ‘small things’ 
industries can do in order to improve their competitive edge. One such example is a programme 
about the reduction of wastages in a firm.  
 
In line with global regionalisation literature (Geyer 2006; Leonova 2016) CZI also conducts 
training on trade, focusing mainly on improving awareness of the current SADC, COMESA, and 
AU trade protocols. The purpose of this training is to equip firms with knowledge and skills to 
manoeuvre African markets and to maximise the economic benefits of global regionalisation 
(Leonova 2016). The only challenge is that mainly CZI members benefit from this training, 
which would have been more effective, if more firms in Bulawayo were involved. The IDCZ 
also advocates similar training programmes that are conducted in collaboration with other 
regional development finance institutions. The main purpose of these programmes is to educate 
firms on how to access and utilise development finance. In addition, the IDCZ occasionally 
sends key personnel abroad for further studies and refresher courses. Each year a group of 
employees are identified and sent to different countries in a skills-exchange program. As such 
experiential learning has been a key factor in the resilience of firms under the management of the 
IDCZ. 
 
Firms in Bulawayo have benefitted from linkage programmes facilitated by various 
organisations. Industrial associations, such as the CZI, play a key role in this regard. This process 
involves twinning Zimbabwean companies with foreign companies that are members of 
industrial associations linked with the CZI. This has been done with companies in India, Turkey, 
and Botswana where platforms have been created for members to meet and have discussions and 
through which mutually beneficial partnerships and trade linkages have been created.  With these 
linkage programmes, the CZI has saved some of its members from collapsing. However, the 
challenge that was highlighted before remains, as these programmes are confined to CZI 
members whereas they could also be helpful to non-members. The creation of linkages has also 




creation of business linkages and formalisation among SMEs and co-operatives during the 
implementation of Zim Asset (GoZ 2013). Furthermore, government policies that followed Zim 
Asset, also highlight the need to create business linkages. Notwithstanding, implementation 




Firm resilience in Bulawayo is mainly in the form of resistance and reconfiguration. The 
majority of the firms that have experienced a decline in either capacity utilisation or employment 
levels, are failing to return to their pre-shock growth levels. However, although lower than the 
pre-shock levels, these firms are managing to reconfigure and adopt new growth rates. Yet, some 
firms have defied economic decline by continually growing their capacity utilisation and 
employment levels, while others have maintained constant levels. Nevertheless, the percentage 
of firms that have recovered from decline and achieved growth rates higher than the pre-shock 
level, has remained low. It emerged from the study that small firms are more resilient than 
medium-sized and large firms. However, this has a negative implication on the economic 
resilience of BMP since the majority of these firms are non-basic industries operating locally. 
Their ability to attract monetary inflows into the metropolis is limited.  
 
In order to remain operational, firms in Bulawayo have adopted different strategies. The most 
common among these strategies are diversification, broadening their customer base, adopting a 
USD-based pricing system, investment in new technology, and downsizing. A comparative 
summary of chi-square tests conducted in this chapter to test for an association between these 
resilience strategies and firm characteristics is shown in Table 7.11. The firm characteristics 
covered in the table are age, size, and ownership. These are common in the tests for association 







Table 7. 11 A summary of chi-square tests – resilient strategies vs. firm characteristics 
 
The resilience strategies are influenced by government policy interventions at both national and 
regional levels. As such, this chapter has laid the groundwork for the next chapter that 













CHAPTER 8: POLICYMAKING FOR ECONOMIC RESILIENCE IN 
ZIMBABWE 
 
“We are still trying to lobby for a favourable policy direction. Government occasionally 
considers our input in its policy documents, but it is not enough.” Zimbabwe National Chamber 




This chapter seeks to examine economic and industrial policymaking in Zimbabwe, while 
highlighting possible areas of improvements. The impetus is to propose policymaking 
alternatives that can help promote economic resilience of metropolitan regions in the country. 
The phases of policymaking included in this chapter are agenda setting, policy formulation, 
policy adoption, policy implementation, policy assessment, policy adaptation, policy succession, 
and policy termination (Dunn 2018). The chapter commences by assessing government policy 
interventions and their effects, before shifting the focus to policy strategy options for economic 
revitalisation and resilience. The chapter is concluded by a review of the current industrial policy 
in Zimbabwe.  
 
8.2 EFFECTS OF POLICYMAKING ON THE ECONOMY OF BULAWAYO 
 
In an effort to improve industrial and economic performance in Zimbabwe the government 
implemented a number of policies from 2009 to 2018. The policies applicable to the phenomena 
under study are shown in Table 8.1. In a question where the participants were asked if they were 
familiar with the abovementioned economic and industrial policies, they expressed different 
levels of familiarity. The majority (73%) reported being familiar with Zim Asset, making it the 
most widely known policy amongst the participants. This is followed by the Transitional 
Stabilisation Programme (TSP) (42.6%) and the Statutory Instrument (SI) 64 of 2016/SI 122 of 




interventions, with only 22.7% being familiar with the Medium-Term Plan (MTP) and the 
Industrial Development Policy (IDP). 
 
Table 8.1 Government policy interventions 2009-2018 
Policy Intervention Implementation Period 
Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP I)  2009 
Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP II)  2010–2012 
Medium Term Plan (MTP) 2011–2015 
Industrial Development Policy (IDP) 2012–2016  
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim 
Asset)  
2013–2018   
10-Point Plan for Economic Growth  2015 
Statutory Instrument - SI 64 of 2016/SI 122 of 2017 2016–2018 
Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP)  2018–2020  
 
Those familiar with the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programmes, STERP 1 and STERP 2, 
are 18.1% and 19.4% respectively. The least known policy is the 10-Point Plan for Economic 
Growth selected by only 14.3% of the participants.  
 
8.2.1 Government efforts to improve industrial performance 2009-2018 
  
The discussion in this section is mainly anchored on data collected from government ministries 
on policies or programmes implemented to help industries remain operational. Due to their direct 
involvement in the industrial sector in Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) 
and Ministry of Women Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises Development 
(MWACSMED) were the key informants. The major contribution of the MIC to the performance 
of industries in Zimbabwe is through formulating and implementing industrial development 
policies. The focus of the MWACSMED is mainly on the development of micro, small, and 
medium enterprises (MSMEs). 
 
To improve the resilience of industries in Zimbabwe, government has also made use of import 
management policies. An example of such policies is the Consignment Based Conformity 




aim of assessing whether the quality of imports conforms to acceptable global, regional, and 
national standards. In addition the programme was meant to protect the consumers together with 
local industries from low quality and substandard import products, while preventing the dumping 
of substandard goods on the local market. Government also enacted SI 64 of 2016 which was 
later amalgamated with other statutory instruments to form SI 122 of 2017. This policy was 
meant to encourage re-industrialisation through restricting the importation of goods that could be 
or were produced locally. The idea was to promote local industries struggling to compete with 
cheap imports, due to a distorted pricing mechanism. Prices of locally produced goods were high 
because of high production costs. With reduced competition, an increase in sale volumes was 
expected amongst local industries, coupled with growth in earnings. Extra earnings were 
expected to support recapitalisation and retooling. Accordingly, government introduced SI 6 in 
2016 focusing on tax rebates offered to industries when importing capital equipment. Taking 
advantage of tax rebates, industries were expected to replace their old industrial machinery and 
equipment in order to improve production efficiency.     
   
Moral persuasion is one of the initiatives implemented by the MIC to help industries improve 
their market share. The ‘Buy Zimbabwe Campaign’ was introduced in order to persuade citizens 
to align their consumption patterns with goods and services produced by local industries. The 
other important programme that has been on government’s priority list was facilitating linkages 
between producers and markets with large and small enterprises. The linkages programme can be  
found in policies such as STERP 1, STERP 2, IDP 2012-2016, Zim Asset, and also Zimbabwe 
National Industrial Development Policy (ZNIDP) 2019-2023. The MWACSMED has also been 
instrumental in the implementation of this programme.  
 
In order to help MSMEs remain operational, the MWACSMED implemented the Market 
Linkages Programme in 2017, thereby linking small companies to huge markets. Specific 
interventions included linking small firms in the clothing sector with large departmental stores 
such as Edgars and Topics. The MWACSMED also facilitated the linkage between small firms 
producing plastics in Bulawayo with Bakers Inn, one of the biggest bakeries in Zimbabwe, in 




helped MSMEs remain operational in spite of the national economic decline. The positive effects 
recorded amongst the contracted small firms include better monetary inflows and improved 
production levels.  
 
One of the major challenges reported by firms experiencing decline in Bulawayo was the 
shortage of business finance. Central government through MWACSMED, facilitated that funding 
opportunities be available to MSMEs. The intervention was mainly in the form of loans through 
banks. In order to have funds available to distribute amongst MSMEs, the Commercial Bank of 
Zimbabwe (CBZ) was given US$100 million in 2016 by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). 
In addition, the Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe (Agribank) also provided funding 
to MSMEs albeit mainly to those in the agricultural sector. People’s Own Savings Bank (POSB) 
has the same facility called group lending. MSMEs could form mergers or groups to borrow 
money from the bank. Another funding facility available in Bulawayo is the Savings and Credit 
Cooperative Societies (SACCOS). This is a micro-lending facility whereby cooperatives or 
MSMEs pool their financial resources. These resources are lent to other people or firms and an 
interest is levied on the loan.  
 
The Zimbabwean Government, by way of the MWACSMED, also present training and capacity 
building workshops meant to equip MSMEs with business management skills needed for their 
resilience. MWACSMED usually invite partners such as banks and other corporate firms to train 
and equip participants with necessary skills. Besides facilitating trainings, MWACSMED has 
also been instrumental in facilitating infrastructure provision. Through MWACSMED’s efforts, 
Bulawayo SMEs Chamber managed to enter into an agreement with Old Mutual, whereby Old 
Mutual consented to having one of its factory buildings in the city partitioned into factory shells 
to be allocated to SMEs. Similarly, the National Railways of Zimbabwe gave up some of its 
space to the Mining SMEs Chamber for partitioning into factory shells. Notwithstanding this, 







8.2.2 Effects of government policy interventions on industrial growth 
 
Despite the efforts by government to improve the performance of industries through different 
policy interventions, participants expressed different views concerning the effectiveness of such 
interventions. This study found that 50.5% of the participants rated government policy 
interventions as poor and 23.3% as very poor. On the contrary, those who rated the interventions 
as good constitute 24.4%, and excellent 1.5%. Zim Asset was rated as the most beneficial policy 
intervention as shown in Table 8.2. Participants that rated Zim Asset beneficial constitute 29.8% 
of the total participants. The participants did not think that the other policies were beneficial as 
they gave them very low percentages. Only 13.5% of the participants rated MTP as beneficial 
compared to 12.5% who selected IDP (2012-2016). 
 
Table 8.2 Policies that benefitted participants 
 Responses24 




Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-
Economic Transformation (Zim Asset) (2013 to 
2018) 
117 20.6% 29.8% 
Medium Term Plan (2011-2015) 53 9.3% 13.5% 
Industrial Development Policy (2012-2016). 49 8.6% 12.5% 
Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme 
(STERP 2) [2010 -2012] 
44 7.7% 11.2% 
Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme 
(STERP 1) [2009 -2010] 
40 7.0% 10.2% 
SI 64 of 2016 and/or SI 122 of 2017 35 6.2% 8.9% 
Transitional Stabilisation Programme (2018-2020) 32 5.6% 8.2% 
10-Point Plan for Economic Growth (2015) 15 2.6% 3.8% 
None 184 32.3% 46.9% 
Total 569 100.0% 145.2% 
 
 
                                                 
24 Tables of this format in this chapter capture multi-responses from 392 participants. Accordingly, ‘N’ represents 
the number of responses given by the participants, the ‘percent’ column represents percentages of responses, and the 




Unexpectedly, 46.9% of the participants highlighted that none of the policies were beneficial to 
their operations. This could be because some micro and small firms were not familiar with the 
highlighted policies and could thus not evaluate their benefits. On the other hand, the majority 
(34.9%) of the participants who expressed having benefitted from government policy 
interventions, experienced widening market opportunities. Other benefits indicated by the 
participants include increased output (21.2%), protection from stiff competition (20.2%), 
increased access to business finance (14.8%), and reduced operation costs (11.2%).   
 
The Transitional Stabilisation Programme was selected by 36% of the participants as having had 
the most negative effects on them. The negative effect that the majority (24.5%) of the 
participants indicated was reduced production as shown in Table 8.3.  
 
Table 8.3 Negative effects of policy interventions 
 Responses 
Percent of Cases N Percent 
Negative effects 
of policies on 
participants 
Reduced production output 96 11.8% 24.5% 
An increase in the cost of doing business in 
Bulawayo and Zimbabwe as a whole 
90 11.0% 23.0% 
Scarcity of foreign exchange 89 10.9% 22.7% 
Scarcity of business finance 84 10.3% 21.4% 
Shrinking market opportunities 80 9.8% 20.4% 
Failure to withstand stiff competition from cheap 
imports 
77 9.4% 19.6% 
Unable to acquire raw materials from other 
countries 
66 8.1% 16.8% 
Erosion of company finances due to high inflation 
levels 
59 7.2% 15.1% 
Downsizing (reduced capacity utilisation, reduced 
employment levels, etc.) 
32 3.9% 8.2% 
Closure of some branches in and outside Bulawayo 
metropolis 
16 2.0% 4.1% 
N/A 126 15.5% 32.1% 






This was followed by increased operation costs (23%), scarcity of foreign currency (22.7%), 
scarcity of business finance (21.4%), and shrinking market opportunities (20.4%). These were 
the effects the participants indicated that seriously threatened the resilience of firms operating in 
Bulawayo. Government efforts to encourage formalisation, especially amongst MSMEs, have 
not been well received. MWACSMED (2019, Pers com) noted that, “there has been a general 
resistance against formalisation. Firm owners prefer having for example 10 micro-businesses 
dotted around town.” This perception has largely been influenced by an operation that was 
conducted by ZIMRA to enforce tax payments. Firms found without payment records had their 
presumptive taxes calculated from the day they were registered, regardless of the actual date they 
started operating. Those found without updated tax payments were fined a 100% penalty on their 
outstanding taxes. Thus, excessive taxation has been one of the factors discouraging MSMEs to 
formalise their operations. Notwithstanding the relaxation that has been effected in terms of 
taxes, the firms’ previous experiences with ZIMRA have cast a cloud on formalisation. 
 
Accessibility is one of the factors that have affected the rate of success of government 
interventions meant to assist MSMEs. MWACSMED believes that there are many MSMEs that 
are yet to be registered in Bulawayo. It is suspected that these MSMEs have remained ‘hidden’ 
as they do not want to be registered. Consequently, they have been left out of government 
programmes. Another factor affecting the success rate of government policy interventions 
targeted to help MSMEs is a lack of collateral from MSMEs. Consequently, funds availed 
through different programmes remain untapped for long. This study found that funds allocated to 
the CBZ in 2016 for distribution to MSMEs have not been used up by the end of 2019. This 
demonstrates the restrictive nature of the collateral requirements of government.  
 
8.3 STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS 
 
The previous sections in this chapter have covered government’s efforts to improve economic 
resilience through different policy interventions. The effects of these interventions have been 
discussed. However, the narrative remains incomplete if the discussion on strategies that can be 




variable that influences economic growth and development. As noted by Simmie (2004) long-
term, reliable, and consistent policies are essential in an attempt to revitalise growth in lagging 
regions.  
 
Various strategies can be adopted in Zimbabwe to make policies improve both firm and regional 
economic resilience. As shown in Table 8.4, 61.8% of the participants indicated that government 
should avoid politicising policies if they are to positively influence business growth and 
development.  
 
Table 8.4 Strategies for improving industrial and economic policies 
 Responses 








Government should avoid politicisation of policies  239 32.6% 61.8% 
Adequate research should inform crafting and 
implementation of policies 
163 22.2% 42.1% 
Government should ensure that policies guarantee 
availability of business finance 
107 14.6% 27.6% 
The policies should protect industries or companies 
from cheap imports 
87 11.9% 22.5% 
Implementation of policies should be in earnest, with 
provisions adhered to 
54 7.4% 14.0% 
Policies should protect companies' financial assets 47 6.4% 12.1% 
Needs of intended beneficiaries should be taken into 
account when crafting policies 
37 5.0% 9.6% 
Total 734 100.0% 189.7% 
 
 
Other common strategies indicated by participants include undertaking research-based 
policymaking (42.1%) and making policies guarantee availability of business finance (27.6%) as 
shown in Table 8.4. 
 
8.3.1 Avoiding politicisation of policies 
 
The policymaking process by its nature is political. Policymakers are political beings 




are affected by the conflicting interests of political parties. Thus, 61.8% of the participants 
indicated that policymaking can help improve their operations if ‘national interests’ are pursued 
rather than those of a few powerful politicians. This entails rethinking the agenda setting stage. 
As noted by Dunn (2018), that is the stage when officials place problems on government agendas 
for discussion. The ruling party in Zimbabwe dominates this stage by virtue of having a majority 
in parliament so policy problems put forward by the ruling party members are given more 
attention than those from opposition parties. 
 
The conflict among political parties with regards to prioritisation of interests in policymaking 
can be illustrated through the use of an example. The opposition party policymakers have argued 
that currency crisis is one of the major problems negatively affecting the economy. As such the 
issue should be addressed by either re-dollarising the economy or with ‘genuine’ national 
confidence building. The currency crisis was also raised by the Zimbabwe National Chamber of 
Commerce (ZNCC). However, ZNCC supports confidence building amongst investors and the 
general populace who have since lost trust in the local currency. In contrast, the ruling party has 
maintained that economic problems are emanating from sanctions imposed on the country by the 
USA and its allies. Consequently, ruling party policymakers believe that the best policy direction 
is to find alternative trade partners in the East coupled with an ‘international re-engagement’ 
programme under the motto Zimbabwe is Open for Business. Nevertheless, this re-engagement 
campaign has so far failed to attract the much-needed foreign direct investment.  
 
Conflicted interests in agenda setting and policy formulation were found to be prevalent among 
politicians who are also business people. ZNCC (2019, Pers com) noted that, “those politicians 
who also double as business people go to parliament to protect their business interests. In most 
cases, they are not worried about the general welfare of the country.” This has become a 
common trend in Zimbabwe where most politicians are also the leading entrepreneurs controlling 
the industrial sector. Accordingly, these politicians are known to oppose any policy that threatens 
their businesses or reduces their grip on the industrial sector. Policies likely to benefit the general 




interests. However, good policymaking should put the interests of citizens at the centre of the 
process. 
 
Policy formulation is influenced by deliberations done at the agenda setting phase. According to 
Dunn (2018), policy formulation involves the creation of alternative policies to address a policy 
problem, these alternative policies can be in the form of executive orders, court decisions, and 
legislative acts. In Zimbabwe, alternative policies are mainly in the form of executive orders and 
legislative acts. However, these alternatives are influenced by policy problems discussed at the 
agenda setting phase. In light of this, ZNCC (2019, Pers com) noted that, “most of the policies 
formulated in Zimbabwe are populist, meant to get votes. Without proper understanding of the 
‘Zimbabwean interest’, the Chinese, Europeans or Americans are not going to be the answer to 
economic problems in Zimbabwe.” As such, to revitalise the economy, there should be a strategy 
in place that all policymaking must address the ‘genuine Zimbabwean interest’. What this 
interest is, remains a matter of different perceptions. In this study, the ‘genuine Zimbabwe 
interest’ is equated to ‘public interest’ (Klosterman 1980). The ‘public interest’ is served if both 
collective and individual benefits of policy outcomes outweigh their common and particular 
demerits (Klosterman 1980). Policymaking can be better in Zimbabwe if all political parties 
could prioritise the ‘public interest’.  
 
Policy adoption is another phase in policymaking. Dunn (2018) noted different routes of 
adopting policies such as by legislative majority, consensus amongst agency directors, and a 
majority court decision. In Zimbabwe, the most common route is the legislative majority. 
However, due to conflicting ideas from agenda setting and policy formulation, the adoption 
process is also a battleground for party politics. These conflicts eventually affect the 
implementation phase, as some members of both government and the private sector end up 
resisting policies. As such, policies are sometimes not implemented in earnest. These findings 
are in line with existing literature suggesting that the politicisation of development policies is 
common in Africa. Richardson (1973) noted that regional policy decisions are political in nature 
and are mainly undertaken by policymakers who purport to represent the welfare of society. 




policies can be a result of political pressures or a response to economic development 
programmes. Political pressures seem to override economic development in Zimbabwe. 
 
8.3.2 Evidence-based policymaking  
 
Policies in Zimbabwe can improve industrial growth and development if they are based on 
adequate research. In support of 42.1% of the participants who raised these sentiments, ZNCC 
(2019, Pers com) noted that, “there is not much research conducted by Zimbabweans focusing on 
how we can have a self-reliant and sustainable economic system. Our current system is heavily 
reliant on Asians, Europeans, Americans, etc. Our research and development is poor.” The 
ZNCC also raised the issue of budget constraints limiting adequate research and development in 
the country’s industry. Without a budget it is difficult to undertake proper research about the 
country’s industrial standing. According to ZNCC, it is vital to launch investigations about the 
real problems hindering industrial growth, namely the machinery used in industries, the 
machinery required for industries, and strategies for acquiring machinery. ZNCC alleges that 
these issues are unknown yet, researchers have been occupied with studies to address these 
issues even though funding has remained their greatest challenge.  
 
The lack of empirical evidence has affected policymaking in Zimbabwe. This emanates from the 
failure to properly ‘define’ and ‘structure’ policy problems. Policies, consequently formulated, 
do not address the ‘real’ problems but rather symptoms of the problems. Furthermore, real 
problems remain unknown because comprehensive policy research is not done. This could be 
explained by constrained government budgets that have led to financial shortages, which in turn 
has hampered adequate policy research and development. The outcomes are often inadequate, 
incomplete, and wrong policies that not only waste scarce resources, but are also prematurely 








8.3.3 Policy guaranteeing availability of business finance 
 
One of the major challenges facing industries in Bulawayo is the shortage of finance. Emanating 
from this, 27.6% of the participants indicated that government policy interventions should 
guarantee the availability of business finance. As previously indicated in Section 8.2.1, different 
finance mechanisms have been availed. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
has set up an Industrial Development Fund which was announced in the 2019-budget statement. 
A sum of US$30 million seed money was allocated to IDCZ as venture capital to projects of 
national importance. In corroboration IDCZ (2019, Pers com) indicated that, “we have received 
money from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development to revive industries in the 
country. We are still doing a baseline survey and developing the terms of references for loans.” 
Similar strategies have produced positive economic growth in countries such as Japan where the 
government provided loans and improved access to foreign exchange to key industries (Ito & 
Weinstein 1996). Japan Development Bank and Japan Export and Import Bank were the leading 
institutions that provided these loans (Ito & Weinstein 1996).  
 
In as much as business funds are availed to industries through different platforms, this study 
found that the biggest challenge is accessibility. The collateral requirements are too high to be 
met by MSMEs. The researcher found that for small companies to qualify for loans, some 
financial institutions require collateral in the form of movable assets for a loan of up to ZWL5 
000 (equivalent to US$200 according to the official RBZ rate of US$1 to ZWL25).25 For loans 
above ZWL5 000, collateral in the form of immovable property is required. Considering the 
nature of MSMEs in Bulawayo and Zimbabwe in general, neither of the two amounts are enough 
for their expansion needs and the majority of firms do not even meet these collateral 
requirements. The fact that firms are failing to access these funds because of collateral 
requirements, is one of the reasons why funds released by government for the benefit of MSMEs, 
remain unused for considerable periods of time. As such, collateral issues need to be treated as 
an important policy problem on government’s agenda.  
 
                                                 




8.3.4 Industrial protectionism policies 
 
Industries in Bulawayo need protection from cheap imports. This strategy was indicated by 
22.5% of the participants. The level of industrial protection in current policies is considered 
inadequate and affected by inconsistencies in implementation. Consequently, 80.1% of the 
participants indicated that firms in Bulawayo require protection from cheap imports if the city is 
to regain its former glory as the industrial capital in Zimbabwe. In contrast, 19.9% of the 
participants do not consider government protection to be a catalyst for economic revival in 
Bulawayo. One of the participants in this category indicated that firms in Bulawayo have to find 
ways of turning the current economic decline into a springboard that catapults them to greater 
heights. Furthermore, the participant highlighted that firms in Bulawayo need to be innovative to 
survive the current economic meltdown.  
 
The findings on industrial protection are consistent with existing literature. In Japan, industries in 
their infancy received government protection against cheap imports. However, these industries 
were exposed to full competition when they became exporters and were also competitive on the 
global market (Ito & Weinstein 1996). Protection of industries in their infancy is therefore a 
common strategy. Protection should also be considered for firms operating in economically 
depressed regions such as Bulawayo. However, this protection should be lifted once firms show 
signs of competitiveness. These arguments should inform policymaking in Zimbabwe in order to 
improve regional economic resilience. Notwithstanding this, firms should not relax and wait for 
government protection. They should continually seek to overcome different types of shocks on 
their own. While exogenous factors are vital for economic resilience, firms and regions alike, 
should have endogenous mechanisms that help them adapt to changes. Policy changes in their 
very nature can sometimes be regarded as shocks that firms and regions need to overcome. 
 
8.3.5 Earnest policy implementation 
 
Adhering to policy prescriptions is an important aspect that determines prospects of policy 




Zimbabwe can improve if implementers adhere to policy prescriptions rather than diverting from 
them. This goes back to the issue of implementation challenges. While some policies are 
reasonable and representative, poor implementation makes them fail to achieve their intended 
goals. The diversion from policy prescriptions is mainly caused by the lack of adequate funds. In 
such circumstances, implementers end up prioritising the key objectives. However, policy 
assessment becomes important in such scenarios. In the policy assessment phase, auditing and 
accounting units in government determine the compliance of policies to statutory requirements 
and also whether policies are realising their intended objectives (Dunn 2018). Thus, proper 
monitoring should provide feedback mechanisms to implementers alerting them when the 
implementation process goes off-course. 
 
Proper assessment of any policy provides important information acted upon in the policy 
adaptation phase. In this phase, auditing and evaluation units make recommendations concerning 
the adaptation of policies, due to reasons such as insufficient resources and inadequate training 
(Dunn 2018). No publicly available evidence points to such processes taking place in Zimbabwe. 
If done, the recommendations are possibly not publicised. This compromises the monitoring and 
evaluation of policies and government programmes. However, it should not be forgotten that 
monitoring and evaluation are sometimes properly done but that politicians do not always listen 
to the voice of reason. Thus, the funding of policies should improve, and strict monitoring is 
required to make sure that policies are implemented in earnest. 
 
8.3.6 Security of firms’ assets 
 
The security of firms’ financial assets is an important aspect that needs government protection 
through policy interventions. This was indicated by 12.1% of the participants. Participants 
mainly stressed that policy inconsistencies have made them lose financial assets. In support, 
MWACSMED (2019, Pers com) noted that: “It has become a norm that people are not given 
enough warning in terms of policy changes.” Business people tend to lose out because they are 
caught unaware. An example is the abandonment of the multi-currency system. It was effected 




implement policies that encourage business people to invest and grow their capital. These 
findings are consistent with those of Tan (2014), who observed that a stable macroeconomic 
environment played an important role in the economic and industrial growth of Malaysia. Such 
improvements are needed in Zimbabwe to improve the policymaking process. 
 
Another area of possible improvement in Zimbabwe is the handling of policy succession and 
policy termination. After policy evaluation, recommendations can point to either policy 
succession or termination. Policy succession involves redefining the objectives of the policy 
rather than terminating it (Dunn 2018). Usually this happens when the problem for which the 
policy was formulated is considered solved and the need for the policy no longer exists (Dunn 
2018). However, through the recommendation of a legislative committee responsible for policy 
evaluation, a policy can be terminated. Again, this is after it has been found that the policy is no 
longer required (Dunn 2018). This phase needs improvement in Zimbabwe. There is no evidence 
of adequate ex-post evaluation of policies, which are sometimes abandoned prematurely. No 
monitoring and evaluation reports are published making it difficult to learn from previous policy 
implementation experiences. As such, Zimbabwe needs experiential learning in order to improve 
its policymaking processes. 
 
8.3.7 Needs-driven policymaking 
 
Policymaking as a process involves conflicting interests and is characterised by contestations. 
While politicians purport to represent the interests of the public in policymaking, in some cases 
they represent their own interests. Emanating from this, 9.6% of the participants noted that 
policymaking in Zimbabwe can improve if the needs or interests of intended beneficiaries are 
‘genuinely’ considered in policy formulation. An example highlighted by one of the participants 
involves the issue of working space for MSMEs. The participant noted that regardless of the 
common talk of improving and encouraging the growth of MSMEs, little has been done to 
provide adequate working space. Furthermore, the provision of infrastructure for MSMEs has not 





Needs-driven policymaking can be linked to the public interest debate previously referred to. 
This study found that industrial growth and development is possible if policies in Zimbabwe 
address the interests of the public. According to Klosterman (1980: 323) many scholars “reject 
[public interest] as a vacuous phrase used only to promote the special interests of some over the 
equally valid interests of others.” However, policies need to be able to address or meet the 
interests of those they are formulated for. Loosely defined the ‘public’ can be perceived as the 
targeted or intended beneficiaries of a policy. Accordingly, policies that serve the interests of the 
public should have more collective and individual benefits to intended beneficiaries rather than 
demerits. For the industrial policies, these benefits are expected to accrue to the industries in the 
country regardless of size, ownership, or location. Likewise, economic policy outcomes should 
have more collective and individual benefits to citizens and firms in the country, than demerits. 
As such policy analysts in Zimbabwe have a great task before them. Through their analyses at 
different levels, their main task according to Wildavsky (1980: 126) “is the weighty and ancient 
one of speaking truth to power.” This means that policy analysis has a role to play in improving 
policymaking in Zimbabwe. Policy analysis is defined by Dunn (2018: 3) as “a process of multi-
disciplinary enquiry aiming at the creation, critical assessment, and communication of policy-
relevant knowledge.” Thus, needs-based policymaking can improve the growth and development 
of the industrial sector in Zimbabwe. 
 
8.4 REVIEWING THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY (2019-2023)   
 
The major objective of the Zimbabwe National Industrial Development Policy (ZNIDP) as 
indicated by Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ 2019a: 7) is, “to facilitate the sustainable growth of 
industry, development of new industries and the transformation and diversification of the 
Zimbabwean industry.” This is linked with the government’s vision of making the country 
technologically advanced, comprising a competitive and diversified industry by 2030 (GoZ 
2019a). A diversified industrial base is necessary for economic resilience (Burton 1989). The 




emphasis to export growth. The policy direction is consistent with literature that supports the 
expansion of the economic base. Stimson, Stough & Roberts (2006) noted that economic base 
expansion results in an increase of export goods and services sold to consumers outside the 
region’s boundaries. Economic base expansion also increases cash inflows into a region that can 
be used to generate new local consumption. In Zimbabwe, the industrial sector together with 
mining, tourism, and agriculture constitute the economic base. The ZNIDP has various broad 
strategies, implemented to boost industrial growth. Some of these strategies are discussed below. 
 
8.4.1 Sector strategies 
 
The sector-based strategy envisaged in ZNIDP is one of the broad strategies identified in the 
policy document and is in line with Hirschman’s (1958) unbalanced growth theory. Sector-based 
strategies are developed to give more attention to priority sectors such as, the Zimbabwe Cotton 
to Clothing Strategy and Zimbabwe Leather Sector Strategy. Hirschman (1958) and 
Saliminezhad & Lisaniler (2018) agree, they encourage investments in key sectors of the 
economy. Growth in key sectors is believed to trigger growth in the other sectors through 
positive externalities (Hirschman 1958; Saliminezhad & Lisaniler 2018). According to 
Hirschman (1958), forward and backward linkages between industries are vital in the transfer of 
growth from core to peripheral regions. The transfer of growth is achieved through the trickling 
down effects as economic policies are enacted to address unfavourable effects of polarisation 
(Hirschman 1958; Dawkins 2003). Like other countries in the Global South, Zimbabwe is 
characterised by low financial capital, inability to create an environment for massive investment, 
and limited diversity in human resource skills (Saliminezhad & Lisaniler 2018). Thus, induced 
investments in key sectors are likely to have multiplier effects in the sense that they can trigger 
other subsequent investments in a series (Hirschman 1958).  
 
8.4.2 Financing industrial development 
 
Financing industrial development is another broad strategy in the policy document. In line with 




finance for retooling have crippled industrial development in the country. The policy therefore 
stresses the need to financially capacitate the Industrial Development Corporation of Zimbabwe 
(IDCZ) so that it is able to fund industrial sector activities. Government has already released 
US$30 million seed money for that purpose. Other forms of finance envisaged in the policy 
include domestic and external financiers willing to avail lines of credit to the industrial sector. 
Group financing schemes are expected to fund MSMEs and rural industrialisation. However, 
complexities surrounding the issue of collateral should be addressed for this strategy to benefit 
many firms. 
 
8.4.3 Local content strategy 
 
Another broad strategy is the Local Content Strategy (LCS) and it is presented in a separate 
document. Several sub-strategies are outlined in the LCS document. The main ones are presented 
in Table 8.5.  
 
Table 8.5 Sub-strategies under the Local Content Strategy 
Sub-strategy Action plan 
Preferential local procurement  Encourage consumers to purchase locally produced goods and 
services.  
 Local production and consumption awareness programmes to be 
implemented. 
 One of the key messages to be utilised is “Make Local, Buy Local and 
Consume Local”.  
Funding to capacitate local suppliers  Funds to support the programme to be sourced from government, 
development partners, and private capital. 
Creating business opportunities for 
local firms 
 Encourage backward and forward linkages.  
 Big contracts will be unbundled that will ensure the participation of 
local citizens and entrepreneurs. 
Technology transfers  Firms operating in Zimbabwe are expected to spearhead the 
technological and skills transfers in their areas of specialisation. 
 Rebates on duty offered to those importing raw materials and capital 
equipment. 
 Tax and duty waivers to firms promoting local producers through 
forward and backward linkages. 





According to GoZ (2019b: 7) the LCS is meant to promote “local value addition through 
utilisation of domestic resources and localisation of supply chains.” The LCS is taken as a tool 
that should promote competitiveness and beneficial linkages amongst local sectors (GoZ 2019b). 
As its sub-objectives, the LCS seeks to increase the percentage of the usage of local resources in 
priority industries from 25% to 80% by 2023, increase capacity utilisation in the same sectors 
from 45% to 75% by 2023, and achieve a 5% annual increase in manufactured exports from 
2019 to 2023 (GoZ 2019b). The sub-strategies are expected to provide quick returns in the 
revitalisation of the industrial sector. However, these strategies should be properly implemented. 
In addition, consistency in government policies is important to allow business planning and 
forecasting.  
 
8.4.4 Improvement of innovation and technology 
 
Improvement of innovation and technology, another broad strategy, is expected to enhance 
competitiveness of goods and services. Accordingly, government envisages giving incentives to 
firms investing in innovation and research and development activities. The incentives are in the 
form of tax rebates and low interest rates. Here, the policy attempts to tackle the challenges 
common to many countries in the Global South. As compared to countries in the Global North, 
most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are characterised by low investment and capital 
formation, minimum technological change, shifting of labour from industry to agriculture, and 
minimum benefits from international trade (Sampath 2014). Under such circumstances, Geyer 
(2006) asserted that for companies and industries in the South to survive the global competition, 
stronger manufacturing and marketing capabilities are now required. This can be achieved in 
Zimbabwe through improvement of innovation and technology. As noted by Lin (2013: 260) “a 
continuous stream of technological innovation is the basis for sustained growth in any economy.” 
Tax rebates and low interest rates are indeed necessary for the industries in the country to 






8.4.5 Embracing the fourth industrial revolution 
 
Linked to improvement in innovation and technology is the upgrading and modernisation of 
industries in line with the fourth industrial revolution. Central government anticipates re-
orientating tertiary institutions towards the production of high-end skills needed by industries in 
order to be competitive. Government commitment has been witnessed in this regard. Currently 
tertiary institutions have been reviewing their degree programmes so as to be in line with the 
fourth industrial revolution. The new emphasis is on ‘Education 5.0’ (i.e. teaching, research, 
community engagement, innovation, and industrialisation). This is an improvement from 
‘Education 3.0’ (i.e. teaching, research, and community engagement) which was common in 
tertiary institutions. The reviewed programmes are expected to be available in August 2020. As a 
new policy direction, tertiary institutions are expected to advance interests in innovations and 
industrial solutions, to address problems facing the country. This is consistent with strategies 
undertaken in other Global South countries with stronger economies, such as the Asian Tigers.  
 
8.4.6 Industrial cluster initiatives 
 
Industrial cluster initiatives are also considered an important strategy in ZNIDP. Through this 
strategy, government aims to establish industrial clusters. The main target is to support the 
development of MSMEs by promoting linkages with other businesses. Government is set to 
identify geographical areas where existing synergies can be leveraged. However, creating new 
clusters might be problematic, especially where government seeks to find areas in different 
provinces that can be designated for the operation of clusters. Clustering is usually a spontaneous 
formation rather than an induced one, hence once formed, a cluster is expected to evolve subject 
to its ability to adapt to changing times (Qing 2012). The clusters to be formed by government 
should be able to evolve, for this strategy to work out. 
 
Another challenge to the cluster initiative is the current state of the economy. Favourable 




(Porter & Ketels 2009). Creating clusters without addressing business confidence may be setting 
up the clusters for failure. Besides, linkages and complementarities amongst industries and other 
entities are essential in clusters especially for competitiveness (Porter 1990; 2000). These 
linkages cannot be fully enforced by government by way of cluster development. However, 
leveraging the already existing clusters has a potential to help them grow. This can be effective 
in countries in the South as they are characterised by less-developed clusters that are inundated 
by inadequate supporting industries and institutions (Porter & Ketels 2009). Thus, competition of 
firms is mainly based on cheap labour and locally available natural resources (Porter & Ketels 
2009). Besides, the firms in such clusters are mainly dependent on components, machinery, and 
technology that must be imported (Porter & Ketels 2009). This explains the character of the 
firms in Bulawayo. These firms are mainly using old machinery installed in industries during the 
colonial times (i.e. before 1980). Little has been done to improve or upgrade the machinery. This 
issue needs to be addressed for the cluster initiative to fully benefit the growth and development 
of industries and subsequently regional economies. 
 
8.4.7 Entrepreneurship and micro, small, and medium enterprises  
 
The ZNIDP also seeks to encourage the development of entrepreneurship amongst MSMEs. This 
recognises the important role played by MSMEs in socio-economic development. Accordingly, 
the government seeks to address industrialisation constraints experienced by MSMEs. This 
approach is expected to benefit the economy of Bulawayo which is dominated by MSMEs. The 
economy is also dominated by industrial-district type of firms. Industrial districts focus on 
agglomerations of mainly small light manufacturing industries or firms (Porter & Ketels 2009). 
In light of this the linkages programme proposed by government can promote the effective 
growth of industrial districts in the metropolis and their potential development into clusters. The 
same can also be said about existing clusters in Bulawayo that are struggling to thrive in the 
current economic meltdown. Sub-contracting linkages between large formal industries and 




access to export markets (Kimura 2009). This linkage thrust has the potential to improve the 
industrial sector in Bulawayo metropolis. 
 
8.4.8 Reflections on the ZNIDP (2019-2023) 
 
The ZNIDP is strongly rooted in existing regional development literature. However, it is vital to 
note that production processes are not always influenced by policy interventions. Production 
processes move to areas where conditions are most favourable for production (Geyer 2006). A 
firm therefore chooses an optimal location that supports profit maximisation (Brouwer, Mariotti 
& Van Ommeren 2004). It is thus clear that there is a need to create conditions favourable for 
investment in Bulawayo. The first step is to recognise that most urban economies in Southern 
Africa are dualistic in nature (Geyer 1989). Thus, the integration of formal and informal urban 
sectors provides prospects for better economic growth in these cities (Geyer 1989). This can be 
beneficial in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) indicated that 
approximately seven billion Zimbabwean dollars are trapped in the informal sector in Zimbabwe. 
Emanating from this, the integration of formal and informal sector firms is likely to unlock this 
dead capital (De Soto 2001a; 2001b) in the informal sector.  
 
The policy is also anchored on the belief that development can be taken as increased 
industrialisation. Strategies in this development thinking are usually meant to achieve rapid 
industrialisation and the abandonment of agriculture (Todaro & Smith 2015). However, 
abandonment of agriculture seems impossible in Zimbabwe. Agriculture has been at the centre of 
Zimbabwe’s economic growth for decades. In addition, the bulk of industrial production has 
been anchored on agriculture. The revitalisation of the agricultural sector may help reduce food 
imports and so save scarce foreign currency. Rather than spending the currency on food imports, 
it can be invested in social overhead investments (Hirschman 1958). As noted by Hirschman 
(1958), governments should identify economic sectors with strong growth potential and make 
social overhead investments. This would expand employment opportunities in those sectors once 
they have started responding to the social overhead investments (Hirschman 1958). In Zimbabwe 




Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a good source of capital and technological know-how 
(Diaconu 2014). Consequently the government’s focus has been influenced in order to attract 
FDI. However, one participant indicated that government efforts to lure investors, should not 
ignore those investors already in the country. Investors in Zimbabwe might also be interested in 
diversifying their investments. Apart from that, attracting FDI also requires an improvement in 
the business climate of the country as poor business environments could negatively influence the 
effectiveness of private capital and could also increase the cost of doing business to 




Political instability is a threat to the achievement of policy goals and objectives (Mbaku 1988). 
Improvements discussed in this chapter are required to make policies that positively influence 
economic resilience in general in Zimbabwe. Policy analysis is one of the key improvements 
required in Zimbabwe. If well executed, it could improve problem structuring, forecasting, and 
prescription (Dunn 2018). Improvements are also required in the educational system which, 
according to ZNCC, is not yet entrepreneurially focused, although efforts to revamp the 
education system are already underway. It is clear that there is a need for continuity, whether the 
current government remains in power, or loses the next election. Continuity promotes 
consistency in policies. Furthermore, it increases the chances to attract foreign investors into the 
country. Finally, government should be committed to its policy direction on import substitution 









CHAPTER 9: STRATEGY OPTIONS FOR ECONOMIC RESILIENCE IN 
BULAWAYO METROPOLITAN PROVINCE 
 
A region’s economic structure; the competitiveness and innovative propensity of 
its firms; the relational linkages of its firms with networks of other producers and 
customers in other regions and other countries; the skills of its workforce; its 
entrepreneurial culture, its institutional forms; the stance taken by and the 
resources and measures available to any local policy bodies (such as regional or 
local development agencies); and the region’s economic governance 
arrangements, will all shape the resistance and response of a region’s economy 




This chapter seeks to explore the different strategies for economic revitalisation and resilience in 
Bulawayo Metropolitan Province (BMP). Kimura (2009) noted that, to achieve economic 
development, countries in the Global South must ensure the existence of a stable macroeconomic 
environment, address national challenges (e.g. inadequate infrastructure and human capital), and 
utilise advantages drawn from the process of globalisation. However, for regional economic 
resilience, the following factors are important, namely a region’s economic structure, firms’ 
innovation and competitiveness, linkage types and levels, and regional economic governance, 
among others (Martin 2012). The chapter therefore analyses the level of economic resilience 
using employment as the key variable. The focus is then shifted to different strategy options that 
can be adopted to enhance economic resilience in BMP. 
 
9.2 AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC RESILIENCE IN BULAWAYO 
 
When examining the economic resilience of a region, there is a need to address three issues. 
According to Faggian et al. (2017), it is vital to highlight the shock (resilience ‘to what’), the 
variable utilised in analysing resilience (i.e. resilience ‘of what’), and the temporal aspect 
involved in the analysis (resilience ‘over what period’). While these issues were addressed in 




9.2.1 The shock experienced in Bulawayo 
 
The need to explain the shock under study is an important step in understanding and analysing 
regional economic resilience. The disturbance or shock under analysis in the study should be 
well defined (Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016) and it should also be determined when such shock 
actually occurred (Han & Goetz 2015; Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016). While it might be easy 
to determine such shocks as closures of firms, it is difficult to show with certainty when a shock 
such as an economic crisis started (Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016). Notwithstanding this, the 
shock in this study takes the form of an economic recession that is believed to have been 
triggered by the election victory of the Zimbabwe African National Unity Patriotic Front (ZANU 
PF) in July 2013. As corroborated by Mlambo (2017), a period of economic collapse set in 
immediately after the election in 2013.  
 
The economy of Bulawayo was heavily affected by the economic recession that followed the 
2013 national election. However, it is important to realise that two years earlier, in 2011, 
political campaigning and jostling were already affecting the economy (see Figure 9.1). This can 
be attributed to conflicts that arose amongst the principal parties in the government of national 
unity (GNU) as campaigning and jostling for votes overshadowed government business. Thus, 
the onset can be argued to have started in 2011 as opposed to 2013. The end of the recessionary 
period is more difficult to define. Because of successive recessionary shocks experienced in 
Bulawayo specifically, and Zimbabwe in general, it is difficult to clearly highlight the period 
over which resilience is measured. The same challenge was experienced in studying regional 
economic resilience in Italy (Faggian et al. 2017). However, for purposes of this study, economic 
resilience is measured from 2011 to 2018. This is taken to represent the period of economic 
recession attributed to the July 2013-national election.  
 
9.2.2 Analysing the resilience of the economy  
 
Economic resilience is measured using regional employment levels from 2009 to 2018. 




necessary so as to get a picture of the trends before 2009. An attempt to use gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita was hampered by the unavailability of adequate data. Likewise, an 
attempt to determine the economic base of the metropolis using the location quotient, was 
unsuccessful, due to incomplete data. The Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) 
indicated that data on GDP per capita in Zimbabwe is only available at a national level. Besides 
that, employment data gathered are not disaggregated into sectors at provincial levels. The 
disaggregation is only done at a national level, so creating gaps in the data available.  
 
The data deficiencies experienced in this study did not, however, affect an analysis of regional 
economic resilience that was done using employment levels as a variable. In an Italian study, Di 
Caro (2014) used employment as compared to GDP data, as many manipulations were needed 
before GDP could be utilised in that analysis. In any case, there is yet to be an agreement in 
literature on the variables that should be used to measure economic resilience (Breathnach, Van 
Egeraat & Curran 2015). As previously highlighted, variables commonly used in the North 
include GDP per capita, employment levels and regional production levels. Emanating from this, 
employment levels in BMP were utilised to analyse the economy’s resilience. The employment 
trend is shown in Figure 9.1. 
 
The employment trend line starts with a recession and continues on a downward trend reaching a 
trough in 2008. This coincides with the crash of the Zimbabwean currency that took place in the 
same year (Munangagwa 2009; Pilossof 2009; Mukuhlani 2014; Mlambo 2017). The disputed 
election result of 2008 gave birth to a GNU that introduced a multi-currency system in 2009. 
Accordingly, a form of recovery was experienced though its peak (in 2011) was lower than the 
previous one in 2005. Another form of decline was experienced after 2011. This shock was in the 
form of an economic recession possibly caused by political in-fighting in government as political 
parties tried to position themselves in preparation for the 2013 harmonised election. The trough 
of the economic recession was reached in 2015. This was followed by another lower peak in 
2016. It is difficult, though, to treat the increase that took place between 2015 and 2016 as a 
recovery because it was short lived and because the trend started declining before surpassing the 





Source: ZIMSTAT (2019)  
Figure 9.1 Formal employment trends in Bulawayo 2005-2018 
 
The ‘Adjusted’ trend line shows formal employment inclusive of agricultural (A1 and A2) sector 
employment. However, ZIMSTAT (2019, Pers com) indicated that inclusion of this data in 
regional employment calculation, started in 2016. Thus, only the ‘Actual’ employment trend line 
was utilised in analysis for purposes of data consistency.  
 
The resistance aspect of resilience is analysed using the sensitivity index by Martin (2012: 13). 
The index, which is fully explained in Chapter 5, is expressed as follows: 
 
βr = [(ΔEr/Er)/(ΔEN/EN)] 
Where βr produced a value of (-1.435353469) 
 
The values used in the calculation were peak and trough values for the years 2011 and 2015. The 
corresponding values for national employment for the same years were also used.26 However, the 
                                                 




sensitivity index achieved is difficult to properly interpret as Martin (2012) did not explain the 
interpretation of negative values in his original abstraction. According to Martin (2012) if the 
index is greater than 1, it means the region’s resistance to a recessionary shock is low. However, 
if it is less than 1, the concerned region has a greater resistance to a recessionary shock. Using 
these criteria it means Bulawayo’s economy has greater resistance to the shock than the national 
one. In order to expand the scope of analysis other variants that exist in literature (Oliva & 
Lazzeretti 2018) were adopted. Two indices were selected, which are modifications of Martin’s 
(2012) formula by Faggian et al. (2017) and Lagravinese (2015). The modification by Faggian et 
al. (2017: 399) is expressed as follows: 
  
SI = (Er,t /Er,t-1)/(En,t/En,t-1) 
Where  Er represents total employment in region (r)   
En represents total national employment  
Period t is the recessionary period  
Period ‘t – 1’ is the pre-recessionary period 
 
The modified formula produced a sensitivity index value of 0.850037128. As indicated by 
Faggian et al. (2017) the result above 1 represents a region which is more resistant than the 
nation. On the contrary, a result below 1 indicates that the concerned region was affected by the 
shock more than the comparable nation. Consequently, this means the economy of Bulawayo 
was less resistant than the national one. Another variant of Martin’s (2012) sensitivity index is 
presented by Lagravinese (2015:334) as follows: 
 
  βres = [(ΔEr / Er) − (ΔEN / EN)]/ | ΔEN / EN |  
Where   (ΔEr / Er) represents the percentage change in employment at a regional level 




Lagravinese’s (2015) variant produced a βres of (-2.435353469). According to Lagravinese 
(2015) a positive βres shows that the region has a greater resistance to the shock than the nation. 
On the contrary, a region with a negative index has a lower resistance. Accordingly, this 
confirms the conclusion reached using Faggian et al. (2017) namely, that the economy of 
Bulawayo showed a lower resistance than the national economy. This means the economic 
meltdown in Zimbabwe had a greater impact on the economy of Bulawayo than the national 
economy. 
 
9.3 STRATEGIES FOR ENHANCING ECONOMIC RESILIENCE IN BULAWAYO 
 
The promotion of regional economic resilience is not a straightforward process. Variables that 
affect economic resilience are many and they vary from one region to another. In addition to the 
factors indicated in Section 9.1, regional economic resilience is also influenced by the skills of 
labour force and entrepreneurial culture (Martin 2012). Apart from that, Simmie (2014: 104) 
noted that, “invention and new knowledge production, and their commercialization as new 
product and process innovations, are argued to underlie the long-term adaptation of and the 
development of economic resilience in regional economies.” Accordingly, the strategy options 
applicable in Bulawayo are assessed. 
 
9.3.1 Diversification of the economic base  
 
The economic base of BMP is dominated by the manufacturing sector as shown in Table 9.1. In 
2017, manufacturing dominated the metropolis’ export earnings followed by tourism, 
agriculture, and mining.27 These findings are comparable to existing literature. For instance in 
Thailand, diversification in the economy was important for its growth. Besides industry 
development, foreign earnings were also obtained from agricultural outputs and tourism (Burton 
1989).  
                                                 




Table 9.1 Bulawayo export earnings in 2017 
Industrial Sector Export Earnings (USD) 
Manufacturing 17 620 000 
Tourism  5 880 000 
Agriculture 3 540 000 
Mining 400 000 
Total 27 440 000 
 
While the economic base in Bulawayo is diversified, the dominance of the manufacturing sector 
makes the economy vulnerable. As highlighted in Chapters 6 and 7, the economy was devastated 
when industrial decline became rife as the other sectors constituting the economic base in 
Bulawayo could not sustain the economy on their own. The diversification of the economy in 
Bulawayo is therefore superficial. There is a need to grow export earnings from the other three 
sectors in order for export earnings to represent a more balanced combination of sectors. This 
study showed that 66.1% of the participants were in the manufacturing sector, followed by 
26.5% in the services, 5.6 % in the agricultural, and 1.8% in the extractive sectors, respectively. 
Consistent with the economic base theory, regions experiencing growth should have their 
economies diversifying as production increases in order to serve both the local and export market 
(Dawkins 2003). Thus, the growth and development of the services, agricultural, and extractive 
sectors is likely to improve Bulawayo’s economic resilience.  
 
Increasing the export levels of tourism, agriculture, and mining in Bulawayo can be achieved by 
exploiting already existing opportunities. Zimbabwe is a member of the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Free Trade Area. COMESA-membership provides a 
huge market for the firms in Bulawayo. Full participation in this market can increase the levels 
of export earnings in the metropolis. This represents benefits of global regionalisation (Geyer 
2006; Leonova 2016). However, there is need to improve the level of technology and innovation 
as a precursor to strengthening and further diversifying the economic base. This strategy 
produced positive results in other countries in the South. The success of industrialisation in 
China, for instance, was anchored on the country’s improvement in technology and the 
importation of sophisticated industrial machines (Lin 2013). This resulted in massive production 




the share of manufactured goods in its exports from 75% in 1979 to levels above 95% in 2009 
(Lin 2013).  
 
9.3.2 Firm linkages for economic growth and development  
 
The types of firm relationships found in Bulawayo are mainly in the form of backward and 
forward linkages (Hirschman 1958). However, the linkages found can also be classified into 
local, national, and international linkages. Linkages are important to understand as they attract 
monetary inflows and influence the circulation of wealth within regions.  
 
9.3.2.1 Local linkages 
 
This study found that 81.9% of the participants have business linkages with firms in Bulawayo. 
The types of linkages reported by the participants are shown in Table 9.2. 
 
Table 9.2 Types of local linkages 
 Responses28 
Percent of Cases N Percent 
Linkages with 
firms in Bulawayo 
We purchase goods and services 221 30.2% 56.4% 
We are suppliers of goods and services 208 28.4% 53.1% 
Outsourcing (they hire us)  61 8.3% 15.6% 
Outsourcing (we hire them) 59 8.1% 15.1% 
We share the same production infrastructure 
(roads, railways, power grids, etc.) 
47 6.4% 12.0% 
Sharing knowledge and technology transfers 40 5.5% 10.2% 
We borrow business finance from them 17 2.3% 4.3% 
We provide business capital to them 4 0.5% 1.0% 
N/A 75 10.2% 19.1% 
Total 732 100.0% 186.7% 
                                                 
28 Tables of this format in this chapter capture multi-responses from 392 participants. Accordingly, ‘N’ represents 
the number of responses given by the participants, the ‘percent’ column represents percentages of responses, and the 




A total of 56.4% of the participants purchase goods and services from other firms in the 
metropolis while 53.1% sell their products to local firms. These findings are consistent with 
Hirschman’s (1958) backward and forward linkages. Other types of business linkages that exist 
in Bulawayo are in the form of outsourcing, with 15.6% of the participants being hired by other 
local firms. In contrast, 15.1% of the participants hire other local firms for tasks they cannot 
perform internally. These linkages are important in explaining how participants rated the 
competitiveness of their goods and services against imports. A chi-square test conducted at 5% 
significance level showed that there is significant evidence of an association between local 
linkages and competitiveness of goods and services. The test produced a p value of 0.040 as 
shown in Table 9.3. 
 
Table 9.3 Chi-square test – local linkages vs. competitiveness of goods 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 10.053a 4 0.040 
Likelihood Ratio 10.447 4 0.034 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.242 1 0.622 
N of Valid Cases 392   
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 0.54. 
 
The result shows that firms with local linkages have a better chance of producing competitive 
goods and services as compared to those without linkages. However, the Cramer’s V test 
conducted together with the chi-square test produced a coefficient value of 0.16. This coefficient 
indicates a weak association.  
 
9.3.2.2 National linkages 
 
Firms in Bulawayo that have linkages with firms in other Zimbabwean regions constitute 60.2%. 
The types of linkages are shown in Table 9.4. The majority of the participants (44.6%) supply 




purchase goods and services from firms outside Bulawayo. Only 11.2% of the participants share 
knowledge and technology with firms in other Zimbabwean regions. 
 
Table 9.4 Types of national linkages 
 Responses 
Percent of Cases N Percent 
Business linkages 
with firms outside 
Bulawayo 
We are suppliers of goods and services 175 27.6% 44.6% 
We purchase goods and services 139 22.0% 35.5% 
Sharing knowledge and technology transfers 44 7.0% 11.2% 
We share the same production infrastructure 
(roads, railways, power grids, etc.) 
41 6.5% 10.5% 
Outsourcing (we hire them) 31 4.9% 7.9% 
Outsourcing (they hire us)  29 4.6% 7.4% 
We borrow business finance from them 15 2.4% 3.8% 
We provide business capital to them 5 0.8% 1.3% 
N/A 154 24.3% 39.3% 
Total 633 100.0% 161.5% 
 
A chi-square test conducted at 5% significance level showed that there is evidence of an 
association between national linkages and the way participants rated the competitiveness of their 
goods and services. The test produced a p value of 0.00029 as shown in Table 9.5.  
 





Pearson Chi-square 24.227a 4 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio 25.678 4 0.000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.157 1 0.023 
N of Valid Cases 392   
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.19. 
 
                                                 




The strength of the association measured by Cramer’s V test produced a value of 0.249. This 
represents a moderate association. Generally the study revealed that the association between 
local linkages and competitiveness of goods produced in Bulawayo is weaker (as evidenced by a 
Cramer’s V coefficient of 0.16) than that involving linkages at a national level (0.249). 
 
A Fischer’s exact test was conducted to determine whether there is a relationship between 
participants’ export/import relationships and national linkages. The test produced a p value of 
0.000 [Exact Sig (2-sided)] as shown in Table 9.6 
 











Pearson Chi-square 40.178a 3 0.000 0.000   
Likelihood Ratio 43.237 3 0.000 0.000   
Fisher's Exact Test 41.416   0.000   
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
37.219b 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N of Valid Cases 392      
a. 3 cells (37.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.18. 
b. The standardised statistic is -6.101. 
 
Accordingly the test showed that there is significant evidence at 5% of a relation between 
participants’ export/import relationships and their national linkages. The Cramer’s V test 
produced a value of 0.32, depicting a moderate association.  Generally the study showed that 
firms with national linkages have more exports than imports compared to those without linkages 
at a national level. 
 
9.3.2.3 International linkages 
 
International linkages are those involving firms in Bulawayo and those operating outside 
Zimbabwe. It emerged from the study that only 35.2% of the participants have business linkages 




participants (29.1%) purchasing goods and services outside Zimbabwe is higher compared to 
those supplying the same outside the country (11.5%).  According to the economic base theory, 
these findings imply that firms in Bulawayo are more importers than exporters. This has negative 
implications for the monetary inflows of the metropolis. 
 
Table 9.7 Types of international linkages 
 Responses 
Percent of Cases N Percent 
Business linkages 
with firms outside 
Zimbabwe 
We purchase goods and services 114 23.6% 29.1% 
We are suppliers of goods and services 45 9.3% 11.5% 
Sharing knowledge and technology transfers 29 6.0% 7.4% 
Outsourcing (we hire them) 17 3.5% 4.3% 
Outsourcing (they hire us)  8 1.7% 2.0% 
We borrow business finance from them 8 1.7% 2.0% 
We share the same production infrastructure 
(roads, railways, power grids, etc.) 
8 1.7% 2.0% 
We provide business capital to them 1 0.2% 0.3% 
N/A 254 52.5% 64.8% 
Total 484 100.0% 123.5% 
 
The metropolis is using more foreign currency on international trade compared to earnings.30 As 
such the metropolis’ exports need to improve for the economy to become resilient. 
 
International linkages improve the competitiveness of local goods and services against imports. 
A chi-square analysis conducted at 5% significance level produced a p value of 0.000 as shown 
in Table 9.8. Accordingly, there is significant evidence of an association between international 
linkages and how participants rated the competitiveness of their goods and services against 
imports. The strength of the association is moderate as evidenced by a Cramer’s V coefficient of 
0.257. In general international linkages have a relatively stronger (0.257) association with 
competitiveness of goods and services against imports. This is followed by the association 
                                                 
30 This argument is made, holding other factors constant. The real picture is only depicted if values of both exports 




involving national linkages (0.249) and local linkages (0.16), respectively. The trend displayed 
by the Cramer’s V tests shows the importance of linkages in determining competitiveness of 
goods and services. Linkages that attract monetary inflows into the region are important for 
economic growth and development. 
 
Table 9.8 Chi-square test – international linkages vs. competitiveness of goods 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 25.803a 4 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio 25.537 4 0.000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.359 1 0.002 
N of Valid Cases 392   
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.06. 
 
Likewise, the utility of the local linkages cannot be overlooked. These linkages promote the 
circulation of export earnings into the region. The same analysis can also be applied to the 
participants’ export/import relationships. A Fisher’s exact test conducted at 5% significance level 
produced a p value of 0.000 [Exact Sig. (2-sided)] as shown in Table 9.9.  
 











Pearson Chi-square 84.977a 3 0.000 0.000   
Likelihood Ratio 84.627 3 0.000 0.000   
Fisher's Exact Test 84.120   0.000   
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
80.850b 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N of Valid Cases 392      
a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.82. 
b. The standardised statistic is -8.992. 
 
The test showed that there is an association between international linkages and participants’ level 
of exports. The association is relatively strong as determined by a Cramer’s V coefficient of 




between firms’ exports and imports. Firms with international linkages have more exports than 
imports compared to those without international linkages.  
 
The different types and levels of linkages presented in the foregoing paragraphs can be a useful 
strategy option for economic resilience in Bulawayo. Linkages between formal and informal 
firms have an opportunity to unlock dead capital in the informal sector. This sector mainly 
constitutes industries producing goods and services that are only consumed within the region and 
not for export (Stimson, Stough & Roberts 2006). The linkages between foreign- and locally-
owned firms and, public and private firms, also have a positive influence on a region’s economic 
growth. Besides creating jobs for the rural workforce, foreign-owned export-oriented firms in 
Malaysia fostered the development of locally-owned enterprises through backward and forward 
linkages (Tan 2014). Apart from that, a mutually beneficial relationship between the public and 
private sectors in Malaysia supported growth and development of the latter (Tan 2014). The 
private sector benefitted from public investments in roads, ports, and energy infrastructure (Tan 
2014).  
 
9.3.2.4 Industrial cluster strategy 
 
Another strategy option for economic resilience lies in promoting cluster development in 
Bulawayo. Efforts to initiate industrial clusters are already underway through government 
programmes. One of the cluster initiatives is the Bulawayo Leather Cluster (BLC). Areas 
surrounding Bulawayo specialise in cattle and game ranching, thus there is a reliable source of 
hides. One of the participants indicated that the market for footwear is available in and out of 
Zimbabwe. The COMESA (as a partner of BLC) facilitates the distribution of leather products in 
the region. The European Union (EU) has also expressed interest in BLC products through a 
programme that supports sustainable economies and employment creation in countries in the 
South. Accordingly, one of the participants indicated that the EU donated 250 000 Euros worth 





Institutions providing skills and knowledge in the cluster are already available. The Leather 
Institute of Zimbabwe has been re-launched after its recapitalisation in 2018. The Leather 
institute, together with the Africa Leather & Leather Products Institute (ALLPI) can provide the 
research and skills needs of the cluster. The main gap that was found was on the availability and 
production of chemicals used to treat and process the hides. These chemicals are mainly 
imported. As such the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) can help bridge 
the gap. Other important institutions that are also available in the metropolis include the 
Esigodini Agricultural College that offers courses in animal husbandry. This institution supports 
the research and production of skills required in cattle breeding. The leather industry used to be 
one of the biggest sectors in BMP. As such it remains a strategy option for economic 
revitalisation and resilience. 
 
9.3.2.5 Industrial districts expansion and re-orientation  
 
Industrial districts are also common in Bulawayo. These districts are dominated by micro and 
small enterprises. The clustering of these firms can be explained by both internal and external 
agglomeration economies (Hoover 1937; Isard 1956; Parr 2002a; 2002b) though urbanisation 
economies were found to be a dominant force. The agglomeration is similar to the one described 
by Marshal (1920), who observed that textile industries were mainly concentrated in the same 
areas with mining and engineering industries. Almost the same pattern characterises Bulawayo. 
The pattern of the industrial districts in Bulawayo also resembles Markusen’s (1996) satellite 
platforms though the metropolis is not a lagging region according to the ranking of cities in 
Zimbabwe. Some small firms were found to be branches that are controlled by corporate 
headquarters outside Bulawayo. As a strategy option for economic resilience, there is a need to 
support the growth of MSMEs into large enterprises. As indicated by the Zimbabwe National 
Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), this can be achieved through identifying MSMEs with potential 
for growth from each sector in Bulawayo. These MSMEs should then be given tax holidays or 
preferential tax brackets by the government in order to encourage growth. Long-term capital 




ensure the performance and adherence to stipulated terms, these MSMEs should be monitored 
strictly. 
 
Supporting small engineering31 firms that are solely focused on export production can be a 
crucial strategy in Bulawayo. The ZNCC observed that some Chinese companies investing in 
Zimbabwe are MSMEs and not big conglomerates. With adequate support, MSMEs in Bulawayo 
can significantly contribute to the monetary inflows through exports and investments outside the 
country. These findings are consistent with existing literature. In the post-World War II era, 
Japan had a considerable number of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Kimura 2009). 
These firms received a great deal of support from government in the form of financial, 
technological, and tax concessions (Kimura 2009). The growth of SMEs in Japan led to 
subcontracting linkages with large firms. Consequently, the SMEs improved technologically and 
in terms of their access to export markets. Likewise, MSMEs in Bulawayo can grow the 
economy if given government support. 
 
9.3.3 Improving city’s attractiveness  
 
Improving a region’s attractiveness to capital and labour is an important variable of regional 
growth and development. As explained by Myrdal’s (1957) circular cumulative causation theory, 
regions that are able to attract capital, labour, and enterprises, experience economic growth as 
compared to the regions losing capital, labour, and enterprises. Improving the attractiveness of 
Bulawayo is a possible strategy for economic revitalisation and resilience.   
 
Currently, the level of investment in Bulawayo is generally low. The metropolis has been 
experiencing out-migration of investors and skilled labour to other cities in Zimbabwe and 
countries in Southern Africa. The migration taking place can be explained through the lens of the 
world systems theory by Wallerstein (1974) and also Krugman’s (1991) new economic 
                                                 
31 The mining and engineering sector is ranked as the most important in Bulawayo. The ranking was done by BMM 




geography. South Africa exhibits characteristics of a semi-periphery whilst Zimbabwe is a 
periphery. Metropolitan cities in South Africa have been able to attract capital, skilled labour, 
and enterprises from BMP. Bulawayo has lost mainly manufacturing labour which, according to 
Krugman (1991) is completely mobile compared to immobile agricultural labour. Semi-
peripheries offer better business and employment opportunities than peripheries. As such, 
economic opportunities in South Africa have acted as magnets to enterprises and skilled labour 
from BMP. Alternatively, the process can also be explained by Myrdal’s (1957) backwash 
effects, viewed as a capital and labour flight towards the growing region (Dawkins 2003; Hall & 
Ludwig 2009). Growth experienced in South Africa has partly resulted in negative growth effects 
in Zimbabwean cities and towns (Myrdal 1957). In order to turn this trend around, a strong 
marketing strategy is required in Bulawayo.  
 
At the metropolis level, Bulawayo Metropolitan Municipality (BMM) has implemented a 
number of initiatives meant to improve the city’s attractiveness. In terms of city planning and 
local economic development, BMM has mainly produced ‘marketable’ statutory plans. BMM 
indicated that the Waste Water Master Plan has helped the city attract a huge investment in the 
form of a US$36 million grant from the African Development Bank. In addition, Egodini, 
Makokoba, and Ascot redevelopment plans have attracted huge infrastructural investments to the 
city. New infrastructural developments currently underway are expected to revive the image of 
the city. An example is a multi-million-dollar Egodini Mall project. On completion the mall will 
have approximately 50 state-of-the-art shops, a modern bus terminal, and working space for 
informal traders. BMM’s public transport policy has also attracted the attention of Australians 
who are currently working on a project to develop trackless trains in the metropolis. Linked to 
this are promotional materials that are utilised by BMM to market the metropolis’ natural 
endowments and investment opportunities. Examples of promotional pamphlets are shown in 
Appendix E. 
 
The marketing initiatives by BMM are partly in tandem with the expectations of the participants, 




reducing the level of rates and taxes paid by industries (49%) and developing modern industrial 
parks for export production (32.1%). 
 
Table 9.10 Possible strategies by BMM for industry revival 
 Responses 
Percent of Cases N Percent 
Action by BMM 
that can help 
revive industries 
Lower the level of rates and taxes paid by industries 192 26.2% 49.0% 
Developing modern industrial parks meant for 
export production 
126 17.2% 32.1% 
Provide adequate and strategic work space for 
formal and informal industries  
125 17.0% 31.9% 
Overall upgrade of urban infrastructure that support 
business growth 
125 17.0% 31.9% 
Effective and efficient management of urban 
systems, e.g. transport networks 
80 10.9% 20.4% 
Improve the provision of municipal services such as 
water, etc. 
68 9.3% 17.3% 
None  18 2.5% 4.6% 
Total 734 100.0% 187.2% 
 
Instead of relying on government tax incentives only, participants indicated that BMM should 
offer rates discounts to struggling firms to keep them operational. Apart from reducing rates paid 
by declining industries, participants also advocated the development of modern industrial parks 
meant for export production. This strategy is in tandem with the government initiative of special 
economic zones (SEZs). Once operational, SEZs are expected to attract a significant level of 
local and foreign investments. 
 
9.3.4 Infrastructural development strategy 
 
Infrastructural development is one of the central strategies that can boost economic growth in 
Bulawayo. Vacant industrial buildings are some of the infrastructure that is readily available as 
well as a network of railways, roads, and air transport that link the metropolis to countries such 




incentive to investors who want to produce goods for export as the location of the metropolis 
facilitates easy access to regional markets, especially that of Botswana and South Africa. It must 
be noted, however, that the available industrial infrastructure needs to be refurbished and 
modernised.  
 
Infrastructural development can also help boost the special economic zones (SEZs) initiative 
being implemented in Bulawayo. The designated sites are Belmont, Donnington, and Umvumela. 
While the first two are built-up industrial areas, the third one is yet to be serviced. As noted by 
BMM, the challenge remains the provision of adequate infrastructure in these SEZs especially in 
Umvumela. Furthermore, BMM indicated that the other designated areas have the necessary 
industrial infrastructure. What is mainly needed is to make changes to the available infrastructure 
in order to suit the investors’ expectations. Accordingly, 58.2% of the participants expressed 
optimism on the possibility of SEZs benefitting them, as compared to 41.8%, who did not 
anticipate any benefits.  
 
A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) has been formed to oversee the development of SEZs in 
Bulawayo. Enablers such as the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) and the 
National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) have been roped in. These findings are in line with 
Hirschman’s (1958) theory of unbalanced growth. Economic development is to a greater extent 
influenced by the availability of social overhead capital (SOC) (Hirschman 1958). As an 
example, Hirschman (1958) observed that investments in energy and transport infrastructure 
have a positive effect on economic growth and development. Accordingly, investments in water 
and electricity infrastructure in Bulawayo can improve the metropolis’ economic resilience. 
Current transport facilities do however need renovation and upgrading. 
 
The study findings in Bulawayo are also supported by Ndulu et al. (2007), who found that Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) has weak social overhead investments. Poor infrastructure has caused 
delays in new energy connections and prolonged periods of power outages (Ndulu et al. 2007). 
These delays and outages reduce productivity and increase the cost of doing business in SSA. 




regions (Ndulu et al. 2007). Furthermore, widespread state monopolies in energy provision in 
African countries have created inefficiencies that affect the operation of private capital (Ndulu et 
al. 2007). Accordingly, social overhead investments should be at the centre of economic 
revitalisation in Bulawayo.  
 
9.3.5 Favourable regional policy  
 
Regional policy is an important variable for regional economic resilience. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, evidenced-based policymaking has an opportunity to address ‘real’ policy 
problems in Zimbabwe. This study found a dire need to promote research and development in 
Zimbabwe in general and Bulawayo specifically. The dearth of quality data has to some extent 
affected the quality of policies implemented in the country. Zimbabwe has not collected gross 
domestic product (GDP) data on a provincial or city level. Such data is only found at a national 
level. While employment data is available at provincial and city levels, the data has not been 
classified into industrial sectors. That classification is only done at a national level. These data 
deficiencies have a negative effect on regional economic planning. It is thus suggested that 
research and development should be prioritised especially at provincial and city levels. This 
enhances city-based or province-based economic analyses that in turn inform strategic 
interventions. 
 
One of the most important policy shifts required in Zimbabwe is the protection of priority 
industries. These are industries of national or regional importance. Commenting on this issue, 
ZNCC (2019, Pers com) stated that, “while some countries protect their key companies, in 
Zimbabwe ours are no more. Investors who came in and bought some of the remaining ones, 
paid very little. This is a lost opportunity for the country.” In Bulawayo, such companies include 
National Blankets, National Railways of Zimbabwe, Merlin and United Refineries. The 
protection of priority industries has been implemented in some countries in the South. According 
to Lin (2013) governments should protect priority industries through measures such as subsidies, 




economic power. In China, industrial protection helped priority industries to remain operational 
and to avoid their collapse (Lin 2013). In the long run, these priority industries regained viability 
and competitiveness (Lin 2013).  
 
A clear separation of national and regional policymaking can positively influence economic 
revitalisation and resilience in Bulawayo. Bureaucracy and centralisation of decision-making is 
not desirable for regional economic resilience thus, this separation should be addressed. This is 
consistent with the findings of Kakderi & Tasopoulou (2017). The reliance on national policies 
to achieve regional economic resilience is problematic because in many instances national 
policies are not sensitive to regional differences (Kakderi & Tasopoulou 2017). This is supported 
by Simmie (2014: 115) who noted that, “regionally specific innovation policies are required in 
order to generate locally relevant configurations of actors, institutions, knowledge, skills, 
learning, and networks that constitute a successfully functioning Regional Innovation System.” 
For Zimbabwe, clear separation of national and regional policies can be helpful for provinces 
and metropolitan cities though, complementarities should be guaranteed. This gives provinces an 
opportunity to create policies that are specific to their unique developmental needs with their 
efforts complemented by national policies. 
 
9.3.6 Regional patriotism 
 
One of the key determinants of regional economic resilience was found to be regional patriotism. 
In this study the term ‘regional patriotism’ is used to mean one’s dedication and devotion to the 
wellbeing (economic, social, and environmental) of an area, whether it is a province, city, or 
town. The patriotism in this instance applies to all the inhabitants of an area in their different 
capacities. Such capacities may include business people, skilled labour, political actors, and 
consumers of goods and services. It emerged from the study that rejuvenated regional patriotism 
can be a strategy to revitalise the economy of Bulawayo. Commenting on national and regional 





Our economy should be driven by the indigenous people as is the case of 
economically advanced countries such as USA, Britain, etc. It is not good for our 
economy to be dominated by foreigners. Our mentality is biased towards seeking 
foreigners who invest and run the economy for us while our own millionaires and 
billionaires are either investing or hiding money in different parts of the world.  
 
Two important issues can be discerned from the comment by ZNCC. Firstly, the proportion of 
foreign versus indigenous investors in an economy should be balanced. This mix guards against 
possible economic sabotages especially by foreign investors. However, this argument is posed 
holding constant the fact that capital follows favourable locations. Investors place their capital in 
areas that are likely to give them high returns. The second issue pertains to lack of regional 
patriotism.  
 
Regional patriotism entails having dedicated business people that hail from Bulawayo who are 
dedicated to invest in the growth and development of the metropolis. Likewise, politicians, 
skilled workforce, and consumers should also be dedicated to support initiatives meant to 
revitalise the economy. ZNCC (2019, Pers com) noted that, “there is need to revisit our mind 
power as Zimbabweans. We need to revisit how we see things, how we digest them and come up 
with solutions to address our contemporary challenges.” Linked to the strategy of regional 
patriotism is the use of public and private savings in the growth and development of Bulawayo. 
Instead of indigenous people ‘hiding’ their wealth in different parts of the world as alleged by 
ZNCC, the money can be invested in developmental projects in the metropolis. This strategy 
proved functional in countries in Asia. In China high rates of savings by households and private 
firms resulted in an increased rate of investments (Lin 2013). Apart from that, Hill (2013) noted 
that the existence of a group of reformers referred to as the ‘technocrats’ was behind the success 
of the economic reforms in Indonesia. While the reforms undertaken were driven by necessity 
instead of political gimmicks (Hill 2013), the ‘technocrats’ were passionate about achieving 
economic growth and development. Thus, re-invigorated regional patriotism can be a strategy 







Regional economic resilience strategies vary from one region to the other as shocks have 
different effects on regional economies. In Bulawayo, the diversification of the economic base 
and the leveraging of business linkages are important strategies for economic revitalisation and 
resilience. However, these strategies need to be buttressed by social overhead investments and 
favourable regional policies. In as much as vacant industrial space is available in the metropolis, 
refurbishments are required in tandem with modern industrial space requirements. The likelihood 
of yesteryear industries re-opening is slim, hence forward planning, with the fourth industrial 
revolution in mind, might provide opportunities to turn the economy around. Finally, national 
and regional patriotism among the economic, political, and social actors was found to be an 
important factor for economic resilience in Bulawayo. Turning around the economy and 
enhancing its resilience ought to be driven by dedicated and devoted patriots yearning for a 
better Bulawayo. However, this is dependent upon government regaining and earning the trust of 

















CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS – RECONCEPTUALISING REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC RESILIENCE 
 
The concept of regional (economic) resilience is a promising and attractive 
approach for some researchers; however, it still remains an alternative and fuzzy 
framework … . Notwithstanding this, there is an increasing need to explore and 
discuss the concept of regional (economic) resilience, especially in periods of 




This chapter gives an overall conclusion of the study. The objectives addressed in this study were 
to evaluate the effects of industrial decline on the economy of Bulawayo Metropolitan Province, 
assess the resilient strategies employed by industrialists in Bulawayo to overcome their 
operational challenges, examine how economic and industrial policies in Zimbabwe should be 
formulated in order to promote economic resilience of metropolitan regions in the country, 
explore how the economy of Bulawayo can be revitalised in order to attract meaningful 
investment, and enhance economic resilience in the metropolis, and redefine the concept of 
economic resilience in the light of the African economic development setting, whilst highlighting 
how it is similar or dissimilar to its conceptualisation in other parts of the world. The chapter is 
concluded with a proposed model for analysing economic resilience in Zimbabwean 
metropolises. This proposed model can also be applicable to other countries in the South. 
 
10.2 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
 
This summary is organised under the following subheadings; the effects of industrial decline on 
the economy of Bulawayo Metropolitan Province (BMP), the operational challenges and 




strategy options for economic resilience in BMP. These subheadings present an overall 
perception of the study findings.  
 
10.2.1 Effects of industrial decline on the economy of Bulawayo 
 
The factors behind industrial decline in Bulawayo are many and varied. Key factors include 
capital flight, worn out and aging industrial machinery, shortage of finance and financing 
mechanisms, high production costs, and market shrinkages. In addition liquidity problems and 
capital constraints are also some of the challenges facing industrialists in Zimbabwe. Capital 
flight in Zimbabwe was mostly caused by policy inconsistencies and reversals by central 
government. These inconsistencies further frustrated the efforts of local firms to stay afloat. 
These uncertain circumstances also made business forecasting and prediction very difficult. As a 
result investors migrated from BMP in search of locations where conditions are favourable for 
production (Geyer 2006). Regardless of how industrial decline set in, the outcomes thereof 
affected the economy of BMP in different ways. 
 
10.2.1.1 The structure of the industry in Bulawayo 
 
The nature and form of industry in Bulawayo has significantly changed since the country 
attained independence in 1980 (Ndlovu 1994; Zaaijer 1998; Mbiba & Ndubiwa 2006; Mlambo & 
Phimister 2006; Parliament of Zimbabwe 2011; Mbira 2015). The abandoned and dilapidating 
industrial infrastructure lying idol in some parts of its industrial areas confirms that Bulawayo 
used to be the industrial capital of Zimbabwe. In fact, the majority of large industries in 
Zimbabwe were traditionally located in Bulawayo, resulting in the city being named ‘Manchester 
of Rhodesia’. While some of these industries, for example, Radar Metal and the Treger Group, 
are still operational, others such as Hunyani Holdings, Hubert Davies, and National Blankets 
Limited have closed down. As a result, the metropolis is now dominated by micro, small, and 
medium enterprises (MSMEs) mainly owned by indigenous Zimbabweans. These MSMEs 




enterprises. Consistent with Desoto (2001a; 2001b) and Ndulu et al. (2007), the bulk of capital in 
Bulawayo is currently trapped in the informal sector. This scenario is explained by the concept of 
path dependence, especially the ‘lock-in’ effect (Page 2006; Simmie & Martin 2010). BMP’s 
economy has been ‘restricted’ to a declining economic development path due to the effects of 
successive economic recessions, since 1980 (see Chapters 4 and 6), that negatively affected its 
industrial growth and development. As such, the ‘lock-in’ development trajectory in this case, is 
a negative trait affecting the adaptability of the regional economy to various shocks (Simmie & 
Martin 2010). 
 
10.2.1.2 The city’s export levels 
 
Following the protracted industrial decline, the majority of firms in Bulawayo are non-basic in 
nature and sell the bulk of their goods and services locally. While 76% of the participants are 
non-exporters, only 22% of the participants export 1-40% of their products. Furthermore, a 
combined 2% of participants export 41-100% of their goods and services. Apart from the 
declining export levels, industrial decline has also affected the city’s economic base with basic 
industries downsizing, relocating, or shutting down completely (Mlambo 2017; RBZ 2018). 
These findings also epitomise what has been taking place in Zimbabwe’s economy as a whole.  
 
10.2.1.3 Employment levels in Bulawayo 
 
Industrial decline in Bulawayo has generally caused an increase in unemployment levels. This 
study found that between 2009 and 2018, 40.9% of the participants experienced an increase in 
employment, 34% of the participants experienced a decline, and 22.6% maintained their 
employment levels. These findings are comparable to those of Mbira (2015) despite the fact that 
he only focused on manufacturing industries. However, the general trend shows that industrial 
decline in Bulawayo affected employment levels in the manufacturing sector more than in the 





10.2.1.4 The city’s attractiveness  
 
Industrial decline has triggered out-migration of firms from BMP, causing the number of 
industries operating in BMP to dwindle. Currently, the metropolis is failing to attract and retain 
industries with high and sustainable growth levels. Consistent with Birkinshaw et al. (2006) the 
need to remain competitive has pushed firms to migrate to other cities and countries. This is 
corroborated by Gambe (2019) who found that firms do not want to establish, or continually 
operate in a city that negatively affects their competitiveness. 
 
10.2.2 The operational challenges and resilience strategies of firms 
 
Firms in Bulawayo are facing numerous challenges that interrupt their operations. The most 
common challenges include their inability to access cash needed in daily operations (68.9%), 
erratic power supplies (54.3%), and their inability to import inputs (50.5%). In spite of these 
challenges, capacity utilisation and employment levels showed that small firms in Bulawayo are 
more resilient than medium-sized and large firms. The firms’ capacity utilisation and 
employment trends managed to fit into the different categories of resilience (Simmie & Martin 
2010; Martin 2012; Simmie 2014; Han & Goetz 2015). While the majority of the firms showed 
resistance, others showed recovery and reconfiguration (Martin 2012). Common firm resilience 
strategies in Bulawayo are the diversification of products and services (49%), expansion of the 
market base (47.4%), using a US dollar-based pricing system to avoid losses through currency 
reforms (45.9%), and the adoption of new technology in the production of goods and services 
(33.4%). 
 
10.2.2.1 Diversification of products and services  
 
Firms in Bulawayo have resorted to the production of a diversity of goods and services. The 
participants indicated that the failure of one product and/or service on the market does not 




diversification is a widely used strategy at firm, regional, and national levels that stimulates 
economic growth. In other Global South countries such as Thailand, diversification has led to 
positive economic growth where foreign earnings are not only obtained from industrial 
operations, but also from agriculture and tourism (Burton 1989). 
 
10.2.2.2 Broad customer base and loyalty 
 
The size of the firm’s market share is also an important determinant of firm resilience in 
Bulawayo. This study found that the second most important firm resilience strategy in Bulawayo 
is the firm’s ability to maintain a broad customer base. This strategy is affected by the size of the 
city’s population, the quality, and pricing of the firm’s goods and services. However, some firms 
were able to command a huge market, even outside the Bulawayo metropolis. Firms with high 
quality and durable products that are correctly priced have managed to command a broad 
customer base within and outside Bulawayo. Producers of these products have managed to 
penetrate the Southern African market. It can thus be stated that the expansion of a firm’s local, 
regional, and global market share is a strategy option for firm resilience.   
 
10.2.2.3 USD based pricing system strategy  
 
Charging goods and services in US dollars has been, for some time, illegal in Zimbabwe. An 
exception was made with regards to the tourism sector that deals with both local and foreign 
clients. However, most firms have continued to charge their goods and services according to a 
USD-based pricing system.  As a result, Zimbabwean dollar prices change almost on a daily 
basis as firms seek to protect themselves from losses caused by fluctuating exchange rates. The 
insistency on charging goods and services in US dollars is widespread especially amongst firms 
importing raw materials. For these firms to remain operational, these firms need a guaranteed 





10.2.2.4 Adoption of new technology  
 
Adoption of new technology and new ways of producing goods and services has kept 33.4% of 
the participants operational. The quality of their goods and services has improved compared to 
those of their local counterparts. Out of 33.4% of the participants who adopted new technology, 
83.6% of them are private companies, 10.7% are public companies, and only 3.1% represent 
mixed ownership (i.e. partnership of private and public ownership). The Marxist’s approach to 
development regards technology as a key determinant of economic growth (Parthasarathy 1994). 
For economic resilience firms in Bulawayo need to import and adapt technology to serve their 
needs. These firms can also facilitate technological transfers through different types of linkages. 
A case in point is the way Japan managed to successfully integrate informal and formal 
production technology (Ito & Weinstein 1996; Kimura 2009; Jhingan 2011) that resulted in a 
reduction of their production costs and creation of beneficial synergies between formal and 
informal industries. 
 
10.2.3 Policymaking for regional economic resilience 
  
More than half (50.5%) of the participants in this study rated government policy interventions as 
poor while 23.3% rated the interventions as very poor. In contrast, those who rated the policies 
as good constitute 24.4% and as excellent a slim 1.5%. The policy with the most negative effects 
to the operation of the participants is the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP). These 
negative effects include reduced production indicated by 24.5% of participants, followed by 
increased operation costs (23%), scarcity of foreign currency (22.7%), scarcity of business 
finance (21.4%), and shrinking market opportunities (20.4%). Accordingly, the strategies 
indicated by participants to improve policymaking include avoiding politicisation of policies 
(61.8%), research-based policymaking (42.1%), policymaking guaranteeing availability of 





10.2.3.1 Avoiding politicisation of policies 
  
Approximately 62% of the participants indicated that policymaking can improve their operations 
if ‘national interests’ are pursued rather than individual interests. Conflicted interests in agenda 
setting and policy formulation are prevalent among politicians who are also business people. 
This study found that ‘double players’ (i.e. politicians who are also entrepreneurs) sometimes use 
policies to protect their business interests. Accordingly, to revitalise the economy, a strategy 
option is required in terms whereof policymaking would address the ‘public interest’ 
(Klosterman 1980). The ‘public interest’ would then be served if both collective and individual 
benefits of policy outcomes outweigh their common and particular demerits (Klosterman 1980).  
 
10.2.3.2 Evidence-based policymaking 
 
Policies in Zimbabwe can improve business growth and development if based on adequate 
research. According to the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) the real problem 
that hinders industrial growth is a gap in the research concerning machinery that are used, 
machinery that are required, and the strategies that are effective in achieving the required 
machinery and reviving the industrial sector. ZNCC alleges that these are issues little is known 
about. In spite of researchers having been occupied with studies to address these issues, funding 
has remained the biggest challenge. Lack of adequate policy research has affected problem 
definition and structuring in Zimbabwe. As such, some policies do not address the ‘real’ 
problems, but their symptoms. The ‘real’ problems have remained ‘hidden’, waiting to be 
discovered.  
 
10.2.3.3 Policy should guarantee availability of business finance   
 
Acute shortage of finance is one of the challenges faced by firms in Bulawayo. Thus, 27.6% of 
the participants indicated that government policy interventions should guarantee the availability 




Industrial Development Fund which was announced in the 2019-budget statement. A sum of 
US$30 million seed money was given to the Industrial Development Corporation of Zimbabwe 
(IDCZ) as venture capital to projects of national importance. However, high collateral 
requirements remain one of the factors that hinder most firms from benefitting from this loan 
facility.  
 
10.2.3.4 Industrial protectionism policies  
 
Industries in Bulawayo need to be protected from cheap imports. The level of industrial 
protection provided for in current policies is considered inadequate and is affected by 
inconsistencies and reversals. Consequently, 80.1% of the participants indicated that firms in 
Bulawayo require protection from cheap imports if the city is to regain its former glory as the 
industrial hub of Zimbabwe. Protection of industries in their infancy was adopted as a resilience 
strategy in Japan. However, the firms were exposed to full competition as soon as they became 
exporters and competitive on the global market (Ito & Weinstein 1996). Some form of protection 
of industries in their infancy is therefore a common strategy and should be considered for firms 
operating in economically depressed regions such as Bulawayo.  
 
10.2.4 Economic revitalisation and resilience in BMP  
 
Utilising three different sensitivity indices by Martin (2012), Lagravinese (2015), and Faggian et 
al. (2017), this study found that Bulawayo’s economy has low resistance to economic recession 
as compared to the national economy. The economy showed some recovery between 2015 and 
2016 although this was short-lived, with further decline that immediately set in thereafter. 
Factors important for economic resilience in Bulawayo are the level of diversification in the 
region’s economic structure, linkage types and levels, regional attractiveness, and social 





10.2.4.1 Diversification of the economic base 
 
The economic base of Bulawayo is dominated by the manufacturing sector, followed by tourism, 
agriculture, and mining, respectively. While the economic base is diversified, the dominance of 
the manufacturing sector makes the economy vulnerable. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, the 
economy was devastated when industrial decline became rife. There is a need to grow export 
earnings from the other three sectors for the economy to become more balanced. However, 
improvement of technology and innovation as a precursor to strengthening and further 
diversifying the economic base is important. This strategy was vital in the success of 
industrialisation in China where the share of manufactured goods in exports grew from 75% in 
1979 to more than 95% in 2009 (Lin 2013).  
 
10.2.4.2 Business linkages for economic growth and development 
 
The types of firm relationships found in Bulawayo are mainly in the form of backward and 
forward linkages (Hirschman 1958) at local, national, and international levels. Improving these 
linkages was found to be a useful strategy option for economic resilience in Bulawayo. Linkages 
between formal and informal firms have an opportunity to unlock dead capital in the informal 
sector. Assets trapped in the informal sector cannot be used as collateral against a bank loan or 
any other payments (De Soto 2001a). As a result, assets do produce abundant wealth in countries 
in the North but very little in the South (De Soto 2001b). Other strategy options that can be 
adopted in Bulawayo are cluster development, and improvement of existing industrial districts. 
Efforts are underway to revive the Bulawayo Leather Cluster, which has already partnered with 
COMESA and has received financial assistance from the European Union.  
 
10.2.4.3 Improving city’s attractiveness  
 
Improving a region’s attractiveness to capital and labour is an important variable of regional 




experience economic growth (Myrdal 1957).  The attractiveness of Bulawayo needs to improve 
as the metropolis has been experiencing out-migration of investors and skilled labour to other 
cities in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa. Metropolitan cities in South Africa (as a semi-
periphery) have been able to attract capital, skilled labour and enterprises from Bulawayo. 
Accordingly, the resultant economic downturn can be addressed by improving the attractiveness 
of Bulawayo.  
 
10.2.4.4 Infrastructural development strategy 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa has weaker social overhead investments that resulted in an increase of  
power, transport, and communication costs to levels higher than those of other regions (Ndulu et 
al. 2007). This is evident in Bulawayo where the infrastructure available is in the form of 
dilapidating industrial buildings, and rail-, road- and air transport networks linking the 
metropolis to countries such as South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Zambia. State monopoly 
in energy provision in Zimbabwe has created inefficiencies that have affected the operation of 
industries in Bulawayo. Prolonged power outages have affected production costs and output. 
Thus, social overhead investments (Hirschman 1958) should be at the centre of economic 
revitalisation in Bulawayo.  
 
10.2.4.5 Favourable regional policy  
 
One of the most important policy shifts required in Zimbabwe is the protection of key industries. 
These are industries of national or regional importance. In Bulawayo, such companies include 
National Blankets, National Railways of Zimbabwe, Merlin, Cold Storage Commission and 
United Refineries. As a source of security and economic power, priority industries should be 
protected through measures such as subsidies, price distortions, and monopolies (Lin 2013). 
However, in Bulawayo the priority industries have been facing viability challenges for a long 





10.2.4.6 Regional patriotism 
  
Rekindling regional patriotism is one of the strategies that can be adopted in Bulawayo in order 
to revitalise the economy. Regional patriotism entails having dedicated and devoted business 
people to invest in the growth and development of the metropolis. Likewise, politicians, skilled 
workforce, and consumers should also be dedicated to support initiatives meant to revitalise the 
economy. Hill (2013) noted that the existence of a group of reformers referred to as the 
‘technocrats’ was behind the success of the economic reforms in Indonesia. While the reforms 
undertaken were driven by necessity instead of political gimmicks (Hill 2013), the ‘technocrats’ 
were passionate about achieving economic growth and development.  
 
10.3 CONCLUSIONS: REGIONAL ECONOMIC RESILIENCE IN THE SOUTH 
 
Notwithstanding the usage of the concept of resilience in different disciplines, it remains an 
elusive concept. In literature, its meaning is still subject to debate (Hill, Wial & Wolman 2008; 
Simmie & Martin 2010; Hill et al. 2011; Martin 2012; Breathnach, Van Egeraat & Curran 2014; 
Simmie 2014; Tóth 2015). The concept is regularly used in fields such as economics, social 
sciences, and regional or urban studies, however no universally agreed definition of the concept 
exists (Simmie & Martin 2010; Hill et al. 2011). Instead, it is multidimensional and has multiple 
meanings in different academic fields (Simmie 2014; Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016). The 
current study attempted to provide a conceptualisation of economic resilience in light of the 
African development context, indicating how it is similar or dissimilar to its conceptualisation in 
the North. As a way of conclusion, the study proposes a model for analysing economic resilience 
in metropolises in the South, specifically Zimbabwe. This model is mainly applicable to 
industrial metropolitan cities. The model displays the driving issues of economic resilience, the 






10.3.1 Analysing regional economic resilience in Global South metropolises 
 
The proposed model in Figure 10.1 shows the connectedness amongst major determinants of 
regional economic resilience in the industrial cities in Zimbabwe. Different relationships in the 
model are depicted by single and double-headed arrows. These arrows are used to depict a cause-
effect relationship. The origin of the arrow is assumed to be the cause and the destination of the 
arrow the effect. Single-headed arrows depict a one-way relationship whilst the double-headed 
arrows show a two-way relationship. An example of a one-way relationship is depicted by 
single-headed arrows originating from sub-factors under the Driving factors and linking them 
with Regional attributes. This means factors under the Regional attributes are affected by the 
sub-factors under the Driving factors. A two-way relationship is depicted by the linkages 
between Firm growth and development and Firm resilience strategies.  
 
10.3.1.1 Driving factors 
 
The analysis of regional economic resilience in industrial metropolises is driven by a set of three 
different factors, namely Background factors (such as international, historical, political, 
economic, social, and institutional), National policymaking and the Determinants of industrial 
growth. The relationship of Zimbabwe with the international community has affected foreign 
direct investment. Capital flight has partly been the resultant effect as the country has been 
considered a poor investment destination. As indicated in Chapter 6, the historical, political, and 
economic developments in the country have negatively affected economic resilience in 
Bulawayo.  
 
In terms of relationships, Background factors influence National policymaking and Determinants 
of industrial growth at both national and regional levels. As an example, economic and industrial 
policies implemented in Zimbabwe from independence have been heavily influenced by the 
country’s history, national politics, and international relations (see Chapters 4 and 6). Likewise, 
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These determinants include state and age of industrial machinery, available business finance and 
financing mechanisms, production costs, and the size of the market. The determinants were fully 
explained in Chapter 6, including their consequential effect on the economy of BMP. 
 
10.3.1.2 Processes involved 
 
The processes that influence economic resilience in industrial metropolises are Firm production 
processes, Competitiveness of firms & their products, Firm growth and development, and Firm 
resilience strategies. These processes are affected by National policymaking, Determinants of 
industrial growth and overall by Background factors. This study found that the production 
processes in Bulawayo are affected by worn-out and aging industrial machinery, high production 
costs, and market shrinkages, among other factors. Consequently, firms in the metropolis are 
struggling to compete with others whether in the region or globally. The pricing of goods is 
uncompetitive owing to high production costs. Therefore the goods are failing to compete with 
cheap imports sold in the market. Due to the economic recession, some firms downsized and 
relocated, while others closed down. Those that remained operational in BMP have adopted 
various strategies including products and/or services diversification, technological advancement, 
fostering industrial linkages, maintaining a broad customer base, strategic downsizing (reducing 
unnecessary expenses), and toll manufacturing. These strategies are fully explained in Chapter 7. 
The Processes involved influence Firm resilience, which is a major determinant of Regional 
economic resilience in industrial metropolitan regions such as Bulawayo. 
 
10.3.1.3 Regional attributes 
 
It emerged from the study that some of the factors that affect regional economic resilience are 
region specific. In Bulawayo, these factors were found to be the level of economic and industrial 
diversification, types and levels of firm linkages, the metropolis’ attractiveness to capital and 
skilled labour as well as firms from other regions, the state and level of infrastructural 




These factors have a direct effect on both firm and regional economic resilience as demonstrated 
in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. This study found that Regional attributes are influenced by the Driving 
factors. Thus the interaction of these two has an influence on the resilience outcomes in 
metropolitan cities. The economic base of Bulawayo is dominated by the manufacturing sector 
and the contribution of other sectors (tourism, agriculture and mining) to the metropolis’ export 
earnings is limited. Further diversification of the economic base is therefore a strategy option for 
economic resilience in BMP. 
 
10.3.1.4 The observed outcomes in metropolitan cities 
 
The proposed model shows Firm resilience and Regional economic resilience as the two 
observed outcomes. In Bulawayo, small firms are more resilient than large firms (see Chapter 7). 
Resilience at the firm level was measured using capacity utilisation and employment trends. The 
common type of resilience found among firms in Bulawayo is ‘resistance’. This covers firms that 
continually increased their employment or capacity utilisation levels and those that kept them 
constant in spite of the economic recession. Other firm resilience types that emerged from the 
study include recovery and reconfiguration (Martin 2012). Regional economic resilience in 
Bulawayo was measured using employment levels and the economy of the metropolis was found 
to be less resistant to economic recession than the national economy (see Chapter 9). Overall, it 
should be stressed that the model in Figure 10.1 is mainly applicable to the development context 
in Zimbabwe. However, the model can also be useful to other cities in the South, in which case, 
each metropolis should be evaluated and judged according to its own specific historical, political, 
and economic attributes. 
 
10.3.2 Re-conceptualising economic resilience in metropolises in the South 
 
The concept of resilience is fully discussed in Chapter 2. However, as a background to the 
debates presented in this chapter, an overview is given. Instead of focusing on resilience in its 




Other perspectives of resilience such as ‘engineering’ (Simmie & Martin 2010; Martin 2012; 
Wink 2012) and ‘ecological’ (Martin 2012) are not given due cognisance in this section.  
 
Regional economic resilience is a concept that can be perceived through different lenses 
including the ‘plucking model’, ‘hysteresis’, and ‘adaptive evolution’ (Simmie 2014). The 
‘plucking model’ defines resilience as the ‘bounce-back’ of an economy to its pre-shock growth 
path, while the ‘hysteresis’ approach defines resilience as an economy’s reaction to an external 
shock and the nature of the new development path that the economy takes due the shock’s 
immediate impact (Simmie 2014). The concept of ‘adaptive evolution’ as the third approach 
emanates from the theory of complex adaptive systems (Martin 2012; Simmie 2014). In this 
approach, regional economic resilience is taken to be the regional economy’s capacity to 
reconfigure and/or adapt its structure in terms of its industries, technologies, and institutions so 
that it is able to maintain sustainable growth levels in terms of output, employment, and wealth 
over a given period of time (Martin 2012). It is also worth noting that in literature there seems to 
be consensus that economic resilience is better conceptualised as a process (Turok 2014; Sensier, 
Bristow & Healy 2016) and resilience can be analysed at different levels, for example on 
individual, community, firm, sub-regional, regional, sub-national, and national levels (Vale 
2014; Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016).  
 
In terms of its definition, regional economic resilience in Zimbabwe is viewed in the same way 
as in the North. In agreement with Sensier, Bristow & Healy (2016), reflections on the study in 
Bulawayo showed that economic resilience is indeed better viewed as a process, with the shock 
and period of analysis, being clearly stated. However, resilience is better perceived through the 
‘hysteresis’ and ‘adaptive’ approaches but rarely the ‘plucking model’. This study revealed that 
although it is difficult, it is possible to find circumstances where an economy bounces back to its 
pre-shock growth level. This is evidenced by the employment levels in Bulawayo (presented in 
Chapter 9) and Zimbabwe (see Figure 10.2 and Figure 10.3) in general. The types of resilience 
shown are mainly ‘resistance’ and ‘reconfiguration’ as compared to a return to the pre-shock 
growth level. The same argument is also applicable to firm resilience (see Chapter 7). 




determined by how accurately it is measured. While in the North variables such as GDP per 
capita and employment trends are mainly used (Breathnach, Van Egeraat & Curran, 2015; 
Sensier, Bristow & Healy 2016; Giannakis & Bruggeman 2017), utilising the same presents 
challenges in the South. 
 
 
Source: ZIMSTAT (2019) 
Figure 10.2 Formal employment trends in Zimbabwe 2005-2018 
 
These variables may show economic resilience while in conflict with the actual situation on the 
ground. This cannot be clearly illustrated by employment levels in Bulawayo, however national 
employment and GDP per capita levels provide a clearer picture. Employment levels in Figure 
10.2 show that the economy of Zimbabwe is resilient. The trend shows resilience in the form of 
recovery starting from 2013 onwards. Apart from that, the GDP per capita trend line shown in 
Figure 10.3 also depicts that the economy of Zimbabwe is resilient. The trend shows continuous 
growth from 2009 to 2018 though the rate of growth decreases from 2013 onwards. 
 
In resilience thinking, the trends shown by Figures 10.2 and 10.3 are misleading. The economy 




2017).  This depicts a conflict between data and the scenario on the ground. This scenario has 
been foreseen by Tóth (2015: 73) who noted that: “One may imagine a situation, where 
‘objective’ data showed resilience, but inhabitants of an area and the local society do not express 
pleasure or satisfaction.” This is the case in Zimbabwe. The local citizens show a general lack of 
satisfaction (as presented by the findings in Chapters 6 to 9) with the economic trends in the 
country yet, the quantitative indicators show economic resilience. 
 
 
Source: ZIMSTAT (2019) 
Figure 10.3 GDP per capita trends in Zimbabwe 2009-2018 
 
The discrepancies can be explained in two ways. The low-quality data gathered in poor countries 
in the South (e.g. Zimbabwe) and possible manipulation of data by some governments may be 
behind this discrepancy. In the case of Bulawayo, the dearth of data restricted the analysis of 
economic resilience using GDP per capita and only employment trends could be utilised. Thus, 
measuring and analysing regional economic resilience is not a smooth process in the South, 
especially in Zimbabwe. While regional economic resilience can be defined and perceived 
through the lens of the North, its measurement and analysis should be different. Consideration 
should be given to the unique and region-specific attributes or determinants of regional economic 




The factors that influence regional resilience in Zimbabwe are partly similar to those in the 
North. However, regional patriotism was found to bear more weight in Bulawayo. The devotion 
amongst economic actors in a region is important in driving economic resilience. Regional 
patriotism is considered vital because, unlike in the North, systems in the South are still very 
much dependent on the people who control them. The political, economic, and social systems 
and institutions in Bulawayo are influenced by those who preside over them. As such, 
inculcating resilience thinking within actors controlling these systems and institutions, has a 
better chance of enhancing regional economic resilience. On the other hand, systems and 
institutions in the North have been in existence for long and have therefore matured. 
Accordingly, they are not easily influenced by those presiding over them.  
 
When resilience is analysed at firm level, it is not only the ability to resist or recover from a 
shock that should define firm resilience. This study found that downsizing is an important form 
of firm resilience in BMP. Firms may continually downsize for a long period of time until they 
reach an optimum level. Such firms are considered to be ‘resilient’ in BMP because those that 
are not resilient have totally collapsed. An example is Firm 4 (see Figure 7.3 in Chapter 7), 
which was one of the leading textile industries in Bulawayo but that was affected by the 
successive economic recessions in Zimbabwe since 1980 (see Chapter 4). In the course of re-
strategising, the firm downsized to a capacity utilisation level of 10% in 2009 and 2010. In 2011, 
the firm closed down its operations. However, the firm re-opened its doors in 2018 operating at a 
capacity utilisation of 5%. Firm 4 is therefore resilient. This is consistent with Gambe’s (2019) 
observations in Harare. He noted that although firms exhibited a downward trend in terms of 
their capacity utilisation and employment levels, they were able to ‘adapt’. Their adaptability 
was however viewed as the ability to continually operate in an environment where others totally 
shut down. Likewise, Firm 4 in the previous discussion, can be taken to have adapted to the 
changes in the economy. However its way of adapting entailed reducing capacity utilisation, 







10.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In Zimbabwe, the concept of resilience still remains difficult to measure accurately through 
quantitative indicators due to the dearth of data and its low quality. To measure and analyse 
regional economic resilience quantitative and also qualitative indicators must be used, including 
the level of motivation for resilience, regional patriotism, and the skill set among the economic 
actors in the region. These qualitative attributes, among other factors, have an influence on the 
performance of firms and other institutions important for regional economic resilience. 
 
10.4.1 Enhancing firm resilience strategies 
 
Firm resilience is one of the most important determinants of regional economic resilience 
(Martin 2012; Soroka et al. 2019). Accordingly, it is essential that firms in BMP improve their 
level of innovation and technological advancements. An improvement in innovation and 
technology has been, and still is, a necessity for competitiveness (Parthasarathy 1994; Ito & 
Weinstein 1996; Kimura 2009; Jhingan 2011) both regionally and globally. Firms in Bulawayo 
should work on technology transfers that can be achieved through international business 
linkages. As noted by Parthasarathy (1994), technological advancements can also be in the form 
of developing new technologies or by importing and adapting technology. Developing new 
technology is difficult for most firms in Bulawayo for now, hence importing and adapting 
technology from other countries should be endeavoured.  
 
10.4.2 Policymaking for regional economic resilience in Zimbabwe 
 
The policymaking process was found to be an important determinant of both firm and regional 
economic resilience. Accordingly, policymaking in Zimbabwe and its metropolitan cities should 
aim to serve the public interest.32 Besides, a clear separation of national and regional 
policymaking is recommended. For so long regional planning in Zimbabwe has been silent and 
                                                 




invisible in spite of its existence in statutes. It is therefore essential to operationalise regional 
planning in Zimbabwe so that regions are able to formulate and implement policies that are 
unique to their local settings. However, the study recommends that such regional and national 
policymaking processes should be complementary.  
 
Both national and regional policymaking in Zimbabwe should also be evidence-based. This 
recommendation emanates from the study findings on the deficiencies in regional data that 
informs policymaking. Examples include the lack of GDP data at provincial and metropolitan 
levels and data detailing the contribution of each sector in regional growth. These datasets are 
important for regional policymaking. As such a concerted effort by government departments, 
private firms, research institutes, and local authorities is needed to start building data bases 
consisting of ‘quality’ data that informs national and regional policymaking. Apart from that, 
there is a need to rethink industrial protectionism policies. In line with the findings of Ito & 
Weinstein (1996), government protection should be granted to firms in their infancy and also 
those operating in economically depressed regions such as Bulawayo. However, protection 
should be lifted once firms achieve competitiveness. 
 
10.4.3 Improving economic resilience in BMP 
 
Although the economic base of BMP is diversified it is dominated by manufacturing. This makes 
the economy vulnerable to shocks, especially those that threaten the manufacturing industry. 
Accordingly, further diversification of the economic base is imperative. Besides revitalising 
manufacturing, incentivising investments in other sectors is important. Such sectors include 
tourism, agriculture, and mining. As these sectors are already exporters, what is required is to 
improve their contribution to the regional export earnings. Duty-free importation of sophisticated 
industrial machines by investors in these sectors may help improve the export levels.   
 
Encouraging the linkages between formal and informal sector firms is also recommended as a 




existing backward and forward linkages. Besides that, it is also important to support strategically 
and financially cluster initiatives. An example is the Bulawayo Leather Cluster currently 
operational. Clusters have a positive influence on regional growth and development (Porter 
1990; 2000). Likewise, there is a need to promote MSMEs-based export growth. MSMEs 
constitute approximately 90% of the industries in Bulawayo. Accordingly, any growth strategy in 
the metropolis that is oblivious of this reality is likely to fail. Linked to this strategy is the 
investment in social overhead capital (Hirschman 1958). Social overhead investments 
recommended in Bulawayo are mainly in the energy and water sectors. Similarly, available 
industrial, transport, and the information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure 
need to be refurbished to suit the modern-day industry requirements. 
 
As a way of encouraging sustained economic growth and resilience in Bulawayo, the study 
recommends behaviour-change programmes or strategies meant to inculcate regional patriotism 
and resilience thinking within economic and social actors. These include investors, politicians (at 
all levels), skilled workers, and consumers. As in the case of Indonesia (Hill 2013), those 
presiding over firms and different institutions in Bulawayo should be passionate about achieving 
an economically resilient metropolis.  
 
10.5 AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 
Measuring regional economic resilience in the Global South requires adequate and reliable data. 
As such, there is a need for detailed research on the types of industrial machinery and 
infrastructure, and also the level of technological advancements in the industry in Bulawayo, as 
well as other cities and towns in Zimbabwe. This comprehensive study should focus on the levels 
of technology required versus what is currently available in the industry, the skillset necessary 
for industrial revitalisation, opportunities available for improving and expanding the services 
sector, and assess the opportunities for providing patient capital to MSMEs in the metropolis. 
The findings of such research should inform the kind of interventions required to resuscitate 
industrial activity in BMP and the country at large. Apart from this, there is also need for a 




relocation patterns of firms overtime explain firm resilience in Bulawayo. This study should 
indicate how different locations such as industrial areas, city centre, and suburban areas 
influence firm resilience patterns in the metropolis. In addition, a temporal analysis is required 
covering periods such as 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, in order to explain how the relocation patterns 
of MSMEs within Bulawayo influences firm resilience outcomes. A study of this nature will 
complement the current one and broaden the understanding of firm resilience and regional 
economic resilience in industrial metropolises.  
 
Further research on regional-based planning strategies is necessary as it can be useful in 
enhancing economic resilience in towns and cities in Zimbabwe. This study should initially focus 
on the contribution of each province to the economic performance of the country then examine 
the different region-specific opportunities that can improve regional growth and development. 
Furthermore, an analysis should be conducted to assess whether these region-specific 
opportunities support the adoption of a provincial government system similar to the one in South 
Africa. In general, the provincial government system is expected to invoke the desire to 
undertake practical regional-based planning and development in Zimbabwe. This justifies the 
need for research that details the nature and form the provincial government system should take 
and how this system is likely to improve the growth and development of regional economies in 
Zimbabwe. Finally, more research is still required focusing on ways to measure and properly 
conceptualise regional economic resilience in poor and data-deficient countries in the South. The 
gist should be on finding appropriate research methodologies that can be easily utilised in such 




Despite its complexity and elusiveness, the study has attempted to conceptualise economic 
resilience in industrial metropolises in a country in the Global South. The proposed model for 
analysing resilience in Zimbabwe has indicated the major factors behind such an analysis and 




resilience is also affected by policymaking processes and determinants of industrial growth at 
both national and regional levels. In analysing economic resilience in industrial cities, firm 
growth and development, production systems, and firm resilience strategies should be assessed. 
These processes have an influence on firm resilience, which is a key determinant of regional 
economic resilience. However, regional economic resilience is also affected by the concerned 
region’s attributes that include the level of economic and industrial diversification, types and 
levels of firm linkages, the region’s attractiveness to high-growth industries and skilled 
workforce, the level of social overhead investments, regional policy, and regional patriotism. 
 
Regional economic resilience in metropolises in Zimbabwe mainly takes the form of resistance 
and reconfiguration as compared to recovery. Findings in BMP indicated that prolonged and 
stepped downsizing at firm level is also considered a form of resilience. Firms can intentionally 
downsize over an extended period of time while reconfiguring themselves to adapt to shocks and 
recessions. While high-quality data in the North underpins the conceptualisation of regional 
economic resilience, the same is not the case in some countries in the South. An attempt to 
measure and analyse regional economic resilience quantitatively in Zimbabwe is marred by low-
quality data and data deficiencies. Accordingly, utilising mixed methods provides a better chance 
of success. Finally, regional patriotism is an important determinant of economic resilience that 
should be inculcated within those who preside over different systems and institutions operating 
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APPENDIX A: ECONOMIC RESILIENCE OUTCOMES 
 
A region recovers and returns to pre-shock growth trend. 
 
(a) Permanent decline in level followed by pre-recession growth rate. (b) Permanent decline in level followed by 
lowered growth rate. 
 
(a) Recovery to higher level exceeding pre-shock growth rate. (b) Recovery to a sustained higher growth rate 
exceeding pre-shock growth. 







APPENDIX B: MAIN POLICY INTERVENTIONS IN ZIMBABWE 1980-2018 
Policy/Programme Main Objective/Key Strategies Main Effects 
Growth with Equity 
(GWE) 1981. 
 High rate of economic growth averaging 8% over 
a 3 year period. 
 Address social & economic imbalances 
(redistribution of incomes & land). 
 Lure FDI by allowing investors to repatriate 50% 
of profits. 
 Remarkable improvement in health 
& educational facilities. 
 FDI levels below expectation. 
 Budget deficits. 





 Achieve a new society anchored on equality in 
terms of economic opportunities & prosperity for 
all Zimbabweans. 
 Achieve an economic growth rate of 8% and 
reduce inflation to around 15%. 
 Plan abandoned due to drought. 
 Targets (economic growth & 
inflation) not met. 
 Low levels of export earnings 
though moderate economic growth 
was recorded. 




 Develop an egalitarian and socialist society in 
Zimbabwe. 
 To achieve an economic growth of 5.1%. 
 Improve the standards of living of the entire 
population. 
 Increase employment opportunities and 
manpower development. 
 Promote the development of science and 
technology. 
 Growth targets not met. 
 Low rate of economic growth. 
 Improvement in public 








 To promote market-led economic development in 
Zimbabwe while at the same time stimulating 
productive investment, employment and exports. 
 Reducing government budget deficit. 
 Removing barriers on international trade in order 
to promote increased competition. 
 The removal of stringent domestic controls on 
for example prices, labour and wages. 
 
 
 Budget deficits remained high 
thereby increasing inflation. 
 High interest rates.  
 Unemployment soared while textile 





 To revive the economy through supporting 
export production. 
 To attract foreign direct investment. 
 Offering tax exemptions and duty-free imports of 
mainly capital goods and raw materials. 
 The policy failed to boost economic 
growth in the country due to 
continued existence of government 
restrictions. 









 Addressing the ills of ESAP by restoring macro-
economic stability & encouraging growth 
through utilising public and private savings. 
 Promoting economic empowerment and 
reduction of poverty. 
 Reduction of budget deficits & inflation levels.  
 Promoting an improvement in domestic savings. 
 The contribution of savings & 
investments to GDP decreased from 
an average of 18% in 1996 to 9% 
and 13% in 1999. 
 Export growth measured in US$ 
terms declined from 12% in 1996 to 
(-20%) in 1999. 
 Foreign exchange reserves declined 
from 4.2 months cover in 1995 to a 





APPENDIX B CONTINUED 
Policy/Programme Main Objective/Key Strategies Main Effects 




 Redress land imbalances in terms of ownership 
created by the colonial rule. 
 Acquisition of 8.3 million hectares targeting 
resettlement of 160 000 families in A1 model and 
54 000 families in the A2 model. 
 Empower indigenous Zimbabweans by giving 
them access to rich fertile land. 
 200 000 farm workers (i.e. 
approximately two thirds of total 
farm work-force at the time) lost 
their jobs. 
 About 90% of white commercial 
farmers lost their farms to the 
state by 2002. 
 Massive decline in agricultural 
output. 






 Achieve an all-stakeholder effort in implementing 
reforms that would restore macro-economic 
stability. 
 Restoration of vibrant economic growth and 
curtailing corruption.  
 A reduction of the budget deficit to 3.8% of GDP 
& spending 25% of total expenditure on capital 
projects.  
 Creating institutions that oversee implementation, 
accountability and monitoring of the policies. 
 The economy continued to 
decline. 
 The percentages of the total 
budget that were set aside for 
capital projects from 2000 to 
2003 remained way below 25%, 
ranging around 8%, 4%, 8.1% 
and 11.7% respectively. 
Ten Point Plan (TPP) 
2001. 
 
 Linking land occupations that took place after 
2000 to the broader economic framework. 
 Promoting economic growth driven by agriculture 
and indigenous capital accumulation. 
 No recovery in the economy. 
 Industrial closures. 
 Emergence of a black-elite 
group enjoying preferential 
treatment from government. 




 To restore economic stability & provide 
humanitarian support to the general citizens.  
 The plan allowed the importation of basic food 
items such as maize and wheat duty free.  
 Introducing an export support exchange rate and 
easing price controls. 
 Devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar. 
 
 Continued economic decline. 
 Partial liberalisation of 
commodity prices. 
 Failure to boost gold & tobacco 






 To improve the participation of the indigenous 
people in the national economy through increased 
business ownership.  
 Promoting economic empowerment of indigenous 
Zimbabweans through reserving for them 51% 
shareholding in public companies or any other 
business operating in Zimbabwe. 
 Industrial closures. 
 Flight of foreign investors. 
 Continued economic decline. 










APPENDIX B CONTINUED 
Policy/ 
Programme 







 To stabilise the macro- and micro-economy, recover the 
levels of savings, investment and growth, and lay the basis 
of a more transformative mid-term to long-term economic 
programme. 
 Implementing land audits and addressing security of 
tenure. 
 To increase capacity utilisation in manufacturing sector.  
 Encouraging value addition and beneficiation.  
 Set up external lines of credit to allow actors in the 
tourism sector to access working capital, undertake 
rehabilitation of infrastructure, and import capital 
equipment. 
 A multi-currency system was 
introduced.  
 Moderate economic growth 
witnessed as investor 
confidence improved. 
 Increased capacity utilisation 
and improved agricultural 
output. 
 Increased Value Added Tax 
collections by government from 
US$435 578 in February 2009 








 Sustaining macro-economic stabilisation and 
consolidating STERP. 
 The restoration of basic services. 
 Promote foreign investment complemented by domestic 
savings and investment that is above 20% of the GDP. 
 Restoration of international relations - lobbying for the 
removal of sanctions and other restrictive measures 
imposed against the country. 
 STERP II failed to achieve 
most of its intended objectives. 
 Constitutional reforms were not 
concluded. 
 The restoration of key services 
has failed as power and water 
cuts have worsened. 
 Restrictive measures against the 









 To achieve sustainable development and social equity 
anchored on indigenisation, empowerment, and 
employment creation. 
 Implementing the Presidential Agricultural Input Support 
Scheme to address issues of food security and nutrition.  
 Building and rehabilitating infrastructure and utilities as 
drivers of economic growth.  
 Establishment of diamond cutting and polishing centres 
and also agro-processing projects such canning of fruits 
and vegetables. 
 Promoting ease of doing business in all sectors by 
reducing unnecessary delays and creating one stop shops. 
 Zim Asset failed to turn around 
the economy. 
 Progress has been witnessed in 
the distribution of agricultural 
inputs though still biased 
towards political lines. 
 A few infrastructural projects 
completed e.g. Mutare-
Plumtree highway. 







 Stabilising the macro-economy, and the financial sector. 
 Introducing necessary policy, and institutional reforms, to 
transform the country to a private sector-led economy. 
 Opening up the economy for business by improving the 
ease of doing business and re-engaging international 
investors and financiers. 
 Upholding the rule of law, human, and property rights. 
 Revive industry through implementing Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs). 
 Policy still ongoing however 
currently not much has be 
witnessed in terms of economic 
growth. 
 Removal of the multi-currency 
system. 
 Increase in inflation levels. 
Source: Bratton (1981); UNDP (1986: 6); Zaaijer (1998); Bhalla et al. (1999); ZHDR (2000); Sachikonye (2003); 
OECD & AfDB (2004); Raftopoulos & Phimister (2004); GoZ (2009); GoZ (2010); Zhou & Zvoushe 






APPENDIX C: CLASSIFICATION OF MSMEs IN ZIMBABWE  
Sector or Sub-
sector of Economy  
Size or Class  Maximum total 
number of full time 
paid employees  
Maximum total 
annual turnover $  
Maximum gross value 
of assets (excluding 
immovable property) $  






1 000 000  
500 000  
30 000  
500 000  
250 000  











1 000 000  
500 000  
30 000  
500 000  
250 000  
10 000  








3 000 000  
1 500 000  
50 000  
2 000 000  
1 000 000  
50 000  






1 000 000  
500 000  
30 000  
1 000 000  
500 000  
10 000  






2 000 000  
1 000 000  
50 000  
2 000 000  
1 000 000  
10 000  






2 000 000  
1 000 000  
50 000  
1 000 000  
500 000  
10 000  






1 000 000  
500 000  
30 000  
500 000  
250 000  
10 000  






1 000 000  
500 000  
30 000  
500 000  
250 000  
10 000  






1 000 000  
500 000  
30 000  
500 000  
250 000  
10 000  








1 000 000  
500 000  
30 000  
500 000  
250 000  
10 000  






1 000 000  
500 000  
30 000  
500 000  
250 000  
10 000  














APPENDIX D: INDUSTRIAL SECTOR RANKING IN BMP 
Rank Industrial sector Description  
1 Mining and engineering Top exporter earner in 2016. High potential in terms of old 
infrastructure, good transportation network (road & rail) – 
movement of coal, raw materials from Hwange & Midlands. 
Proximity to supply engineering parts to mines in Matabeleland 
and Midlands. Value addition processing of steel products and 
minerals (Lithium). 
2 Beef and leather industry Beef supplied to abattoirs (CSC & others) then to canning industry 
and hides to leather sector. 
3 Textile and clothing industry Industries supplied with cotton and produce yarn and fabric – to be 
supplied to the clothing sub-sector. 
4 Rubber and plastics  Conveyors and plastic products will be needed in the revived 
manufacturing sector. 
5 Agro-industry To produce stock-feeds to support beef in the region. 
6 Pharmaceuticals Take advantage of infrastructure already existing. 
7 Education, innovation and research 
hub 
Tertiary institutions available e.g. NUST, Bulawayo Polytechnic, 
School of Mines. 
8 Transportation (Logistics) Rail and road available to move raw materials and finished 
products in and out of Bulawayo. Intra-city movements will be 
need in and out of Special Economic Zones. 
9 Creative arts and culture industries  Bulawayo regarded as one of the main cultural hubs in Zimbabwe. 
10 Wood and furniture Availability of raw materials in surrounding areas e.g. Lupane. 
11 Printing and packaging Packaging will be needed for a revived agro-industry. 
12 Tourism and hospitality Availability of mainly conferences and exhibition centres. 
13 Energy and water Consistent power and water supply is needed for reviving the 
industry. 
14 Infrastructure Refurbishments and new infrastructure needed. 
15 Mineral value-addition Taking advantages of the mines in areas surrounding Bulawayo. 




























































































APPENDIX G: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS 
                      
 
Dear Respondent, my name is Tazviona Richman Gambe. I am a PhD student in the Department of Geography and 
Environmental Science at Stellenbosch University. Currently, I am undertaking research regarding economic 
resilience in Bulawayo metropolitan region. The research specifically investigates economic and industrial decline 
and deglomeration. Based on your involvement in the industrial sector in Bulawayo metropolis, you have been 
selected to provide your views on this subject. I am kindly asking you to complete this questionnaire. All 
information obtained will be handled in strict confidence and used only for educational purposes, and participants 
will remain anonymous. The first section deals with information pertaining to your organisation as a participant. The 
second section focuses on the operational challenges you are facing while the third one covers your organisation’s 
contribution to the economy of Bulawayo metropolitan region. The fourth section deals with how economic and/or 
industrial policies have affected your business operations and the final section seeks to understand your perception 
on economic resilience. 
Please tick the appropriate response. 
1. Business Characteristics   
1.1. Respondent’s position in the organisation [     ] Owner             [     ] Director                   [     ] CEO     
[     ] Senior manager       [     ] Junior manager 
 
1.2. The business/company’s year of establishment in Zimbabwe? [     ] Before 1980          [     ]1980-1989          
[     ]1990-1999        [     ] 2000-2009          [     ] 2010-2018 
 
1.3. The year your organisation started operating in Bulawayo?      [     ] Before 1980                [     ] 1980-1989   
[     ] 1990-1999        [    ] 2000-2009         [    ] 2010-2018 
1.4. Kindly indicate any 1 or 2 factors that mainly influenced you to locate in Bulawayo metropolitan region?  
Tax incentives   
Availability of a market  
Expansion strategy (had other branches in some cities)  
Location closer to raw materials   
Locating closer to other industries (purchasers & suppliers)  
Business owners stay in Bulawayo  
Low costs of transport and communication  
Availability of cheap labour  
Availability of land suitable for company operations  
 
1.5. Business ownership type     [     ] Fully local        [     ] Fully foreign        [      ] Partnership (local & 
foreign) 
1.6. Category of business ownership [      ] Private        [     ] Public               [      ] Mixed (private & public)  
1.7. Total number of employees   [     ]1-20        [     ] 21-40         [     ] 41-60        [     ] 61-80      [     ] 81-100   
[    ] Above 100 




1.9. Kindly highlight your subsector by ticking the appropriate box below: 
 
Chemical and petroleum products  
Textiles, clothing   
Drinks and beverages  
Foodstuffs  
Metal and metal products  
Non metallic mineral products  
Paper, printing and packaging  
Transport equipment, transport logistics  
Wood and furniture  
Pharmaceutical products  
Computer and software   
Information and communication technology (telecoms)  
Financial and insurance services   
Film and entertainment   
Construction industry  
Agribusiness (fishing, timber, tobacco, honey)  
Mining industry (minerals, quarry)  
Rubber and allied products  
Leather products and services  
Customs clearing services and logistics  
 
2. Operational challenges 
2.1. Kindly indicate your capacity utilisation33 levels in percentages from 2009 to 2018.  
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
          
 
 
2.2. Kindly indicate the number of your full time employees (including those with contracts of at least one year) 
from 2009 to 2018. 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
          
 
2.3. Have you been experiencing industrial decline: 
Over the past 10 years? [      ] Yes                 [       ] No 
Over the past 5 years?    [      ] Yes                 [       ] No 
Over the past year? [      ] Yes                 [       ] No 
2.3.1. If your answer is yes, kindly indicate below 3 types of decline you have experienced most 
 10 year period 5 year period 1 year period 
Producing less goods than before    
Reduction in export levels    
Reduction in employment levels (loss of skilled labour)     
Reduction in capacity utilisation    
                                                 
33 Capacity utilisation is used here to mean [(real/actual output/potential output) x 100]. In other words, is your organisation operating at 




Closure of some branches in and outside Bulawayo    
A decrease in the competitiveness of goods and services    
Stagnation or decrease in revenue    
Outdated and worn out business infrastructure    
A decrease in profit margins    
 
2.3.2. How has the economic decline in Zimbabwe affected your business operations? (Only tick 5 that are 
most applicable to your organisation) 
Reduced labour productivity levels  
Reduced employment levels  
Untimely payment of salaries  
Inability to access cash needed in daily operations  
Inability to import inputs   
Inability to service our business loans  
Loss of the regional & global market share  
Reduced profit levels  
Political intervention   
Relocation of investors that were business partners  
Purchasing power of our savings eroded due to currency reforms  
Lost skilled labour force  
Erratic power supplies  
Erratic water supplies  
 
2.3.3. Kindly highlight how you managed to overcome/you are trying to overcome the challenges you 
highlighted above (Tick only 4 best strategies you adopted) 
Diversification of products/services (offering new products &services)  
Adoption of new technology in the production of goods and services  
Networking/strategic alliances with other industries/companies doing well   
Utilising the company’s reserve foreign exchange for purchasing inputs not locally available  
Broad customer base kept the organisation in business   
Downsizing as a copying strategy (reducing unnecessary expenses)  
Disinvesting in other investments (including closing other branches or outlets) and focus on the main company  
A stronger control on the organisation’s cash flow  
Joining mergers created by declining industries/companies  
Relocation of some branches to locations outside the country so that they help support those local  
Using a US dollar-based pricing system to avoid losses through currency reforms  
 
2.4.   How do you rate the need for foreign currency in your operations?    [     ] Very low          [     ] Low                
[     ] High               [     ] Very high               [     ] N/A 
2.4.1. If foreign currency is needed, are you able to get enough supplies for your operations?     
 [    ] Yes                     [     ] No 
If your answer is No, explain…………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
3. Revitalising the economy of Bulawayo metropolitan province 
3.1. What percentage of your goods and services is consumed in Bulawayo?   [     ]1-20    [     ]21-40   [     ]41-








3.2. What percentage of your goods and services is consumed outside Bulawayo but within Zimbabwe?    





3.3. What percentage of your goods and services is consumed outside Zimbabwe?   [     ] 1-20        [     ] 21-40    




   
3.4. What is the relationship between your exports and imports34?       [     ] Exports more than imports     
[     ] Exports less than imports     [     ] Exports equal to imports     [     ] N/A 
3.5. In terms of competitiveness, how do you rate your goods and services against imports?            [     ] Low         




3.6. What are the 3 key reforms that you think are needed within your organisation to boost your operations? 
Staff development programmes  
Improve tools of work (vehicles, machines etc)  
Efficient utilisation of technology   
Efficient system of incentives and rewards for performing employees  
Clarification of roles and tasks  
Promotion of proper monitoring and evaluation systems  
Strict financial control and management  
N/A  
 
3.7. In your opinion, what do you think are the 3 major factors that are mainly behind the closure of industries 
in Bulawayo metropolis? 
High costs of doing business  
Acute shortages of raw materials  
Poor availability of foreign exchange   
Unstable/unfavourable government policies  
Poor business management  
Shrinking market opportunities  
Disagreements amongst the shareholders  
Political instability rendering the business environment risky  
Stiff competition from illegal businesses/smuggled &/or cheap imports  
 
                                                 
34 Imports and exports may be taken to mean production inputs and outputs for manufacturing industries. However, for other industries such as 




3.8. Which of the following 2 actions by the Bulawayo Metropolitan Municipality will most positively 
influence the revival of industrial activity in the metropolis?   
Lower the level of rates and taxes paid by industries  
Developing modern industrial parks meant for export production  
Provide adequate and strategic work space for formal & informal industries   
Overall upgrade of urban infrastructure that support business growth  
Improve the provision of municipal services such as water etc  
Effective and efficient management of urban systems e.g. transport networks  
 
3.9. Do you think your organisation can benefit from Special Economic Zones (SEZs) being currently set up 





3.10. Do you have any business linkages with other industries within Bulawayo metropolis?     
[     ] Yes                           [     ] No 
 
3.10.1. If your answer is yes, what form of linkages are they? 
We are suppliers of goods and services  
We purchase goods and services  
Sharing knowledge and technology transfers  
Outsourcing (we hire them)  
Outsourcing (they hire us)   
We provide business capital to them  
We borrow business finance from them  
We share the same production infrastructure (roads, railways, power grids etc)  
 
3.11. Do you have any business linkages with other industries outside Bulawayo metropolis but within 
Zimbabwe?     [     ]Yes               [     ]No 
3.11.1. If your answer is yes, what form of linkages are they?  
We are suppliers of goods and services  
We purchase goods and services  
Sharing knowledge and technology transfers  
Outsourcing (we hire them)  
Outsourcing (they hire us)   
We provide business capital to them  
We borrow business finance from them  
We share the same production infrastructure (roads, railways, power grids etc)  
 
3.12. Do you have any business linkages with other industries/organisations outside Zimbabwe     
[     ] Yes                    [     ] No 
 
3.12.1. If your answer is yes, what form of linkages are they?  
We are suppliers of goods and services  
We purchase goods and services  




Outsourcing (we hire them)  
Outsourcing (they hire us)   
We provide business capital to them  
We borrow business finance from them  
We share the same production infrastructure (roads, railways, power grids etc)  
 
3.13. Do you have any linkages with tertiary institutions?       [      ] Yes                   [      ] No 
3.13.1. If your answer is yes, kindly tick the applicable answer below, 
Tertiary institutions in Bulawayo  
Tertiary institutions outside Bulawayo but in Zimbabwe  
Tertiary institutions outside Zimbabwe  
 
3.13.2. If your answer to 3.13 is no, explain………………………………………………………………... 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
3.13.3. If your answer to 3.13 is yes, what benefits do you get from such linkages? 
Staff training and development  
Research on product standardisation & improvement  
Research on production systems improvements   
Research on new products & ways of doing business  
Sharing infrastructure (science labs, technology hubs in universities etc)   
 
3.14. Do you have any business linkages with the agricultural sector (if not in that sector)? [     ]Yes      [     ] No 
 
3.14.1. If your answer is yes, what are the linkages?  
We purchase inputs from this sector  
We sell our output to this sector  
We conduct research and development for this sector  
We supply business capital to this sector  
We service and repair tools used in this sector  
We link businesses/people in this sector to export markets  
 
3.15. Do you have any business linkages with the extractive sector [mining] (if not in that sector)?  
[      ] Yes             [      ] No 
 
3.15.1. If your answer is yes, what are the linkages?  
We purchase inputs from this sector  
We sell our output to this sector  
We conduct research and development for this sector  
We supply business capital to this sector  
We service and repair tools used in this sector  
We link the businesses in this sector to export markets  
 
4. The Influence of Industrial/Economic Policy on Industrial Activity 
4.1. Which of the following economic and industrial policies are you familiar with? 
Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP 1) [2009 -2010]  
Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP 2) [2010 -2012]  
Medium Term Plan (2011-2015)  
Industrial Development Policy (2012-2016).  
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset) (2013 to 2018)  




SI 64 of 2016 and/or SI 122 of 2017  
Transitional Stabilisation Programme (2018-2020)  
None  
 
4.2. How do you rate the economic and industrial policies that have been implemented in Zimbabwe from 





4.3. From the following policies implemented by government from 2009 to 2018, kindly indicate any 3 that 
resulted in the most positive benefits to your business operations?  
Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP 1) [2009 -2010]  
Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP 2) [2010 -2012]  
Medium Term Plan (2011-2015)  
Industrial Development Policy (2012-2016).  
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset) (2013 to 2018)  
10-Point Plan for Economic Growth (2015)  
SI 64 of 2016 and/or SI 122 of 2017  
Transitional Stabilisation Programme (2018-2020)  
None   
 
 
4.3.1. Kindly indicate 3 positive benefits accrued from the policies you highlighted in Question 4.3,  
Protection from stiff competition posed by cheap imports  
Increased output  
Reduced operation costs (reduced taxes and costs of services)  
Increased access to business finance  
Increased partnerships as FDI increases  
Widening market opportunities  
Security of company profits and other resources  
Expansion of the company (Increased employment levels, capacity utilisation)  
Improved access to foreign currency (mainly for imports)  
None     
 
4.4. From the following policies implemented by government from 2009 to 2018, kindly indicate any 3 that 
have mostly influenced your business operations in a negative way?  
Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP 1) [2009 -2010]  
Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP 2) [2010 -2012]  
Medium Term Plan (2011-2015)  
Industrial Development Policy (2012-2016).  
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim Asset) (2013 to 2018)  
10-Point Plan for Economic Growth (2015)  
SI 64 of 2016 and/or SI 122 of 2017  
Transitional Stabilisation Programme (2018-2020)  
None  
 
4.4.1. Kindly indicate 3 negative effects that mostly affected your business, due to the policies you have 
highlighted in Question 4.4  
Failure to withstand stiff competition from cheap imports  
Reduced production output  
An increase in the cost of doing business in the Bulawayo and Zimbabwe as a whole  




Unable to acquire raw materials from other countries  
Shrinking market opportunities  
Erosion of company finances due to high inflation levels  
Scarcity of foreign exchange  
Downsizing (reduced capacity utilisation, reduced employment levels etc)  
Closure of some branches in and outside Bulawayo metropolis  
None     
 
4.5. Which are the 2 most important actions that can be adopted by central government to make economic and 
industrial policies promote rather than hinder business growth and development? 
Government should avoid politicisation of policies (during crafting and implementation)  
Adequate research should be undertaken before policies are crafted and implemented  
The policies should protect industries/companies from cheap imports  
Implementation of policies should be in earnest, with provisions be adhered to  
The policies should not enable government to erode companies’ financial assets  
Government should make sure that the policies guarantee availability of business finance 
(foreign currency should be available to companies in need) 
 
Needs of intended beneficiaries should be taken into account when crafting policies  
 
4.6. Do you think industries in Bulawayo need to be protected by government (from goods and services 
imported from other countries) for them to regain their former glory?     [     ] Yes                 [     ] No 
 
4.7. Were you affected in any way by the recent suspension of the policy that prohibits the importation of basic 
commodities into the country?      [     ] Yes                     [     ] No 
 
 
4.7.1. If your answer is yes, kindly indicate 2 effects that are most applicable to your organisation. 
Increased competition from imports that have lower prices  
Increased competition from local organisations that repackage and sell the commodities  
Reduced volume of sales   
Increased competition from informal traders selling import commodities at lower prices  
Reduced profit margins   
Reduced capacity utilisation (reduced production output)  
Inability to service business loans due to poor sales  
 
5. Rethinking Regional Economic Resilience 
 
5.1. Do you think it possible for your business to continually achieve productivity growth in the face of 
economic decline?           [     ] Yes                [     ] No  
 
5.1.1. Additional comments………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
5.2. Do you think it is possible for your organisation to retain its previous capacity utilisation and employment 











INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR BULAWAYO METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY  
1. Kindly comment on the level of investment in the metropolis by high growth, innovative and 
profitable industries? 
2. In terms of city planning and local economic development planning, what are you doing (or 
have you done from 2009 to date) to improve the attractiveness of Bulawayo metropolis as a 
potential business destination? 
3. What is your opinion on the level of municipal services provision to industries in your area of 
jurisdiction? 
4. Kindly comment on the changes in the ratio of formal and informal industries in the 
metropolis from 2009 to date. 
5. From your perspective, how has the industrial closures, downsizings and displacements 
affected you as the local authority and also the residents of Bulawayo metropolis? 
6. Have the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that were set up by government, had an impact on 
the revival of industries in Bulawayo metropolis? 
 
 





















INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CONFEDERATION OF ZIMBABWE INDUSTRIES  
 
1. Could you briefly explain the changes in your membership numbers in Bulawayo 
metropolis from 2009 to the current day? (How many industries closed down, relocated 
and how many are still operating in the area?). 
2. What do you consider to be the causes (or reasons cited by those industries that closed 
down) of the industrial decline and displacement in Bulawayo metropolis from 2009 to 
date? 
3. How, historically and presently, has the CZI assisted industries in Bulawayo metropolis 
to remain operational taking into account the current economic decline? 
4. Of all the industries that are your members in Bulawayo metropolis, which industrial 
sector do you consider to be performing better than others? (What might be the reason for 
that?). 
5. Could you briefly comment on the changes in the industries amongst your members in 
Bulawayo metropolis that are foreign-owned from 2009 to date? 
6. From all your member industries currently operating in Bulawayo metropolis, what is the 
percentage (i.e. of industries) that exports goods and services? 
 
 

















INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF 
ZIMBABWE 
1. What programmes/mechanisms have you implemented from 2009 to date, to promote the 
development of new industries in Zimbabwe? 
2. What programmes have you implemented in the past 10 years to assist in the modernisation 
of existing industries? 
3. What are you doing (or have done from 2009 to date) to promote the competitiveness of local 
industries especially against foreign industries? 
4. What new skills and expertise do you think are required in Zimbabwe in order to get the 
industries working again? 
5. What programmes have you implemented so far to attract foreign investment in the country? 
(How successful were they?). 
6. I understand you have control of enterprises in which you have invested, what is your 
comment on their level of performance taking into account the current economic hardships? 
7. How have you managed to keep the companies you run, operational while the majority of the 
companies/industries have been shutting down? 
 
 



















INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE  
1. What do you think have been the major factors behind industrial closures and shrinkages 
from 2009 to date? 
 
2. What industrial policies and/or strategic frameworks have you developed from 2009 to date, 
in order to promote industrial and commercial growth in Zimbabwe? 
 
3. In what ways were the policies and/or strategic frameworks highlighted in question 2 above 
beneficial to industries and businesses in Zimbabwe? 
 
4. What have you done to promote entrepreneurship in economically depressed regions such as 
Bulawayo metropolis? 
 
5. What have you done from 2009 to date, to make sure that local industries benefit from trade 
and trade relations with foreign countries and businesses? 
 
6. What have you done from 2009 to date, to help industries that are currently operational 



























INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MINISTRY OF WOMEN AFFAIRS, COMMUNITY, SMALL 
AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT 
1. May you kindly comment on the role of informal industries and/or businesses in the 
economic development of cities and towns in Zimbabwe. 
2. What policies have you formulated and implemented to help micro, small and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs) thrive in face of economic decline currently prevailing? 
3. What are the infrastructural facilities that you have provided from 2009 to date, in order to 
promote the growth of MSMEs in Zimbabwe in general and Bulawayo metropolis 
specifically? 
4. What programmes/mechanisms have you put in place to make sure that MSMEs are able to 
develop into full grown industries/businesses that export their goods and services? 
5. Since the Ministry promotes the formation and development of clusters, business linkages 
and association for MSMEs, how have these mechanisms assisted MSMEs to remain 
operational in light of the current economic decline in the country? 
6. What is your comment on the sustainability of the financing schemes you develop for micro, 
small and medium enterprises development? 
7. What have been the benefits of the skills, entrepreneurship and management trainings that 
that you conduct to support the growth of MSMEs? 
8. Since you maintain and update a data base of MSMEs in Zimbabwe, kindly comment the 
change in their numbers from 2009 to date. 
 















INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ZIMBABWE INVESTMENT AUTHORITY 
1. Kindly comment on the level of business investment in Bulawayo highlighting the mix 
ratios of foreign versus local investment. 
2. What are the strategies that you have implemented from 2009 to date, to encourage 
investment in Bulawayo metropolis by both domestic and foreign investors. 
3. May you kindly comment on the changes in the number of investment applications you 
have processed in Bulawayo metropolis from 2009 to the current date. 
4. Which industrial sector in Bulawayo metropolis has received the most investment 
applications from 2009 to date? (What could be the explanation for that?). 
5. In your opinion, what are the reasons for the flight of foreign business investors from 
Zimbabwe in general and Bulawayo metropolis specifically from 2009 onwards? 
6. What have you done to encourage and promote the growth of business investments 

























INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ZIMBABWE NATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
 
1. Could you briefly explain the changes in your membership numbers in Bulawayo 
metropolis from 2009 to the current day? (How many industries closed down, relocated 
and how many are still operating in the area?). 
2. What do you consider to be the causes (or reasons cited by those industries that closed 
down) of the industrial decline and displacement in Bulawayo metropolis from 2009 to 
date? 
3. How, historically and presently, has the ZNCC assisted industries in Bulawayo 
metropolis to remain operational taking into account the current economic decline? 
4. Of all the industries that are your members in Bulawayo metropolis, which industrial 
sector do you consider to be performing better than others? (What might be the reason for 
that?). 
5. Could you briefly comment on the changes in the industries amongst your members in 
Bulawayo metropolis that are foreign-owned from 2009 to date? 
6. From all your member industries currently operating in Bulawayo metropolis, what is the 




Thank You for Your Time and Cooperation! 
 
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
